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Designing and Optimizing Matching Markets
Irene Lo
Matching market design studies the fundamental problem of how to allocate scarce resources
to individuals with varied needs. In recent years, the theoretical study of matching markets such
as medical residency, public housing and school choice has greatly informed and improved the
design of such markets in practice. Impactful work in matching market design frequently makes
use of techniques from computer science, economics and operations research to provide end–to-
end solutions that address design questions holistically. In this dissertation, I develop tools for
optimization in market design by studying matching mechanisms for school choice, an important
societal problem that exemplifies many of the challenges in effective marketplace design.
In the first part of this work I develop frameworks for optimization in school choice that allow
us to address operational problems in the assignment process. In the school choice market, where
scarce public school seats are assigned to students, a key operational issue is how to reassign
seats that are vacated after an initial round of centralized assignment. We propose a class of
reassignment mechanisms, the Permuted Lottery Deferred Acceptance (PLDA) mechanisms, which
generalize the commonly used Deferred Acceptance school choice mechanism and retain its desirable
incentive and efficiency properties. We find that under natural conditions on demand all PLDA
mechanisms achieve equivalent allocative welfare, and the PLDA based on reversing the tie-breaking
lottery during the reassignment round minimizes reassignment. Empirical investigations on data
from NYC high school admissions support our theoretical findings. In this part, we also provide
a framework for optimization when using the prominent Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism.
We show that the TTC assignment can be described by admission cutoffs, which explain the role
of priorities in determining the TTC assignment and can be used to tractably analyze TTC. In a
large-scale continuum model we show how to compute these cutoffs directly from the distribution of
preferences and priorities, providing a framework for evaluating policy choices. As an application of
the model we solve for optimal investment in school quality under choice and find that an egalitarian
distribution can be more efficient as it allows students to choose schools based on idiosyncracies in
their preferences.
In the second part of this work, I consider the role of a marketplace as an information provider
and explore how mechanisms affect information acquisition by agents in matching markets. I pro-
vide a tractable “Pandora’s box” model where students hold a prior over their value for each school
and can pay an inspection cost to learn their realized value. The model captures how students’
decisions to acquire information depend on priors and market information, and can rationalize a
student’s choice to remain partially uninformed. In such a model students need market information
in order to optimally acquire their personal preferences, and students benefit from waiting for the
market to resolve before acquiring information. We extend the definition of stability to this partial
information setting and define regret-free stable outcomes, where the matching is stable and each
student has acquired the same information as if they had waited for the market to resolve. We show
that regret-free stable outcomes have a cutoff characterization, and the set of regret-free stable out-
comes is a non-empty lattice. However, there is no mechanism that always produces a regret-free
stable matching, as there can be information deadlocks where every student finds it suboptimal to
be the first to acquire information. In settings with sufficient information about the distribution
of preferences, we provide mechanisms that exploit the cutoff structure to break the deadlock and
approximately implement a regret-free stable matching.
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The allocation of scarce resources is a fundamental societal problem. Whether we are assigning
tenants to public housing, medical supplies and donations to recipients, or children to schools and
foster care, many of the important problems in modern-day society involve distributing a limited
supply of goods to human beings with varied and competing needs. As such, the effective design
of assignment processes requires not only operational and algorithmic tools, but also a sensitivity
to economic incentives and societal influences. Indeed, in many of these applications we wish to
assign goods to strategic users who have private information about their preferences, while accom-
modating societal aversions to using money to redistribute goods and incentivize behavior. The
field of matching market design harnesses rigorous techniques from computer science, economics,
and operations research to address such issues in a holistic manner.
In this dissertation, I develop tools for optimization in market design by studying matching
mechanisms for school choice. In the school choice problem, cities seek to incorporate student
preferences when assigning students to seats in public schools. As many school districts have
fewer seats at desirable schools than students wishing to attend those schools, school choice is a
socially important problem that exemplifies many of the challenges in matching market design. It
is also a setting where theoretical solutions can be validated using data, and insights from theory
have had direct and substantial impact. Since a market design approach to school choice was
first proposed by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003), academics and practitioners have together
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developed algorithms for centralized school seat assignment with better incentive properties and
efficiency than their prior counterparts (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2017a). This literature proposed
two incentive compatible mechanisms, Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Trading Cycles (TTC),
and characterized the trade-off between their guarantees for efficiency and equity. The work in this
dissertation joins a growing operations literature that quantifies operational tradeoffs in the school
choice problem and provides simple policy levers for optimizing school district objectives (Arnosti,
2015; Ashlagi and Nikzad, 2016; Ashlagi and Shi, 2014, 2015; Shi, 2015).
I believe that an operations research perspective can bring two significant contributions to the
sphere of market design. The first is practical: as a discipline that trains its students both in
mathematical theory and solving real-world problems, we can furnish simplifying mathematical
frameworks for market structures that are of practical relevance and help policymakers discern
how decisions affect outcomes. The second is tactical: weaving together tools from combinatorial
optimization and game theory, we can propose algorithms that incentivize strategic users to provide
useful information for achieving desirable outcomes. Accordingly, in my dissertation I have sought
to further our theoretical understanding of both DA and TTC in ways that provide clear operational
insights, and have proposed new algorithms for school choice with desirable properties. In doing so,
I address operational problems in the implementation of school choice, such as reducing congestion
when reassigning students to vacated seats after late cancellations, deciding how to invest in school
quality, and designing market mechanisms to minimize the cost that students must incur to learn
their preferences. In order to provide solutions with practical relevance, I also corroborate my
findings with data from school systems, as well as with personal interactions with parents, principals,
and school district administrators.
2
1.1 Simplifying Frameworks for Optimization in School Choice
As market design theory increasingly shapes the design and operations of real-life marketplaces,
it is important for designers to provide simple policy levers that practitioners can use to optimize
platform objectives. In Chapter 3 we provide a framework for addressing a key operational issue in
school choice – reassigning seats that are vacated after an initial round of centralized assignment.
Every year around 10% of students assigned a seat in the NYC public high school system eventually
do not attend a public school in the following year, opting instead to attend private or charter
schools, and their vacated seats can be reassigned. Practical solutions to the reassignment problem
must be simple to implement, truthful and efficient. We propose and axiomatically justify a class of
reassignment mechanisms, the Permuted Lottery Deferred Acceptance (PLDA) mechanisms, which
generalize the commonly used Deferred Acceptance (DA) school choice mechanism to a two-round
setting and retain its desirable incentive and efficiency properties. We also provide guidance to
school districts as to how to choose the appropriate mechanism in this class for their setting.
Centralized admissions are typically conducted in a single round using Deferred Acceptance,
with a lottery used to break ties in each school’s prioritization of students. Our Permuted Lottery
Deferred Acceptance mechanisms reassign vacated seats using a second round of DA with a lottery
based on a suitable permutation of the first-round lottery numbers. We demonstrate that under
natural conditions on aggregate student demand for schools, the second-round tie-breaking lottery
can be correlated arbitrarily with that of the first round without affecting allocative welfare, and
hence the correlation between tie-breaking lotteries can be chosen to attain other objectives. Using
this framework, we show how the identifying characteristic of PLDAmechanisms, their permutation,
can be chosen to control reallocation. In most school choice systems across the United States, seats
vacated after the initial round are reassigned using decentralized waitlists that create significant
student movement after the start of the school year, which is costly for both students and schools.
We show that reversing the lottery order between rounds minimizes reassignment among all PLDA
mechanisms, allowing us to alleviate costly student movement between schools without affecting
the efficiency of the final allocation. Empirical investigations based on data from NYC high school
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admissions support our theoretical findings.
In Chapter 4, we provide a framework for optimization when using the Top Trading Cycles
(TTC) school choice mechanism. While TTC has attractive properties for school choice and is
often considered by school systems, the commonly used combinatorial description of the mecha-
nism obfuscates many of these properties, and the mechanism has essentially not been adopted in
practice. Moreover there is little guidance in the literature as to how to design the inputs to TTC,
such as schools’ priorities for students, to optimize a school district’s objectives. Drawing on ideas
from general equilibrium theory, we show that the TTC assignment can be described by admission
cutoffs. These cutoffs parallel prices in competitive equilibrium, with students’ priorities serving
the role of endowments. In a continuum model these cutoffs can be computed directly from the
distribution of preferences and priorities, providing a framework that can be used to evaluate policy
choices.
We characterize the TTC assignment in terms of cutoffs pij for every pair of schools (i, j). A
student is able to attend a school i if for any school j her priority at j meets the cutoff pij . We use
a novel formulation of TTC in terms of trade balance equations in order to provide a procedure for
computing these cutoffs as solutions to a system of differential equations. Using this procedure,
we provide closed form solutions for the TTC assignment under a family of distributions, and
derive comparative statics. For example, we show that increasing the desirability of a school may
result in admitting students with lower priority. Our formulation also gives an alternative to
current simulation techniques for evaluating the impact of policy decisions on school assignment
and student welfare. As an illustration, we use our framework to solve for optimal investment
in school quality under the TTC assignment for a parametrized economy, and show that choice
incentivizes a welfare-maximizing school district to invest more equitably in all schools instead of
just in the best schools. Our formulation can be used to better design TTC priorities, optimize the
use of TTC and empirically compare TTC with other assignment mechanisms, and we hope that
it will inspire future work in all these directions.
4
1.2 Mechanisms for Matching with Incomplete Information
One of the essential roles of a marketplace is to communicate information about supply and demand.
Market design affects not only how goods and services are allocated to recipients, but also the
information that must be acquired in order to do so. In Chapter 5 we study how school choice
mechanisms affect the information acquisition costs borne by students. In a matching model where
students pay a cost to learn their preferences, we show that traditional school choice mechanisms
that do not account for costly information acquisition can lead to information deadlocks, where it
is strictly optimal for every agent to wait for other agents to provide additional market information
before paying the cost to learn their own preferences. To overcome this problem, we propose
mechanisms that learn sufficient information about aggregate student demand to approximate the
optimal outcome.
In our “Pandora’s box” model, school priorities are known, and students have a prior over their
cardinal utilities for each school and can pay a cost to see the actual values. We define stability under
incomplete information, where an outcome, consisting of a matching and acquired information, is
stable if any student who has higher priority at a given school than a student assigned to that
school either (1) knows her value for that school and prefers her current assignment, or (2) does
not know her value for that school and is not willing to pay the cost to learn it. In settings with costly
information acquisition students need information about their possible matches to optimally acquire
information, and may benefit from waiting for the market to resolve before acquiring information.
We refine the set of stable outcomes to the set of regret-free stable outcomes, under which the
information acquired by students is as if they acquired information optimally after knowing the
preferences and information acquisition processes of all other students. We characterize the set of
regret-free stable outcomes using cutoffs and show they have a lattice structure. However, without
information about student priors, it can be impossible to compute a regret-free stable matching.
In settings with sufficient information about student preferences, we propose mechanisms that use




The goal of every school district is to provide each student with admission to a desirable school.
However, in most districts, seats at good schools are a scarce resource and a decision has to be
made as to which students are able to secure the most coveted seats. Historically, most schools
districts have adopted neighborhood schooling policies, where students attend schools in their
residential area. This results in students from wealthier families attending the most desirable
schools, as they are the ones who are able to afford property in the neighborhoods of these schools.
Increasingly, in cities across the United States students are assigned to schools via choice-based
systems, where students are able to express their preferences over and be assigned to schools beyond
their residential area. Such systems provide more equitable access to opportunity for students from
all socio-economic backgrounds, and can improve efficiency by matching students to the schools
that provide the educational experience that is best for them. However they also require more
sophisticated assignment processes in order to ensure that students’ true preferences are elicited
and that the assignment process is equitable and efficient.
The mechanism design approach to school choice was first formulated by Balinski and Sönmez
(1999) for college admissions, and by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) for K-12 admissions.
These papers took the view that school choice is an assignment problem where the inputs, each
student’s preferences, are private information that can be strategically reported by agents in order to
affect the assignment outcome, and proposed centralized mechanisms, assignment algorithms with
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strategic input, for computing desirable assignments. This initiated a rich and growing theoretical
literature on the design of suitable mechanisms for a single round of centralized school assignment,
and also led to significant academic input in the redesign of school choice systems across the US.
Academics have worked closely with school authorities to redesign school choice systems in New
York City (2003), Boston (2005), New Orleans (2012), Denver (2012), and Washington DC (2013),
implementing centralized mechanisms that appear to outperform the uncoordinated and ad hoc
assignment systems that they replaced (see, e.g. Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2017a). I provide brief
summaries of the works most relevant to the optimization of quantitative objectives in school
choice, and point the interested reader to recent surveys by Abdulkadiroğlu (2013) and Pathak
(2011) for more comprehensive overviews of the literature.
2.1 The School Choice Model
The model for the school choice problem first introduced by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003)
can be summarized as follows. A finite set of students S must be assigned to seats at a finite set of
schools C. Each student s ∈ S has preferences s for the school they attend, which are strict ordinal
rankings over the subset of schools that they find acceptable. Each school i ∈ C has priorities, a
weak ordinal ranking i over the set of eligible students. Some schools give priority to students
according to strict preferences formed using test scores or admissions portfolios, and other schools
give priority to students based on coarse criteria, such as priority for living in the neighborhood or
for having a sibling attending the school. In the canonical school choice model, it is assumed that
all students know their preferences and that these preferences do not depend on the preferences of
other students or the schools attended by other students. The goal of the school choice problem is
to design a mechanism M that takes as input school priorities  and reported student preferences
r and outputs an appropriate assignment µ : S → C of students to schools.
In this dissertation, we will often consider the following continuum formulation of the school
choice problem, which was proposed by Azevedo and Leshno (2016). A set S of students must






which encodes both the student’s ordinal preferences θ over schools as well as the
schools’ priorities pθ ∈ [0, 1]C for the student. We may think of pθc as the percentile rank of a student
of type θ in the school’s priority ordering. A continuum economy is given by E = (C,Θ, η, q) where
q = {qc}c∈C is the vector of capacities of each school, and η is a measure over the space of student
types Θ. An assignment is a mapping µ : Θ → C ∪ {∅} from students to schools. The goal of the
school choice problem in the continuum setting is again to design a mechanism M that takes as
input school priorities p and reported student preferences r and outputs an appropriate assignment
of students to schools.
The continuum model deviates from the standard model in a way that captures two salient
features of the school choice problem. While traditional matching problems are often classified as
either two-sided (e.g. hospital residency matching (Roth and Peranson, 1999), which view both
residents and hospitals as strategic) or one-sided (e.g. housing allocation (Abdulkadiroğlu and
Sönmez, 1999), which view only the tenants as strategic), the school choice problem lies somewhere
in the middle, as it takes input from agents on both sides of the market with the goal of providing
assignments that are efficient and equitable from the student perspective. The continuum model
visually emphasizes the focus on student outcomes by considering schools’ priorities as properties
of students, rather than of schools, and invites us to view school priorities as a design lever for
achieving what the mechanism designer believes is a desirable assignment for students. In addition,
the continuum model of Azevedo and Leshno (2016) captures a setting where the number of students
is much larger than the number of schools.1 In doing so, it implicitly assumes that students are
non-atomic and that any single student misreporting their preferences does not affect outcomes for
any other students, a simplifying assumption that allows us to provide clean intuition and high-level
insights for design. There is now a growing literature that uses continuum models in market design
(see, e.g. Avery and Levin, 2010; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2015; Ashlagi and Shi, 2015; Che et al.,
2015; Azevedo and Hatfield, 2015) .
1This is contrast with e.g. Che and Tercieux (2015, 2018), which study the properties of TTC in a large market
where the heterogeneity of items grows as the market gets large.
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2.2 Policy Goals and Design Objectives
Since the academic study and design of school choice systems was initiated by Balinski and Sön-
mez (1999); Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003), there have been remarkable levels of collaboration
between academics and practitioners in redesigning school choice systems. This has given us signif-
icant insight into the desirable qualities of school choice assignments and assignment mechanisms,
a few of which I highlight below. More detailed discussions of the first-order issues in school choice
in practice can be found in Pathak (2016), as well as in papers about the redesign processes in
New York (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005a), Boston (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005b) and New Orleans
(Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2017c) .
Clear Incentives
One of the clear themes that has emerged in the redesign of school choice systems is the importance
of providing the correct incentives for students to tell the truth. When redesigning the Boston
school choice system, officials at Boston Public Schools (BPS) strongly advocated for selecting a
non-manipulable mechanism on the grounds that it would equalize the opportunity to access schools
BPS (2005):
“[A] strategy-proof algorithm ‘levels the playing field’ by diminishing the harm done
to parents who do not strategize or do not strategize well. [...] [T]he need to strate-
gize provides an advantage to families who have the time, resources, and knowledge to
conduct the necessary research.”
When we presented our class of reassignment mechanisms (Chapter 3) to practitioners, one of the
first questions we received from officials at BPS and the New York City Department of Education
alike was whether the mechanisms were manipulable by students. Similarly Clark medalist Parag
Pathak, who was involved in the redesign of dozens of school choice systems including those at
New York City and Boston, echoes the sentiment that manipulability erodes equity and trust,
saying “the idea that a manipulable mechanism frustrates participants and creates inequities for
sincere participants is a theme that I have seen in cities other than Boston”(Pathak, 2016). Thus
9
motivated, most of the theoretical literature on school choice has focused on providing mechanisms
that incentivize students to truthfully report their preferences.
Definition 2.1. A mechanism is strategy-proof if it is a dominant strategy for each student to
report her true preferences, i.e. for all students s, for all preferences −s of other students and
priorities p, student s (weakly) prefers her assignment under truthful reporting to her assignment
under any misreport r.
Equity and Fairness
As suggested in the previous section, another key attribute of commonly-used school choice mecha-
nisms is that they are perceived to be fair. While definitions of equity and fairness in market design
are nascent, one partial notion of fairness that was proposed in Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003)
has proved to be enduring in practice. An assignment eliminates justified envy or respects priorities
if, when two students both wish to attend a given school i, the student with higher priority at school
i is given precedence. In the school choice literature, in line with prior work in two-sided matching
markets, this has also been termed stability.
Definition 2.2. An assignment µ is stable or respects priorities if for every student s ∈ S and
school i ∈ C and such that student s prefers i to her assignment i s µ(i), the school i is full of
students with higher priority than s i.e. (i) η (µ(i)) = qi, and (ii) ps
′
i ≥ psi for all s′ ∈ µ−1 (i). A
mechanism M is stable or respects priorities if it always produces a stable assignment.
In a one-sided assignment setting, stability provides a rationale for the assignment: students
who are not assigned to a school have insufficient priority for being assigned to that school. In a two-
sided matching setting, a stable mechanism incentivizes schools and students to adopt the matching
proposed by the mechanism, as students and schools cannot Pareto improve their outcomes by
assigning students outside of the system. Hence in school choice, in addition to providing some
measure of fairness, a stable mechanism also eliminates justifiable challenges to the outcome of the
mechanism and helps prevent unraveling of the market.
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Efficiency
Finally, one of the primary aims of school choice is to increase student welfare by allowing het-
erogeneous students to choose the schools that best suit their educational needs. Hence from an
optimization perspective one of the most natural criteria for a school choice mechanism is that it
produces an efficient assignment. Two desirable notions of efficiency commonly put forth in the
literature are as follows.
Definition 2.3. An assignment µ is non-wasteful if no student desires an unused seat over her
own, i.e. if i s µ (i) then η (µ−1 (i)) = qi.
Definition 2.4. An assignment µ is feasible if the number of students assigned to a school does not
exceed its capacity, η
(
µ−1 (i)
) ≤ qi ∀i. A feasible assignment µ is Pareto efficient (for students)
if there is no feasible assignment µ′ that weakly improves outcomes for all students and strictly
improves for at least one, i.e. there is no feasible assignment µ′ such that µ′ (s) s µ (s) for some
s ∈ S and µ′ (s′) s′ µ (s′) ∀s′ ∈ S.
While the notion of Pareto efficiency has many proponents in the theoretical literature, in prac-
tice school districts have tended to emphasize other notions of efficiency, such as the proportion
of students being assigned to their (reported) first choice school. Further discussion on the impor-
tance of efficiency in practice can be found in Chapter 4, in Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017c), and in
a number of empirical papers (see e.g. Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009)).
2.3 Mechanisms
An ideal school choice mechanism would embody all the desirable properties of strategy-proofness,
stability and efficiency. However, it is well known that there is no mechanism that is both stable
and Pareto efficient (see e.g. Gale and Shapley (1962); Roth (1982)). The two main mechanisms
proposed by the theoretical literature, Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Trading Cycles (TTC),
represent two extremes in the tradeoff between these properties: both mechanisms are strategy-
proof, and DA is stable while TTC is Pareto efficient. Moreover, DA implements the student-
optimal stable assignment (Gale and Shapley, 1962), and TTC minimizes the violations of priorities
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required to achieve an efficient outcome (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2017c). I describe both mechanisms
and their qualitative properties, and also provide some background as to how they can be tuned to
optimize quantitative outcomes.
Deferred Acceptance (DA)
The Deferred Acceptance mechanism for school choice is based on the Gale-Shapley Deferred Ac-
ceptance algorithm for one-to-one stable matching Gale and Shapley (1962), and was one of the
two mechanisms first proposed by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) for school choice. It takes as
input student preferences S and strict school priorities and runs via student proposals as follows.2
In step 1, each student applies to their most-preferred school. A school with a capacity of q tenta-
tively assigns a seat to each of the q highest-ranked eligible applicants and rejects any remaining
applicants. In each subsequent step, students who are not tentatively assigned apply to their most-
preferred school that has not yet rejected them. A school with a capacity of q tentatively assigns
a seat to the q highest-ranked students who have applied to the school in any step and rejects any
remaining applicants. The algorithm runs until there are no new student applications, at which
point it terminates and assigns each student to her tentatively assigned school seat.
The Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance mechanism has many desirable properties for school
choice. Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) proved that it is strategy-proof for students,
and Gale and Shapley (1962) demonstrated that it always finds the student-optimal stable matching
µ∗, which satisfies the property that every student s (weakly) prefers to their assignment µ∗ (s)
under µ∗ to their assignment µ (s) under any stable matching µ. DA also admits the following
description via admissions cutoffs:
Definition 2.5 (Deferred Acceptance (Azevedo and Leshno, 2016)). The Deferred Acceptance




mapping student preferences and strict school priorities
into an assignment µ, defined by a vector of cutoffs C ∈ Rn+ as follows. Each student s is assigned
to her most-preferred school as per her preferences, among those where her priority exceeds the
cutoff:
2In practice, weak school priorities are turned into strict school priorities via random tie-breaking.
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µ(s) = maxs ({i ∈ S : p
s
i ≥ Ci} ∪ {n+ 1}). (2.1)
Moreover, C is market-clearing, namely
η(µ(i)) ≤ qi for all i ∈ S, with equality of Ci > 0. (2.2)
The cutoff characterization simplifies the description of the outcome of Deferred Acceptance
and elucidates the role of priorities in determining the outcome. It has also been instrumental in
providing methods for empirical and counterfactual analysis of school systems (see, e.g. Agarwal
and Somaini, 2018; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2017b; Fack et al., 2015). In addition, the cutoff char-
acterization has been used to provide frameworks for optimization when the mechanism of choice
is Deferred Acceptance. Shi (2015) uses the cutoff description of Deferred Acceptance to provide a
method for optimizing the design of priorities via a reduction to an assortment planning problem,
and Ashlagi and Shi (2014) employs the cutoff characterization to design optimal correlations in
tie-breaking lotteries when the goal is the increase community cohesion in school seat assignment.
In Chapter 3 we define a class of reassignment mechanisms based on running two rounds of Deferred
Acceptance, show that they have a similar cutoff characterization, and use it to show the effect of
cross-round correlations in tie-breaking lotteries on allocative efficiency and reassignment.
Top Trading Cycles (TTC)
The Top Trading Cycles mechanism for school choice is based on the Top Trading Cycles algorithm
for housing allocation, first proposed in Shapley and Scarf (1974) and attributed to David Gale.
It is also one of the two mechanisms first proposed by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) for
school choice. It runs in discrete steps as follows. In step 1, each student points to their most-
preferred school, and each school points to their top priority student. Some number of cycles in
the pointing graph (there is at least one) are selected, students in the cycles are assigned to the
school they are pointing to, and schools in the cycles decrease their remaining capacity by 1. In
each subsequent step, each unassigned student points to their most-preferred school, each school
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with positive residual capacity points to their top priority remaining student, and more cycles are
selected and students assigned. The algorithm runs until either all students are assigned or there
are no seats with remaining capacity.
TTC also has many desirable properties for school choice. It is simple to verify that it always
results in a Pareto efficient assignment, and Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) and Roth and
Postlewaite (1977) demonstrated that it is strategy-proof for students. As a result, TTC has been
considered for use in a number of school choice systems (see, e.g. Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005b).
However, TTC has not been widely adopted for school choice.3 Pathak (2016) hypothesizes that
this may be due to a lack of a simple explanation for TTC that emphasizes its desirable properties,
and a lack of understanding of the role of priorities in TTC. For example, a report from Boston
Public Schools states BPS (2005):
“The Top Trading Cycles Algorithm allows students to trade their priority for a seat at
a school with another student. This trading shifts the emphasis onto the priorities and
away from the goals BPS is trying to achieve by granting these priorities in the first
place.”
In Chapter 4 we provide a cutoff characterization of the TTC mechanism that emphasizes that it is
strategy-proof and elucidates the role of priorities in the TTC allocation. This allows us to reframe
the primary choice between DA and TTC as follows: DA sacrifices some student welfare but strictly
respects priorities, and TTC uses priorities to guide the selection of an efficient allocation. Our
cutoff characterization also lays the framework for designing TTC priorities to achieve desirable
outcomes.
Other Mechanisms
Several variants of DA and TTC have also been suggested in the literature. Kesten (2006) studies
the relationship between DA and TTC, and shows that they are equivalent if and only if the
priority structure is acyclic. In subsequent work Kesten (2010) also proposes the Efficiency Adjusted
3The only instances where TTC was implemented for school choice are in the San Francisco school district and
previously in the New Orleans Recovery School District (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017c)).
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Deferred Acceptance, which relaxes the justified envy condition to improve efficiency. Morrill
(2015b) suggests the Clinch and Trade mechanism, which differs from TTC in that it identifies
students who are guaranteed admission to their first choice and assigns them immediately without
implementing a trade. Hakimov and Kesten (Forthcoming) introduce Equitable TTC, a variation
on TTC that aims to reduce inequity. All these mechanisms provide intermediate alternatives to
DA and TTC in the tradeoff between efficiency and stability
2.4 Optimization and Operations in School Choice
There is a growing operations literature on designing the school choice process to optimize quanti-
tative objectives. In the Boston school choice system (which uses the Deferred Acceptance mech-
anism), Ashlagi and Shi (2014) consider how to improve community cohesion in school choice by
correlating the lotteries of students in the same community, and Ashlagi and Shi (2015) show how
to maximize welfare given busing cost constraints.
Several papers also explore how school districts can use rules for breaking ties in school priorities
as policy levers. Most school choice systems turn weak school priorities into strict school priorities
using the same tie-breaking lottery across all schools before running DA, resulting in a mechanism
known as DA-STB. Arnosti (2015); Ashlagi and Nikzad (2016); Ashlagi et al. (2015) show that
DA-STB assigns more students to one of their top k schools (for small k) compared to DA using
independent lotteries at different schools, and Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009) empirically compare
these tie-breaking rules. A concrete design recommendation of Ashlagi and Nikzad (2016) is that
in order to improve the efficiency of the assignment “popular” schools should use single tie-breaking
to break ties, which is the tie-breaking rule used in our work. Erdil and Ergin (2008) also exploit
indifferences to improve allocative efficiency. Similarly, when using TTC in a setting with weak
priorities, Ehlers (2014) shows that any fixed tie-breaking rule satisfies weak efficiency, and Alcalde-
Unzu and Molis (2011), Jaramillo and Manjunath (2012) and Saban and Sethuraman (2013) give
specific variants of TTC that are strategy-proof and efficient.
There are still many important operational questions in the assignment of students to schools.
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Most of the existing literature on school choice is essentially static and considers a model where all
students know their preferences, submit them to a centralized system and are assigned in a single
round. In Chapter 3 we address the problem of designing reassignment mechanisms and after-
markets, a clear operational issue where a systematic market design approach can have significant
welfare benefits (see, e.g. Narita, 2016; Pathak, 2016). In Chapter 4 we consider how the choice of
a school choice mechanism can also affect how policy decisions outside of the school choice system,
such as investment in school quality, impact student welfare. In Chapter 5 we consider a setting
where students do not know their preferences and must exert effort to learn them, and explore
how sequential matching mechanisms can be designed to reduce unnecessary costly learning. These
works illustrate the benefits of an operations research approach, which can consider the detailed
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Chapter 3
Dynamic Matching in School Choice:
Efficient Seat Reassignment after Late
Cancellations
In public school systems throughout the United States, students submit preferences that are used
to assign them to public schools. As this occurs fairly early in the school year, students typically
do not know their options outside of the public school system when submitting their preferences.
Consequently, a significant fraction of students who are allotted a seat in a public school eventually
do not use it, leading to considerable inefficiency. In the NYC public high school system, over
80,000 students are assigned to public school each year in March, and about 10% of these students
choose to not attend a public school in September, possibly opting to attend a private or charter
school instead.1 Schools find out about many of the vacated seats only after classes begin, when
students do not show up to class; such seats are reassigned in an ad hoc manner by the schools using
decentralized procedures that can run months into the school year. A well-designed reassignment
process, run after students learn about their outside options, could lead to significant gains in
overall welfare. Yet no systematic way of reassigning students to unused seats has been proposed
1In the 2004–2005 school year, 9.22% of a total of 81,884 students dropped out of the public school system after
the first round. Numbers for 2005–2006 and 2006–2007 are similar.
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in the literature. Our goal is to design an explicit reassignment mechanism run at a late stage of
the matching process that efficiently reassigns students to vacated seats.
During the past fifteen years, insights from matching theory have informed the design of school
choice programs in cities around the world. Although there is a vast and growing literature that
explores many aspects of school choice systems and informs how they are designed in practice, most
models considered in this literature are essentially static. Incorporating dynamic considerations in
designing assignment mechanisms, such as learning new information at an intermediate time, is an
important aspect that has only recently started to be addressed. Our work provides some initial
theoretical results in this area and suggests that simple adaptations of one-shot mechanisms can
work well in a more general setting.
We consider a two-round model of school assignment with finitely many schools, where students
learn their outside option after the first-round assignment, resulting in vacant seats which can be
reassigned. In the first round, schools have weak priorities over students, and students submit
strict ordinal preferences over schools. Students receive a first-round assignment based on these
preferences via Deferred Acceptance with Single Tie-Breaking (DA-STB), a variant of the standard
Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA) where ties in school preferences are broken via a single lottery
ordering across all schools. Afterwards, students may be presented with better outside options (such
as admission to a private school), and may no longer be interested in the seat allotted to them. In the
second round, students are invited to submit new ordinal preferences over schools, reflecting changes
in their preferences induced by learning their outside options. The goal is to reassign students so
that the resulting assignment is efficient and the two-round mechanism is strategy-proof and does
not penalize students for participating in the second round. As a significant fraction of vacated
seats are reassigned only after the start of the school year, a key additional goal is to ensure that
the reassignment process minimizes the number of students who need to be reassigned.
We introduce a class of reassignment mechanisms with desirable properties: the Permuted
Lottery Deferred Acceptance (PLDA) mechanisms. PLDA mechanisms compute a first-round as-
signment by running DA-STB, and then a second-round assignment by running DA-STB with a
permuted lottery. In the second round, each school first prioritizes students who were assigned to it
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in the first round, which guarantees each student a second-round assignment that she prefers to her
first-round assignment, then prioritizes students according to their initial priorities at the school,
and finally breaks ties at all schools via a permutation of the (first-round) lottery numbers. Our
proposed PLDA mechanisms are based on school choice mechanisms currently used in the main
round of assignment, and can be implemented either as centralized PLDAs, which run a central-
ized second round with updated preferences, or as decentralized PLDAs, which run a decentralized
second round via a waitlist system that closely mirrors current reassignment processes.
Our key insight is that the mechanism designer can design the correlation between tie-breaking
lotteries to achieve operational goals. In particular, reversing the lottery between rounds minimizes
reassignment without sacrificing student welfare. Our main theoretical result is that under an
intuitive order condition, all PLDAs produce the same distribution over the final assignment, and
reversing tie-breaking lotteries between rounds implements the centralized Reverse Lottery DA
(RLDA), which minimizes the number of reassigned students. We axiomatically justify PLDA
mechanisms: absent school priorities, PLDAs are equivalent to the class of mechanisms that are
two-round strategy-proof while satisfying natural efficiency requirements and symmetry properties.
In a setting where all students agree on a ranking of schools and there are no priorities our
results are very intuitive. By reversing the lottery, we move a few students many schools up
their preference list rather than many students a few schools up, thereby eliminating unnecessary
cascades of reassignment (see Figure 3.1). Suprisingly, however, our theoretical result holds in a
general setting with heterogeneous student preferences and arbitrary priorities at schools. The
order condition can be interpreted as aggregate student preferences resulting in the same order of
popularity of schools in the two rounds. Our results show that if student preferences and school
priorities produce such agreement in aggregate demand across the two rounds, then reversing the
lottery between rounds preserves ex ante allocative efficiency and minimizes reassignment.
We empirically assess the performance of RLDA using data from the New York City public high
school system. We first investigate a class of centralized PLDAs that includes RLDA, rerunning
DA using the original lottery order (termed Forward Lottery Deferred Acceptance or FLDA),
and rerunning DA using an independent random lottery. We find all these mechanisms provide
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Figure 3.1: Running DA with a reversed lottery eliminates the cascade of reassignments.
There are 6 students with identical preferences over schools, and 6 schools each with a single priority group. All
students prefer schools in the order 1  2  · · ·  6. The student assigned to school 1 in the first round leaves
after the first round; otherwise all students find all schools acceptable in both rounds. Running DA with the same tie-
breaking lottery reassigns each student to the school one better on her preference list, whereas reversing the tie-breaking
lottery reassigns only the student initially assigned to 6 from her least preferred to her most preferred school.
similar allocative efficiency, but RLDA reduces the number of reassigned students significantly.
For instance, in the NYC data set from 2004–2005, we find that FLDA results in about 7,800
reassignments, and RLDA results in about 3,400 reassignments out of a total of about 74,000
students who remained in the public school system, i.e. less than half the number of reassignments
under FLDA. The gains become even more marked if we compare with current practice: RLDA
results in less than 40% of the 8,600 reassignments under decentralized FLDA with waitlists.2
To better evaluate the decentralized waitlist systems currently used in practice, we also em-
pirically explore the performance of decentralized FLDA and RLDA as a function of the time
available to clear the market. We find that the timing of information revelation can greatly impact
the allocative efficiency and the congestion of decentralized waitlist systems. If, as in Figure 3.1,
congestion is caused by students taking time to vacate previously assigned seats, then reversing
the lottery increases allocative efficiency during the early stages of reassignment and decreases the
congestion in the system. However, if congestion is caused by students taking time to decide on
offers from the waitlist, then these findings are reversed. In both cases, for reasonable timescales
the welfare gains from centralizing the reassignment are substantial.
2A decentralized version of FLDA is used in most cities and in NYC kindergarten admissions. It was also used in
NYC high school admissions until a few years ago, when the system abandoned reassignments entirely, anecdotally
due to the excessive logistical difficulties created by market congestion. See Section 3.1.1 for more details.
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3.1 Reassignment in Matching Markets
3.1.1 Current Reassignment Systems in School Choice
Schools systems in cities across the US, including in New York, Boston, Washington DC, Den-
ver, Seattle, New Orleans, and Chicago, use similar centralized processes for admissions to public
schools. Students seeking admission to a school submit their preference lists over schools to a
central authority by December through March, for admission starting the subsequent fall. Each
school may have priority classes of students, such as priority for students who live in the neigh-
borhood, priority for siblings of students who are already enrolled at that school, or priority for
students whose families have low income. An allocation of seats to students is produced by using the
student-proposing Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance algorithm with single-tiebreaking. Students
must register in their assigned school by April or early May.
In March and April students are also admitted to private and charter school via processes run
concurrently with the public school assignment process. This results in an attrition rate of about
8-10% of the seats assigned in the main round of public school admissions. Some schools account for
this attrition by making “over offers” in the first round and accepting more students than they have
seats for (see, e.g. Szuflita). However, such oversubscription of students is usually conservative, due
to hard constraints on space and teacher capacity.3 As a result, most schools have unused seats
at the end of the first round that can be reassigned to students who want those seats, and many
schools find out about these vacant seats only after the start of the school year.
Reassignments in most school choice systems, such as in New York kindergarten, Boston, Wash-
ington DC, Denver, Seattle, New Orleans, and Chicago, are performed using a decentralized waitlist
system. Students are put on waitlists for all schools that they ranked above their first-round assign-
ment, in the order of the first-round priorities (after tie-breaking).4 Students who do not register
by the deadline are presumed to be uninterested and their seats are offered to waitlisted students
in sequence, with further seats becoming available over time as students receive new offers from
3Capacity constraints are binding in most schools. Most states impose maximum class sizes and fund schools based
on enrollment after the first 2-3 weeks of classes, which incentivizes schools to enroll as many students as permissible.
4Late applicants are also included in these waitlists, typically with inferior lottery numbers.
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outside the system. The seats previously occupied by students who were reassigned are also offered
to students on the waitlists. Students offered seats by the waitlist system usually have several
days to a week to make a decision, and are only bound by the final offer they choose to accept.5
Overall, this typically results in a “huge slow round robin” (Szuflita) of reassignment that continues
all summer until classes begin, and in some cities (e.g. NYC, Boston, and Washington DC) up to
several months after classes begin.
Our proposed class of mechanisms may be viewed as a generalization of these waitlist systems
as follows. Waitlists are PLDA mechanisms where 1) the second round is implemented in a de-
centralized fashion as information about vacated seats propagates through the system, and 2) the
tie-breaking lotteries used in the second round are the same as those used in the first round. We
show that permuting the tie-breaking lottery numbers before creating waitlists provides a class of
reassignment mechanisms that, given sufficient time to clear the market, result in similar eventual
allocative efficiency while allowing the designer additional flexibility for optimizing other objectives.
3.1.2 Related Literature
There is a vast literature on dynamic matching and reassignments. The reassignment of donated
organs has been extensively studied in work on kidney exchange (see, e.g. Roth et al., 2004; An-
derson et al., 2015, 2017; Ashlagi et al., 2017). Reassignments due to cancellations also frequently
arise in online assignment settings such as kidney transplantation (see, e.g. Zenios, 1999; Su and
Zenios, 2006) and public housing allocation (see, e.g. Kaplan, 1987; Arnosti and Shi, 2017). An
important difference is that these are online settings where agents and objects arrive over time and
are matched on an ongoing basis. In such settings matches are typically irrevocable, and so optimal
assignment policies account for typical cancellation and arrival statistics and optimize for agents
arriving in the future (see, e.g. Dickerson and Sandholm, 2015). In our setting the matching for
the entire system is coordinated in time, and we improve welfare by controlling both the initial
5Students who have accepted an offer off the waitlist of one school are allowed to accept offers off the waitlists
of other schools. Since registration for one school automatically cancels the student’s previous registrations, such an
action would automatically release the seat the student accepted from the first school, making that seat available to
other students on the waitlist.
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assignment and subsequent reassignment of objects among the same set of agents.
Another relevant strand in the reassignment literature is the work of Abdulkadiroğlu and Son-
mëz on house allocation models with existing tenants (or housing endowments) (Abdulkadiroğlu
and Sönmez, 1999). Our second round can be thought of as school seat allocation where some
agents already own a seat and we wish to reassign seats to reach an efficient assignment. There
are also a growing number of papers that consider a dynamic model for school admissions (see,
e.g. Compte and Jehiel, 2008; Combe et al., 2016). A critical distinction between these works
and ours is that in our model, the initial endowment is determined endogenously by preferences,
and so we propose reassignment mechanisms that are impervious to students manipulating their
first-round endowment to improve their final assignment. We also exploit indifference to minimize
reassignment, a direction which is not explored in these works.
A number of recent papers, such as Dur (2012a); Kadam and Kotowski (2014); Pereyra (2013),
focus on the strategic issues in dynamic reassignment. and also propose using modified versions of
DA in each round. These works develop solution concepts in finite markets with specific cross-period
constraints and propose DA-like mechanisms that implement them. In recent complementary work
Narita (2016) analyzes preference data from NYC school choice, observes that a significant fraction
of preferences are permuted after the initial match, and proposes a modified version of DA with
desirable properties in this setting. We similarly propose PLDA mechanisms for their desirable
incentive and efficiency properties. In addition, our large market and consistency assumptions
allow us to uncover considerable structure in the problem and provide conditions under which we
can optimize over the entire class of PLDA mechanisms.
Our work also has some connections to the queueing literature. The class of mechanisms that
emerges in our setting involves choosing a permutation of the initial lottery order, and we find
that the reverse lottery minimizes reassignment within this class. This is similar to the choice of
a service policy in a queueing system (e.g. FIFO, LIFO, SRPT etc.), whereby a particular policy
is chosen in order to minimize cost functions such as expected waiting time (see, e.g. Lee and
Srinivasan, 1989). “Work-conserving” service policies such as these result in identical throughput
but different expected waiting times, and we similarly find that different PLDA mechanisms differ
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in the number of reassignments even when they have identical allocative efficiency. Our continuum
model parallels fluid limits and deterministic models employed in queueing (Whitt, 2002), revenue
management (Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2006), and other contexts in operations management.
3.2 Model
We consider the problem of assigning a set of students S to seats in a finite set of schools C =
{1, . . . , n}. Each student can attend at most one school. There is a continuum6 of students with an
associated measure η: for any (measurable) subset S ⊆ S, we let η(S) denote the mass of students
in S. The outside option is n+ 1 /∈ C. The capacities of the schools are q1, . . . , qn ∈ R+, and
qn+1 =∞. A set of students of η-measure at most qi can be assigned to school i.
Each student submits a strict preference ordering over her acceptable schools, and each school
partitions eligible students into priority groups. Each student has a type θ = (θ, ˆθ, pθ) that
encapsulates both her preferences and school priorities. The student’s first- and second-round
preferences, respectively θ and ˆθ, are strict ordinal preferences over C ∪ {n+ 1}, and schools
before (after) {n+ 1} in the ordering are acceptable (unacceptable). The student’s priority class
pθ encodes her priority pθi at school i. Each school i has ni priority groups. We assume that
schools prefer higher priority groups, students ineligible for school i have priority pi = −1, and that
pi ∈ {−1, 0, 1, . . . , ni − 1}. Eligibility and priority groups are exogenously determined and publicly
known.
Each student s = (θs, L(s)) ∈ S also has a first-round lottery number L(s) ∈ [0, 1]. We
sometimes use the notation (s, ˆs, ps) as a less cumbersome alternative to (θs , ˆθs , pθs). We let
Θ be the set of all student types, so that S = Θ× [0, 1] denotes the set of students. For each θ ∈ Θ
we let ζ(θ) = η({θ} × [0, 1]) be the measure of all students with type θ.
We assume that all students have consistent preferences, defined as follows.
6Our continuum model can be viewed as a two-round version of the model introduced by Azevedo and Leshno
(2016). Continuum models have been used in a number of papers on school choice; see Agarwal and Somaini (2018);
Ashlagi and Shi (2014); Azevedo and Leshno (2016). Intuitively, one could think of the continuum model as a
reasonable approximation of the discrete model when the number of students is large, although we do not establish
a formal relationship between the discrete and continuum models, as that is beyond the scope of this work.
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Definition 3.1. Preferences (, ˆ) are consistent if the second-round preferences ˆ are obtained
from the first-round preferences  via truncation, i.e.: (1) (a school does not become acceptable
only in the second round) for every i ∈ S, iˆ {n+ 1} implies i  {n+ 1}, and (2) (the relative
ranking of schools is unchanged across rounds) for every i, j ∈ S, if iˆ {n+ 1} and iˆj then i  j.
We say that the type θ is consistent if the preferences (θ, ˆθ) are consistent.
Assumption 3.1. If ζ(θ) > 0 then the type θ is consistent.
Assumption 3.2. For all consistent types θ ∈ Θ it holds that ζ(θ) > 0.
The consistency assumption is required in order to meaningfully define strategy-proofness in
our two-round setting, as we require truthful reporting in the first round to be optimal for both the
student’s first-round assignment as well as her second-round assignment. We use the full support
assumption only to characterize our class of proposed mechanisms (Theorem 3.3) and do not need
it for our positive results (Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 and supporting results) .
We also assume that the first-round lottery numbers are drawn independently and uniformly
from [0, 1] and do not depend on preferences. This means that for all θ ∈ Θ and intervals (a, b)
with 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1, η ({θ} × (a, b)) = (b− a)ζ(θ).7
An assignment µ : S → C specifies the school that each student is assigned to. For any
assignment µ, we let µ(s) denote the school to which student s is assigned, and overloading notation
we let µ(i) denote the set of students assigned to school i. We assume that µ(i) is η-measurable
and that the assignment is feasible, i.e. η(µ(i)) ≤ qi for all i ∈ C and if µ(s) = i then psi ≥ 0. We
let µ and µˆ denote the first- and second-round assignments respectively.
Timeline. Students report first-round preferences .8 The mechanism designer obtains a first-
round assignment µ by running DA-STB with lottery L and announces µ and L. Students then
observe their outside options and update their preferences accordingly to ˆ. Finally, students report
their second-round preference ˆ, and the mechanism designer obtains a second-round assignment
7This can be justified via an axiomatization of the kind obtained by Al-Najjar (2004).
8Since we will be considering mechanisms that are strategy-proof in the large, we assume that students report
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Figure 3.2: Timeline of the two-round mechanism design problem
µˆ by running a reassignment mechanism M and announces µˆ. We illustrate the timeline in Figure
3.2.
Informational Assumptions. Eligibility and priorities are exogenously determined and pub-
licly known. The mechanism is publicly announced before preferences are submitted. Before
first-round reporting, each student knows her first-round preferences, and that her second-round
preferences will be obtained from these preferences via truncation. Each student has imperfect in-
formation regarding her own second-round preferences (i.e., the point of truncation) at that stage,
and believes with positive probability her preferences in both rounds will be identical.9 We assume
students know the distribution η over student types and lotteries (an assumption we need only for
our characterization result, Theorem 3.3). Each student is assumed to learn her lottery number
after the first round, as in practice students are often permitted to inquire about their position in
each school’s waitlist; however our results hold even if students do not learn their lottery numbers.
Definition 3.2. A student s ∈ S is a reassigned student if she is assigned to a different school in
C in the second round than in the first round. That is, s is a reassigned student under reassignment
µˆ if µ(s) 6= µˆ(s) and µ(s) 6= {n+ 1} , µˆ(s) 6= n+ 1.10
The majority of reassignments happen around the start of the school year, a time when they are
costly for schools and students alike. Hence, in addition to providing an efficient final assignment,
we also want to reduce congestion by minimizing the number of reassigned students.
9This ensures that students will report their full first-round preferences in the first round, instead of truncating
in the first round based on their beliefs about their second-round preferences.
10Several alternative definitions of reassigned students—such as counting students who are initially unassigned and
end up at a school in C, and/or counting initially assigned students who end up unassigned—could also be considered.
We note that our results continue to hold for all these alternative definitions.
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3.2.1 Mechanisms
A mechanism is a function that maps the realization of first-round lotteries L, school priorities p,
and students’ first-round preference reports  into an assignment µ. A reassignment mechanism
is a function that maps the realization of first-round lotteries L, first-round assignment µ, school
priorities p, and students’ second-round reports ˆ into a second-round assignment µˆ.11 A two-
round mechanism obtained from a reassignment mechanism M is a two-round mechanism where
the first-round mechanism is DA-STB (see Definition 3.3), and the second-round mechanism is M .
In the first round, seats are assigned according to the student-optimal Deferred Acceptance
(DA) algorithm with single tie-breaking (STB), which constructs an assignment as follows. A
single lottery ordering of the students L is used to resolve ties in the priority groups at all schools,
resulting in an instance of the two-sided matching problem with strict preferences and priorities. In
each step, unassigned students apply to their most-preferred school that has not yet rejected them.
A school with a capacity of q tentatively accepts the q highest-ranked eligible applicants (according
to its priority ranking of the students after breaking all ties) and rejects any remaining applicants.
The algorithm runs until there are no new student applications, at which point it terminates and
assigns each student to her tentatively assigned school seat. The strict student preferences, weak
school priorities, and the use of DA-STB mirror current practice in many school choice systems,
such as those in New York City, Chicago, and Denver.
In the continuum model, Azevedo and Leshno (2016) have shown that DA may be formally
defined in terms of admissions scores and cutoffs.
Definition 3.3 (Deferred Acceptance (Azevedo and Leshno, 2016)). The Deferred Acceptance
mechanism with single tie-breaking (DA-STB) is a function DAη
(
(s, ps)s∈S , L
)
mapping student
preferences, priorities and lottery numbers into an assignment µ, defined by a vector of cutoffs
C ∈ Rn+ as follows. Each student s is given a score rsi = psi + L(s) at school i and assigned to her
most-preferred school as per her preferences, among those where her score exceeds the cutoff:
11Here we restrict our design space to second-round assignments that depend on the first-round reports only
indirectly, through the first-round assignment µ. We believe that this is a reasonable restriction, given that the
second round occurs a significant period of time after the first round.
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µ(s) = maxs ({i ∈ C : r
s
i ≥ Ci} ∪ {n+ 1}). (3.1)
Moreover, C is market-clearing, namely
η(µ(i)) ≤ qi for all i ∈ C, with equality if Ci > 0. (3.2)
Azevedo and Leshno (2016) showed that the set of assignments satisfying equations (3.1) and
(3.2) forms a non-empty complete lattice, and typically consists of a single uniquely determined
assignment.12 This unique assignment in the continuum further corresponds to the limit of the set
of stable matches obtained in finite markets as the number of students grows (with school capacities
growing proportionally). Throughout this paper, in the (knife edge) case where there are multiple
assignments satisfying Definition 3.3, we pick the student-optimal matching.
Given cutoffs {Ci}ni=1, we will also find it helpful to define for each priority class pi the cutoffs
within the priority class at each school Cpi,i ∈ [0, 1] by Cpi,i = 0 if Ci ≤ pii, Cpi,i = 1 if Ci ≥ pii + 1,
and Cpi,i = Ci−pii otherwise. Thus, Cpi,i is the lowest lottery number a student in the priority class
pi can have and still be able to attend school i.
We now turn to the mechanism design problem. We emphasize that we keep the first round
consistent with currently used mechanisms and consider only two-round mechanisms whose first
round mechanism is DA-STB, i.e. the only freedom afforded the planner is the design of the
reassignment mechanism. We propose the following class of two-round mechanisms. Intuitively,
these mechanisms run DA-STB twice, once in each round. They explicitly correlate the lotteries
used in the two rounds via a permutation P , and give each student top priority in the school she was
assigned to in the first round to guarantee that each student receives a (weakly) better assignment
in the second round.
Definition 3.4 (Permuted Lottery Deferred Acceptance (PLDA) mechanisms). Let P : [0, 1] →
[0, 1] be a measure-preserving bijection. Let L be the realization of first-round lottery numbers,
and let µ be the first-round assignment obtained by running DA with lottery L.
12A sufficient condition for the assignment to be unique is when the demand D (C) for schools given cutoffs C,
defined by Di (P ) = η
(
s ∈ S | maxs
{




, is continuously differentiable in the cutoffs. Moreover for
almost all demand functions the resulting assignment is unique for all but a measure zero set of capacity vectors.
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Define a new economy ηˆ, where to each student s ∈ S with priority vector ps, and first-round
lottery and assignment L(s) = `, µ(s) = i, we: (1) assign a lottery number P (`); and (2) give top
second-round priority pˆsi = ni at their first-round assignment i and unchanged priority pˆsj = psj at
all other schools j 6= i. PLDA(P ) is the two-round mechanism obtained using the reassignment
mechanism DAηˆ
(
(ˆs, pˆs)s∈S , P ◦ L
)
.
We use CˆPpi,i to denote the second-round cutoff for priority class pi in school i under PLDA(P ).
We highlight two particular PLDA mechanisms. The RLDA (reverse lottery) mechanism uses
the reverse permutation R(x) = 1−x; and the FLDA (forward lottery) mechanism, which preserves
the original lottery order, uses the identity permutation F (x) = x. By default, school districts often
use a decentralized version of the FLDA mechanism, implemented via waitlists. In this paper, we
provide evidence that supports using the centralized RLDA mechanism in a school system like that
in NYC, where a large proportion of vacated seats are revealed close to or after the start of the
school year, and where reassignments are costly for both students and the school administration.
The PLDA mechanisms are an attractive class of two-round assignment mechanisms for a num-
ber of reasons. They are intuitive to understand and simple to implement in systems already using
DA. (A decentralized implementation would be even simpler to integrate with current practice; the
currently used waitlist mechanism for reassignments can be retained with the simple modification of
permuting the lottery numbers just before waitlists are constructed.) In addition, we will show that
the PLDA mechanisms have desirable incentive and efficiency properties, which we now describe.
Any reassignment mechanism that takes away a student’s initial assignment against her will is
impractical. Thus, we require our mechanism to respect first-round guarantees:
Definition 3.5. A two-round mechanism (or a second-round assignment µˆ) respects guarantees
if every student (weakly) prefers her second-round assignment to her first-round assignment, that
is, µˆ(s)ˆsµ(s) for every s ∈ S.
One of the reasons for the success of DA in practice is that it respects priorities: if a student
is not assigned to a school she wants, it is because that school is full of students who have higher
priority at that school. This leads to the following natural requirement in our two-round context:
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Definition 3.6. A two-round mechanism (or a second-round assignment µˆ) respects priorities
(subject to guarantees) if for every i ∈ C and eligible student s ∈ S such that i ˆs µˆ(s) and
every student s′ such that µˆ(s′) = i 6= µ(s′) it holds that s′ is eligible for i and ps′i ≥ psi .
Thus, our definition of respecting priorities (subject to guarantees) requires that every student
who was upgraded to a school i in the second-round must have a (weakly) higher priority at that
school than every eligible student s who prefers i to her second-round assignment.
We now turn to incentive properties. In the school choice problem it is reasonable to assume
that students will be strategic in how they interact with the mechanism at each stage. Hence, it
is desirable that whenever a student (with consistent preferences) reports preferences, conditional
on everything that has happened up to that point, it is a dominant strategy for her to report
truthfully. To describe the properties formally, we start by fixing an arbitrary profile of first and
second round preferences (−s, ˆ−s) for all the students other than student s. For any preference
report of student s in the first round she will receive an assignment that is probabilistic because of
the lottery used to break ties in the first round; then, after observing her first-round assignment
and her updated outside option, she can submit a second-round preference report, based on which
her final assignment is computed. This leads to two natural notions of strategy-proofness.
Definition 3.7. A two-round mechanism is strongly strategy-proof if for each student s (with
consistent preferences) truthful reporting is a dominant strategy, i.e. for each realization of lottery
numbers and profile of first- and second-round reported preferences of the students other than s,
reporting her preferences truthfully in each of the two rounds is a best response for s.
Our definition of strong strategy-proofness is rather demanding: it requires that no student be
able to manipulate the mechanism even if she has full knowledge of the first and second round
preferences of all other students and the lottery numbers. We shall also consider a weaker version
of strategy-proofness that applies when a manipulating student does not know the lottery number
realizations when she submits her first-round preference report and learns all lottery numbers only
after the end of the first round. In that case, each student views her first-round assignment as a
probability vector; her second-round assignment is also random, but is a deterministic function of
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the first-round outcome, the second-round reports, and the first-round lottery numbers. We make
precise the notion of a successful manipulation in this setting as follows.
Definition 3.8. A two-round mechanism is weakly strategy-proof if the following conditions
hold:
• Knowing the specific realization of first-round assignments (and the second round preferences
of the students other than s), it is optimal for student s to submit her second-round preference
truthfully, given what the other students do;
• For each student s (with consistent preferences), and for each profile of first- and second-
round preferences of the students other than s, the probability that student s is assigned to
one of her top k schools in the second round is maximized when she reports truthfully in the
first round (assuming truthful reporting in the second round), for each k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
In other words, in each stage of the dynamic game, the second-round assignment from truthful
reporting stochastically dominates the outcomes of all other strategies. We emphasize that the
uncertainty in the assignment is solely due to the lottery numbers, which students initially do not
know.
Note that a two-round mechanism that uses the first-round assignment as the initial endowment
for a mechanism like top trading cycles in the second round will not be two-round strategy-proof,
because students can benefit from manipulating their first-round reports to obtain a more popular
initial assignment that they could use to their advantage in the second round.
Finally, we discuss some efficiency properties. To be efficient, clearly a mechanism should not
leave unused any seats that are desired by students.
Definition 3.9. A two-round mechanism is non-wasteful if no student is assigned to a school
she is eligible for that she prefers less than a school not at capacity; that is, for each student s ∈ S
and schools i, j, if µˆ(s) = i and jˆsi and psj ≥ 0, then η(µˆ(j)) = qj .
It is also desirable for a two-round mechanism to be Pareto efficient. We do not want any
students to be able to improve their utility by swapping probability shares in second-round as-
signments. However, we also require that our reassignment mechanism respect guarantees and
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priorities (see Definitions 3.5 and 3.6), which is incompatible with Pareto efficiency even in a static,
one-round setting.13 This motivates the following definitions. Consider a second-round assignment
µˆ. A Pareto-improving cycle is an ordered set of types (θ1, θ2, . . . , θm) ∈ Θm, sets of students
(S1,S2, . . . ,Sm) ∈ Sm, and schools (1′, 2′, . . . ,m′) ∈ Cm, such that η(Si) > 0 and (i + 1)′ˆθii′
(where we define (m + 1)′ = 1′), for all i, and such that for each i, θs = θi and µˆ(s) = i′ for all
s ∈ Si.
Let pˆ be the second-round priorities obtained by giving each student s a top second-round
priority pˆsi = ni at their first-round assignment µ(s) = i (if i ∈ S) and unchanged priority pˆsj = psj
at all other schools j 6= i. We say that a Pareto-improving cycle (in a second-round assignment)
respects (second-round) priorities if pˆθi(i+1)′ ≥ pˆ
θi+1
(i+1)′ for all i (where we define θm+1 = θ1).
Definition 3.10. A two-round mechanism is constrained Pareto efficient if the second-round
assignment has no Pareto-improving cycles that respect second-round priorities.
We remark that this is the same notion of efficiency that is satisfied by static, single-round
DA-STB (Definition 3.3)—the resulting assignment has no Pareto-improving cycles that respect
priorities. In other words, the constrained Pareto efficiency requirement is informally to be “as
efficient as static DA”. We also note here that as a result of the requirement to respect second
round priorities, Pareto improving cycles considered must include only reassigned students.
Finally, for equity purposes, it is desirable that a mechanism be anonymous.
Definition 3.11. A two-round mechanism is anonymous if students with the same first-round
assignment and the same first- and second-round preference reports have the same distribution over
second-round assignments.
We show that PLDA mechanisms satisfy all the aforementioned properties.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose student preferences are consistent. Then PLDA mechanisms respect
guarantees and priorities, and are strongly two-round strategy-proof, non-wasteful, constrained
Pareto efficient, and anonymous.
13When schools have strict preferences, an assignment respects priorities if and only if it is stable, and it is well
known that in two-sided matching markets with strict preferences, there exist preference structures for which every
stable assignment can be Pareto improved.
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Proof. Fix a permutation P and some PLDA with permutation P . We show that this particular
PLDA satisfies all the desired properties. Let η be a distribution of students, and let CˆP be the
second-round cutoffs corresponding to the assignment given by the PLDA for this distribution of
student types.
PLDA respects guarantees because fewer students are guaranteed at each school than the ca-
pacity of the school. PLDA is non-wasteful because the second round terminates with a stable
matching where all schools find all students acceptable, which is non-wasteful.
We now show that the PLDA mechanism is strongly two-round strategy-proof. Since students
are non-atomic, no student can change the cutoffs CˆP by changing her first- or second-round
reports. Hence it is a dominant strategy for all students to report truthfully in the second round.
Moreover, for any student s, the only difference between having a first-round guarantee at a school
i and having no first-round guarantee is that in the former case, rˆsi = pˆsi + L (s) increases from rsi
by ni − psi . This means that having a guarantee at a school i changes the student’s second-round
assignment in the following way. She receives a seat in school i whereas without the guarantee she
would have received a seat in some school j that she reported preferring less to school i, and her
second-round assignment is unchanged otherwise.
Therefore, students want their first-round guarantee to be the best under their second-round
preferences, and so it is a dominant strategy for students with consistent preferences to report
truthfully in the first round.
PLDA is constrained Pareto efficient, since we use single tie-breaking and the output is the
student-optimal stable matching with respect to the updated second-round priorities pˆ. This is
easily seen via the cutoff characterization. Let the second-round cutoffs be Pˆ , where overloading
notation we let Pˆi denote the cutoff for school i˜. Fix a Pareto-improving cycle (Θm,Sm, Cm).
Without loss of generality we may assume that pˆs
i˜
+ L(s) ≥ Pi for all s ∈ Si, since the set of
students for whom this is not true has measure 0. Moreover, since all students s ∈ Si prefer
school (i+1)′ to their assigned school µˆ (s) = i′, without loss of generality we may also assume that
pˆs(i+1)′+L(s) < Pi+1 for all s ∈ Si, since the set of students for whom this is not true has measure 0.




and so pˆsi(i+1)′ ≤ pˆ
si+1
(i+1)′ .
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that the cycle (Θm,Sm, Cm) respects second-round prior-
ities. Then for each si ∈ Si and si+1 ∈ Si+1 it holds that pˆsi(i+1)′ ≥ pˆ
si+1
(i+1)′ , and so L (si) > L (si+1).
But since this holds for all i we obtain a cycle of lottery numbers L (s1) > L (s2) > · · · > L (sm) >
L (s1), which provides the necessary contradiction.
We will show in Section 3.3.1 that in a setting without priorities, the PLDA mechanisms are
the only mechanisms that satisfy all these properties (and some additional technical requirements),
even if we only require weak strategy-proofness (Theorem 3.3).
Finally, it is simple to show that the natural counterparts to PLDA mechanisms in a discrete
setting (with a finite number of students) respect guarantees and priorities, and are non-wasteful,
constrained Pareto efficient, and anonymous. We make these claims formal in Section 3.5 and
also provide an informal argument that the discrete PLDA mechanisms are also approximately
strategy-proof when the number of students is large.
3.3 Main Results
In this section, we will show that the defining characteristic of a PLDA mechanism—the permuta-
tion of lotteries between the two rounds—can be chosen to achieve desired operational goals. We
first provide a simple and intuitive order condition, and show that under this condition, all PLDA
mechanisms give the same ex ante allocative efficiency. Thus when the primitives of the market
satisfy the order condition, it is possible to pursue secondary operational goals without sacrificing
allocative efficiency. Next, in the context of reassigning school seats at the start of the school
year, we consider the specific problem of minimizing reassignment, and show that when the order
condition is satisfied, reversing the lottery minimizes reassignment among all centralized PLDA
mechanisms. In Section 3.6, we empirically demonstrate using data from NYC public high schools
that reversing the lottery minimizes reassignment (amongst a subclass of centralized PLDA mecha-
nisms) and does not significantly affect allocative efficiency even when the order condition does not
hold exactly. Our results suggest that centralized RLDA is a good choice of mechanism when the
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primary goal is to minimize reassignments while providing a second-round assignment with high
allocative efficiency. In Section 3.3.1 we provide an axiomatic justification for PLDA mechanisms,
and later in Section 3.7 we discuss how the choice of lottery permutation can be used to achieve
other operational goals, such as maximizing the number of students with improved assignments.
We begin by defining the order condition, which we will need to state our main results.
Definition 3.12. The order condition holds on a set of primitives (C,S, η, q) if for every priority
class pi, the first- and second-round school cutoffs under RLDA within that priority class are in the
same order, i.e., for all i, j ∈ C,
Cpi,i > Cpi,j ⇒ CˆRpi,i ≥ CˆRpi,j .
We emphasize that the order condition is a condition on the market primitives, namely, school
capacities and priorities and student preferences (though checking whether it holds involves investi-
gating the output of RLDA). We may interpret the order condition as an indication that the relative
demand for the schools is consistent between the two rounds. Informally speaking, it means that
the revelation of the outside options does not change the order in which schools are overdemanded.
One important setting where the order condition holds is the case of uniform dropouts and a single
priority type. In this setting, each student independently with probability ρ either remains in the
system and retains her first-round preferences in the second round, or drops out of the system
entirely; student first-round preferences and school capacities are arbitrary. We establish the order
condition and provide direct proofs of several of our theoretical results for the setting with uniform
dropouts in Section 3.4, in order to give a flavor of the arguments employed to establish our results
in the general setting.
To compare the allocative efficiency of different mechanisms, we define type-equivalence of as-
signments. In words, two second-round assignments are type-equivalent if the masses of different
student types θ assigned to each school are the same across the two assignments.
Definition 3.13. Two second-round assignments µˆ and µˆ′ are said to be type-equivalent if14η ({s ∈ S : θs = θ, µˆ (s) = i}) = η ({s ∈ S : θs = θ, µˆ′ (s) = i}) ∀θ ∈ Θ and i ∈ C.
14We remark that the type-equivalence condition is well defined in the space of interest. Specifically, although for
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In our continuum model, if two two-round mechanisms produce type-equivalent second-round
assignments we may equivalently interpret them as providing each individual student of type θ with
the same ex ante distribution (before lottery numbers are assigned) over assignments.
We are now ready to state the main results of this section. The first is a surprising finding that
under the order condition, all PLDAs are allocatively equivalent.
Theorem 3.1 (Order condition implies type-equivalence). If the order condition (Definition 3.12)
holds, all PLDA mechanisms produce type-equivalent second-round assignments.
Thus, if the order condition holds, the measure of students of type θ ∈ Θ assigned to each school
in the second round is independent of the the permutation P . The intuition behind this result is that
if the cutoffs are in the same order under RLDA, then the cutoffs are in the same order under any
PLDA, which can be used to show that aggregate final outcomes are equivalent across mechanisms.
We remark that type equivalence does not imply an equal (or similar) amount of reassignment,
as type-equivalence depends only on the second-round assignment, while reassignment (Definition
3.2) measures the difference between the first- and second-round assignments. For example, in the
example in Figure 3.1 if schools have a single priority class then FLDA and RLDA each give each
remaining student a one fifth chance of being assigned to each of schools 1 through 5, but FLDA
performs 5 reassignments whilst RLDA performs only 1. This brings us to our second result.
Theorem 3.2 (Reverse lottery minimizes reassignment). If all PLDA mechanisms produce type-
equivalent second-round assignments, then RLDA minimizes the measure of reassigned students
among PLDA mechanisms.
Proof. Fix θ = (θ, ˆθ, pθ) ∈ Θ and school i ∈ C. We will show that, among all type equivalent
mechanisms, RLDA minimizes the measure of reassigned students with type θ who were assigned
to school i in the second round. The idea is that RLDA never reassigns a student of type θ into a
school i if it has reassigned a student of type θ out of school i.
Formally, for every permutation P , let the measure of students with type θ leaving and entering
school i in the second round under PLDA(P ) be denoted by `P = η({s ∈ S : θs = θ, µ(s) =
general random mechanisms these measures are random variables, in the case of PLDA mechanisms, these measures
are a deterministic function of priorities and preferences, and the equality is well defined.
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i, µˆP (s) 6= i}) and eP = η({s ∈ S : θs = θ, µ(s) 6= i, µˆP (s) = i}) respectively. Due to type-
equivalence, there is a constant c such that `P = eP − c for all permutations P . We show that
either `R = 0 and eR = c, or eR = 0, implying that eR ≤ eP for all permutations P .
If both eR > 0 and `R > 0, then students of type θ who entered i in the second round of RLDA
had worse first- and second-round lottery numbers than students who left i in the second round
of RLDA, which contradicts the reversal of the lottery. Formally, suppose eR > 0 and `R > 0.
If n+ 1ˆθi then eR = 0, so we may assume iˆθn+ 1 . Since eR > 0, there exists some student
s ∈ S with type θs = θ for whom i = µˆR(s)ˆθµ(s). By consistency, we have i θ µ(s) , and
therefore s could not afford (meet the cutoff for) i in the first round. Since `R > 0, there exists
some student s′ ∈ S with type θs′ = θ for whom j = µˆR(s′)ˆθµ(s′) = i. By definition, s′ could
afford i in the first round and s could not, and hence L(s′) > L(s). Note that since iˆθn+ 1 , it
follows that jˆθiˆθn+ 1. Now, since s′ received a better second-round assignment under RLDA
than s and both s and s′ were reassigned under RLDA, it follows that R(L(s′)) > R(L(s)), which
is a contradiction. Since eP = `P + c ≥ c and eP ≥ 0 this completes the proof.
Our results present a strong case for using the centralized RLDA mechanism when the main
goals are to achieve allocative efficiency and minimize the number of reassigned students. Theorems
3.1 and 3.2 show that when the order condition holds, centralized RLDA is unequivocally optimal
in the class of PLDA mechanisms, since all PLDA mechanisms give type-equivalent assignments15
and centralized RLDA minimizes the number of reassigned students. In addition, we remark that
the order condition can be checked easily by running RLDA (e.g., on historical data).16
Next, we give examples of when the order condition holds and does not hold, and illustrate the
resulting implications for type-equivalence. We illustrate these in Figure 3.3.
Example 3.1. There are n = 2 schools, each with a single priority group. School 1 has lower
capacity and is initially more overdemanded. Student preferences are such that when all students
15A reasonable utility model in the continuum would yield that type-equivalence implies welfare equivalence.
16We are not suggesting that the mechanism should involve checking the order condition and then using centralized
RLDA only if this condition is satisfied (based on the guarantee in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2). However, one could check
whether the order condition holds on historical data and accordingly decide whether to use the centralized RLDA
mechanism or not.
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who want only 2 drop out the order condition holds, and when all students who want only 1 drop
out school 2 becomes more overdemanded under RLDA and the order condition does not hold.
School capacities are given by q1 = 2, q2 = 5. There is measure 4 of each of the four types of first-
round student preferences. Let θi denote the student type that finds only school i acceptable, and let
θi,j denote the type that finds both schools acceptable and prefers i to j. (We will define the second
round preferences of each student type below; each type will either leave the system completely or








Suppose that all type θ2 students leave the system, and all students of other types stay in the
system and keep the same preferences as in the first round. This frees up 2 units at school 2. Under










. In this case, the order condition holds
and FLDA and RLDA are type-equivalent. It is simple to verify that both FLDA and RLDA assign
the same measure µˆ(i) of students of type (θ1, θ1,2, θ2,1) to school i, where
µˆF = µˆR = (µˆ(1), µˆ(2)) = ((1, 1, 0), (0, 2, 3)) .
Suppose that all type θ1 students leave the system, and all students of other types stay in the
system and keep the same preferences as in the first round. This frees up 1 unit at school 1. Under
RLDA, no new students are assigned to school 2, and the previously bottom-ranked (but now top-












. In this case, the order condition does not hold. Type
equivalence also does not hold (and in fact FLDA and RLDA give different ex ante assignments to











, µˆR = ((1.5, 0.5, 0), (1, 2, 2)) .
3.3.1 Axiomatic Justification of PLDA Mechanisms
We have shown that PLDA mechanisms satisfy a number of desirable properties. Namely, PLDA
mechanisms respect guarantees and priorities, and are two-round strategy-proof (in a strong sense),
non-wasteful, constrained Pareto efficient, and anonymous. In this section, we show that in a setting
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Figure 3.3: In Example 3.1, FLDA and RLDA are type equivalent when the order condition holds, and give different
assignments to students of every type when the order condition does not hold.
The initial economy and first-round assignment are depicted on the top left. On the right, we show the second-round
assignments under FLDA and RLDA when type θ2 students (who want only school 2) drop out, and when type θ1
students (who want only school 1) drop out. Students toward the left have larger first round lottery numbers. The
patterned boxes above each column of students indicate the affordable sets for students in that column. When students
who want only school 2 drop out, the order condition holds, and FLDA and RLDA are type-equivalent. When students
who want only school 1 drop out, school 2 becomes more overdemanded in RLDA, and FLDA and RLDA give different
ex ante assignments to students of every remaining type.
with a single priority class the PLDA mechanisms are the only mechanisms that satisfy both these
properties as well as two mild technical conditions on the symmetry of the mechanism, even when
we require only the weaker version of two-round strategy-proofness.
Definition 3.14. A two-round mechanism satisfies the averaging axiom if for every type θ and
pair of schools (i, j) the randomization of the mechanism does not affect the measure of students
with type θ assigned to (i, j) in the first and second rounds, respectively. That is, for all θ, i, j,
there exists a constant cθ,i,j such that η({s ∈ S : θs = θ, µ(s) = i, µˆ(s) = j}) = cθ,i,j w.p. 1.
Definition 3.15. A two-round mechanism is non-atomic if any single student changing her pref-
erences has no effect on the assignment probabilities of other students.
Our characterization result is the following.
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Theorem 3.3. Suppose that student preferences are consistent and student types have full support
(Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2). A non-atomic two-round assignment mechanism where the first round
is DA-STB respects guarantees and is
• non-wasteful,
• (weakly) two-round strategy-proof,
• constrained Pareto efficient,
• anonymous, and
• averaging,
if and only if the second-round assignment is given by PLDA. (Here the permutation P may depend
on the measure of student preference types ζ(·).)
We remark that we require two-round strategy-proofness only for students whose true preference
type is consistent. This is because preference inconsistencies across rounds can lead to conflicts
between the desired first-round assignment with respect to first-round preferences and the desired
first-round guarantee with respect to second-round preferences, making it unclear how to even define
a best response. Moreover, it may be reasonable to assume that students who are sophisticated
enough to strategize about misreporting in the first round in order to affect the guarantee structure
in the second round will also know their second-round preferences over schools in C (i.e., everything
except where they rank their outside option) at the beginning of the first round, and hence will
have consistent preferences.17 We remark also that the ‘only if’ direction of this result is the only
place where we require the full support assumption (Assumption 3.2).
The main focus of our result is the effect of cross-round constraints. By assumption, the first-
round mechanism is DA-STB. It is relatively straightforward to deduce that the second-round
mechanism also has to be DA-STB. Strategy-proofness in the second round, together with non-
wastefulness, respecting priorities and guarantees, and anonymity, constrain the second round to
17One obvious objection is that students may also obtain extra utility from staying at a school between rounds,
or, equivalently, they may have a disutility for moving, creating inconsistent preferences where the school they are
assigned to in the first round becomes preferred to previously more desirable schools. We remark that Theorem 3.3
extends to the case of students whose preferences incorporate additional utility if they stay put, provided that the
utility is the same at every school for a given student or satisfies a similar non-crossing property.
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be DA, with each student given a guarantee at the school she was assigned to in the first round, and
constrained Pareto efficiency forces the tiebreaking to be in the same order at all schools. The cross-
round constraints are more complicated, but can be understood using affordable sets. A student’s
affordable set is the set of schools that she can choose to attend, i.e., the first-round affordable set
is the set of schools for which she meets the first-round cutoff, and the affordable set is the set of
schools for which she meets the first- or second-round cutoff. The set of possible affordable sets is
uniquely determined by the order of cutoffs. By carefully using two-round strategy-proofness and
anonymity, we show that a student’s preference type does not affect the joint distribution over her
first-round affordable set and affordable set, and hence her second-round lottery is a permutation
of her first-round lottery that does not depend on her preference type.
Our result mirrors similar large market cutoff characterizations for single-round mechanisms by
Liu and Pycia (2016) and Ashlagi and Shi (2014), which show, in settings with a single and multiple
priority types respectively, that a mechanism is non-atomic, strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient
(in each priority class) if and only if it can be implemented by lottery-plus-cutoff mechanisms, which
provide random lottery numbers to each student and admit them to their favorite school for which
they meet the admission cutoff. We obtain such a characterization in a two-round setting using the
fact that the mechanism respects guarantees and introducing an affordable set argument to isolate
the second round from the first. This simplification allows us to employ arguments similar to those
used in Liu and Pycia (2016) and Ashlagi and Shi (2014) to show that the first- and second-round
mechanisms can be individually characterized using lottery-plus-cutoff mechanisms.
3.4 Intuition for Main Results
In this section, we provide some intuition for our main results. We also furnish full proofs for a
special case of our model to give the interested reader a taste of the general proof techniques in a
more transparent setting. This section may be skipped at a first reading without loss of continuity.
We begin with some definitions and intuition for our general results. A key conceptual insight
is that we can simplify the analysis by shifting away from student assignments, which depend on
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student preferences, and considering instead the options that a student is allowed to choose from,
which are independent of preferences. Specifically, if we define the affordable set for each student
as the set of schools for which she meets either the first- or second-round cutoffs, then each student
is assigned to her favorite school in her affordable set at the end of the second round, and changing
the student’s preferences does not change her affordable set in our continuum model. Moreover,
affordable sets and preferences uniquely determine demand.
The main technical idea that we use in establishing our main results is that the order condition
is equivalent to the following seemingly much more powerful “global” order condition.
Definition 3.16. We say that PLDA(P ) satisfies the local order condition on a set of primitives
(C,S, η, q) if, for every priority class pi, the first- and second-round school cutoffs within that priority
class are in the same order under PLDA(P ). That is, for all i, j ∈ C,
Cpi,i > Cpi,j ⇒ CˆPpi,i ≥ CˆPpi,j .
We say that the global order condition holds on a set of primitives (C,S, η, q) if:
• (Consistency aross rounds) PLDA(P ) satisfies the local order condition on (C,S, η, q) ∀P ;
• (Consistency aross permutations) For every priority class pi, for all pairs of permutations P, P ′





In other words, the global order condition requires that all PLDA mechanisms result in the same
order of school cutoffs in both rounds. Surprisingly, if the cutoffs are in the same order in both
rounds under RLDA, then they are in the same order in both rounds under any PLDA.
Theorem 3.4. The order condition (Definition 3.12) holds for a set of primitives (C,S, η, q) if and
only if the global order condition holds for (C,S, η, q).
We provide some intuition as to why Theorem 3.4 holds by using the affordable set framework.
Under the reverse permutation, the sets of schools that enter a student’s affordable set in the first
and second rounds respectively are maximally misaligned. Hence, if the cutoff order is consistent
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across both rounds under the reverse permutation, then the cutoff order should also be consistent
across both rounds under any other permutation.
The affordable set framework also sheds some light on the power of the global order condition.
Fix a mechanism and suppose that the first- and second-round cutoffs are in the same order. Then
each student s’s affordable set is of the form Xi = {i, i+ 1, . . . , n} for some i = i(s), where schools
are indexed in decreasing order of their cutoffs for the relevant priority group pi = pθs , and the
probability that a student receives some affordable set is independent of her preferences. Moreover,
since affordable sets are nested X1 ⊇ X2 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Xn, and since the lottery order is independent of
student types, the demand for schools is uniquely identified by the proportion of students whose
affordable set contains school i for each i. When the global order condition holds, this is true for
every PLDA mechanism individually, which provides enough structure to induce type-equivalence.
We now introduce a special case of our model. For this special case, we will prove that the
order condition holds, and show that all PLDA mechanisms give type-equivalent assignments.
Definition 3.17. (Informal) A market satisfies uniform dropouts if there is exactly one prior-
ity group at each school, students leave the system independently with some fixed probability ρ,
(as formalized in Equation (3.3) below), and the students who remain in the system retain their
preferences.
Before formalizing the definition and results for this setting, we provide some intuition for why
the global order condition always holds under uniform dropouts. In the uniform dropouts model,
each student drops out of the system with probability ρ, e.g. due to leaving the city after the first
round for reasons that are independent of the school choice system. The second-round problem
can thus be viewed as a rescaled version of the first-round problem; in particular, the measure of
remaining students who were assigned to each school i in the first round is (1−ρ)qi, the measure of
students of each type θ assigned to each school is scaled down by 1− ρ, the capacity of each school
is still qi, and the measure of students of each type θ who are still in the system is scaled down by
1− ρ. Thus schools fill in the same order regardless of the choice of permutation.
Let us now formalize our definitions and results. Throughout the rest of this section, since
there are no priorities, we will let student types be defined either by θ = (θ, ˆθ,1) or simply by
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θ = (θ, ˆθ). We define uniform dropouts with probability ρ by
ζ({θ ∈ Θ :θ=, ˆθ = (n+ 1)  . . .}) = ρζ({θ ∈ Θ :θ=}),
ζ({θ ∈ Θ :θ=, ˆθ =}) = (1− ρ)ζ({θ ∈ Θ :θ=}) , (3.3)
i.e. for every strict preference  over schools, students with first-round preferences  with proba-
bility ρ find the outside option n+ 1 the most attractive in the second round, and with probability
1− ρ retain the same preferences in the second round.18
We show first that the global order condition (Definition 3.16) holds in the setting with uniform
dropouts. The high level steps and algebraic tools used in this proof are similar to those used to
show that the order condition is equivalent to the global order condition in our general framework
(Theorem 3.4), although the analysis in each step is greatly simplified. We provide some intuition
as to the differences in this section, and furnish the full proof of Theorem 3.4 in the Appendix.
Theorem 3.5. In any market with uniform dropouts (Definition 3.17), the global order condition
(Definition 3.16) holds.
Proof. The main steps in the proof are as follows: (1) Assuming that every student’s affordable
set is Xi for some i, for every school j, guess the proportion of students who should receive an
affordable set that contains j. (2) Calculate the corresponding second-round cutoffs C˜j for school
j. (3) Show that these cutoffs are in the same order as the first-round cutoffs. (4) Use the fact that
the cutoffs are in the same order to verify that the cutoffs are market-clearing, and deduce that the
constructed cutoffs are precisely the PLDA(P ) cutoffs.
Throughout this proof, we amend the second-round score of a student s under PLDA(P ) to be
rˆsi = P (L(s)) + 1{L(s)≥Ci}, meaning that we give each student a guarantee at any school for which
she met the cutoff in the first round. By consistency of preferences, it is easily seen that this has no
effect on the resulting assignment or cutoffs. Let the first-round cutoffs be C1, C2, . . . , Cn, where
without loss of generality we index the schools such that C1 ≥ C2 ≥ · · · ≥ Cn.
18We remark that there is a well-known technical measurability issue w.r.t. a continuum of random variables, and
that this issue can be handled; see, for example, Al-Najjar (2004).
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(1) In the setting with uniform dropouts, since the second-round problem is a rescaled version of
the first-round problem (with a (1− ρ) fraction of the original students remaining), we guess that
we want the proportion of students with an affordable set containing school j to be 11−ρ times the
original proportion. (In the general setting, we no longer have a rescaled problem and so we instead
guess that the proportion of students with each affordable set is the same as that under RLDA.)
(2) We translate this into cutoffs in the following way. Let fPi (x) = |{` : ` ≥ Ci or P (`) ≥ x}|
be the proportion of students who receive school i in their (second-round) affordable set with the
amended second-round scores under permutation P if the first- and second-round cutoffs are Ci
and x respectively. Notice that fi(x) is non-increasing for all i, fi(0) = 1, fi(1) = 1 − Ci, and if
i < j then fi(x) ≤ fj(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Let the cutoff C˜Pi ∈ [0, 1] be the minimal cutoff satisfying
the equation fi(C˜Pi ) = 11−ρ(1 − Ci), and let C˜Pi = 0 if Ci < ρ . (In the general setting the cutoffs
are defined using the same functions fPi (·) with the proportions being equal to those that arise
under RLDA, as mentioned in step (1) above.)
(3) We now show that the cutoffs C˜ are in the right order. Suppose that i < j. If C˜Pi = 0
then Cj ≤ Ci ≤ ρ and so C˜Pj = 0 ≤ C˜Pi as required. Hence we may assume that C˜Pi , C˜Pj > 0.
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≤ 11− ρ(1− Ci) + (Ci − Cj) ≤
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where both inequalities hold since Cj ≤ Ci. It follows that C˜Pi ≥ C˜Pj , as required. (In the general




in terms of the
cutoffs Ci, this step requires using the intermediate value theorem and an inductive argument.)
(4) We now show that C˜P is the set of market-clearing DA cutoffs for the second round of PLDA(P ).
Note that γi = Ci−1−Ci is the proportion of students whose first-round affordable set is Xi (where
C0 = 1). Since dropouts are uniform at random, this is the proportion of such students out of the
total number of remaining students both before and after dropouts.




is the proportion of students whose second-round
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affordable set contains i, and since C1 ≥ C2 ≥ · · · ≥ Cn and C˜P1 ≥ C˜P2 ≥ · · · ≥ C˜Pn , it follows that
the affordable sets are nested. Hence the proportion of students (of those remaining after students









= Ci−1 − Ci1− ρ =
γi
1− ρ.
For each student type θ = (,) and set of schools X, let Dθ(X) be the maximal school in X under
, and let θ′ = (, ˆ) be the student type consistent with θ that finds all schools unacceptable in



















choose to go to school i in the second round under the second-round cutoffs C˜P . We observe that
the expression on the right gives the measure of the set of students who choose to go to school i in
the first round under first-round cutoffs C.
In the case where C˜Pi = 0 the above expressions give upper bounds on the measure of the set
of students who choose to go to school i in the second round under the second-round cutoffs C˜P .
Since C are market-clearing cutoffs, and C˜Pi > 0⇒ CPi > 0, it follows that C˜P are market-clearing
cutoffs too. We have shown that in PLDA(P ), the second-round cutoffs are exactly the constructed
cutoffs C˜P and they satisfy C˜P1 ≥ · · · ≥ C˜Pn , and so the global order condition holds.
The general proof of Theorem 3.4 uses the cutoffs for RLDA in steps (1) and (2) above to guess
the proportion of students who receive an affordable set that contains school j, and requires that
each student priority type be carefully accounted for. However, the general structure of the proof
is similar, and the tools used are straightforward generalizations of those used in the proof above.
We next show that Theorem 3.1 holds with uniform dropouts. Specifically, we show that all
PLDA mechanisms give type-equivalent assignments.
Proposition 3.2. In any market with uniform dropouts (Definition 3.17), all PLDA mechanisms
produce type-equivalent assignments.
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Proof. The proposition follows immedately from the fact that the proportion γPi of students whose
second-round affordable set is Xi does not depend on P . In more detail, consider first the case
when all schools reach capacity in the second round of PLDA. We showed in the proof of Theorem
3.5 that for all i and all student types θ, the proportion of students of type θ with affordable set Xi
in the second round under PLDA(P ) is given by γPi =
γi
1−ρ , where γi is the proportion of students
of type θ with affordable set Xi in the first round. It follows that all PLDAs are “type-equivalent”
to each other because they are type-equivalent to the first-round assignment in the following sense.
For each preference order , let ˜ be the preferences obtained from  by making the outside option
the most desirable, i.e., n+ 1˜ · · · . Then
η({s ∈ S : θs = (,), µˆP (s) = i}) = 11− ρη({s ∈ S : θ
s = (,), µ(s) = i})
= η({s ∈ S : θs ∈ {(,), (, ˜)}, µ(s) = i}),
where the second equality holds since students stay in the system uniformly-at-random with prob-
ability 1 − ρ. Under uniform dropouts this holds for all student types that remain in the system,
and so it follows that µˆP is type-equivalent to µˆP ′ for all permutations P, P ′.
When some school does not reach capacity in the second round, we can show by induction on
the number of such schools that all PLDAs are type-equivalent to RLDA.
Remark. Most of the results of this section extend to the following generalization of the
uniform dropouts setting. A market satisfies uniform dropouts with inertia if there is exactly one
priority group at each school, students leave the system independently with some fixed probability
ρ, remain and wish to stay at their first round assignment with some fixed probability ρ’ (have
‘inertia’), and otherwise remain and retain their first round preferences.19 It can be shown that in
such a market, the global order condition always holds, and RLDA minimizes reassignment amongst
all type-equivalent allocations. Moreover, if all students are assigned in the first round, it can also
be shown that PLDA mechanisms produce type-equivalent allocations.
19This market is slightly beyond the scope of our general model, as the type of the student now also has to encode
second-round preferences that depend on the first-round assignment, namely whether they have inertia.
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3.5 PLDA for a Discrete Set of Students
Before verifying our theoretical results through simulations, we formally define and show how to
implement PLDA mechanisms in a discrete setting with a finite number of students. We also prove
that they retain almost all the desired incentive and efficiency properties discussed in Section 3.2.1.
3.5.1 Discrete Model
A finite set S = {1, 2, . . . , N} of students are to be assigned to a set C = {1, . . . , n} of schools.
Each student can attend at most one school. As in the continuum model, for every school i, let
qi ∈ N+ be the capacity of school i, i.e., the number of students the school can accommodate. Let
n+ 1 6∈ C denote the outside option, and assume qn+1 = ∞. For each set of students S ⊆ S we
let η(S) = |S| be the number of students in the set. As in the continuum model, each student
s = (θs, L(s)) ∈ S has a type θs = (s, ˆs, ps) and a first-round lottery number L(s) ∈ [0, 1], which
encode both student preferences and school priorities.
The first-round lottery numbers L(s) are i.i.d. random variables drawn uniformly from [0, 1]
and do not depend on preferences. These random lottery numbers L generate a uniformly random
permutation of the students based on the order of their lottery numbers.
An assignment µ : S → C specifies the school that each student is assigned to. For an assignment
µ, we let µ(s) denote the school to which student s is assigned, and in a slight abuse of notation,
we let µ(i) denote the set of students assigned to school i. As in the continuum model, we say that
a student s ∈ S is a reassigned student if she is assigned to a school in C in the second round that
is different to her first-round assignment.
3.5.2 PLDA Mechanisms & Their Properties
We now formally define PLDA mechanisms in a setting with a finite number of students. In order
to do so, we use the algorithmic description of DA and extend it to a two-round setting. This also
provides a clear way to implement PLDA mechanisms in practice. We first reproduce the widely
deployed DA algorithm, and then proceed to define PLDAs.
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Definition 3.18. The Deferred Acceptance algorithm with single tie-breaking is a functionDA
(
(s
, ps)s∈S , L
)
mapping the student preferences in the first round, priorities and lottery numbers into
an assignment µ constructed as follows. In each step, unassigned students apply to their most-
preferred school that has not yet rejected them. A school with a capacity of q tentatively assigns
a seat to each of its q highest-ranked applicants, ranked according to its priority ranking of the
students with ties broken by giving preference to higher lottery numbers L (or tentatively assigns
seats to all applicants, if fewer than q have applied), and rejects any remaining applicants, and
the algorithm moves on to the next step. The algorithm runs until there are no new student
applications, at which point it terminates and assigns each student to her tentatively assigned
school seat.
Definition 3.19 (Permuted Lottery Deferred Acceptance (PLDA) mechanisms). Let P be a per-
mutation of S. Let L be the realization of first-round lottery numbers, and let µ be the first-round
assignment obtained by running DA with lottery L. The permuted lottery deferred acceptance
mechanism associated with P (PLDA(P )) is the mechanism that then computes a second-round
assignment µˆP by running DA on the same set of students S but with student preferences ˆ, a
modified lottery P ◦ L, and modified priorities pˆ that give each student top priority at the school
she was assigned to in the first round. Specifically, each school i’s priorities ˆi are defined by lexi-
cographically ordering the students first by whether they were assigned to i in the first round, and
then according to pi. PLDA(P ) is the two-round mechanism obtained from using the reassignment
mechanism DA
(
(ˆs, pˆs)s∈S , P ◦ L
)
.
We now formally define desirable properties from Section 3.2.1 in our discrete model. We
remark that the definitions of respecting guarantees, strategy-proofness and anonymity do not
reference school capacities and so carry over immediately. Similarly, the definitions for respecting
priorities, non-wastefulness and constrained Pareto efficiency do not require non-atomicity and so
our definition of η ensures that they also carry over. For completeness, we rewrite these properties
without reference to η.
Definition 3.20. A two-round mechanism M respects priorities (subject to guarantees) if
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(i) for every school i ∈ C and student s ∈ S who prefers i to her assigned school i ˆs µˆ(s) , we have
|µˆ(i)| = qi, and (ii) for all students s′ such that µˆ(s′) = i 6= µ(s′), we have ps′i ≥ psi .
Definition 3.21. A two-round mechanism is non-wasteful if no student is denied a seat at a school
that has vacant seats; that is, for each student s ∈ S and schools i, if iˆsµˆ(s), then |µˆ(i)| = qi.
Let µˆ be a second-round assignment. A Pareto-improving cycle is an ordered set of students
(s1, s2, . . . , sm) ∈ Sm and schools (1′, 2′, . . . ,m′) ∈ Cm such that (i+ 1)′ ˆii′ (where ˆi denotes the
second-round preferences of student si, and we define (m+ 1)′ = 1′), and µˆ(si) = i′ for all i.
Let pˆ be the second-round priorities obtained by giving each student s a top second-round
priority pˆsi = ni at their first-round assignment µ(s) = i (if i ∈ C ) and unchanged priority pˆsj = psj
at all other schools j 6= i. We say that a Pareto-improving cycle (in a second-round assignment)
respects (second-round) priorities if pˆsi(i+1)′ ≥ pˆ
si+1
(i+1)′ for all i (where we define sm+1 = s1).
Definition 3.22. A two-round mechanism is constrained Pareto efficient if the second-round
assignment has no Pareto-improving cycles that respect second-round priorities.
In a setting with a finite number of students, PLDA mechanisms exactly satisfy all these prop-
erties except for strategy-proofness.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose student preferences are consistent. Then PLDA mechanisms respect
guarantees and priorities, and are non-wasteful, constrained Pareto efficient, and anonymous.
Proof. The proofs of all these properties are almost identical to those in the continuum setting.
As an illustration, we prove that PLDA is constrained Pareto efficient in the discrete setting by
using the fact that both rounds use single tie-breaking and the output is stable with respect to the
second-round priorities pˆ.
Fix a Pareto-improving cycle C. Since si is assigned a seat at a school i when she prefers school
i+ 1 = µ(si+1), by the stability of DA she must either be in a strictly worse priority group than
si+1 at school i+ 1, or in the same priority group but have a worse lottery number. If C respects
(second-round) priorities, then it must hold that for all i that students si and si+1 are in the same
priority group at school i+ 1 and si has a worse lottery number than si+1. But since this holds
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for all i, single tie-breaking implies that we obtain a cycle of lottery numbers, which provides the
necessary contradiction.
Proposition 3.3 states that in a setting with a finite number of students, PLDA mechanisms
satisfy all our desired properties except for strategy-proofness. The following example illustrates
that in a setting with a finite number of students, PLDA mechanisms may not satisfy two-round
strategy-proofness. The intuition is that without non-atomicity, students are able to manipulate the
first-round assignments of other students to change the guarantees, and hence change the second-
round stability structure. In some cases in small markets, students are able to change the set of
stable outcomes to benefit themselves.
Example 3.2 (PLDA with a finite number of students is not strategy-proof.). Consider a setting
with n = 2 schools and N = 4 students, S = {w, x, y.z}. Each school has capacity 1 and a single
priority class. For readability, we let ∅ denote the outside option. The students have the following
preferences:
• 1 w ∅ w 2 and ∅ ˆw 1 ˆw2,
• 1 x 2 x ∅, second-round preferences identical,
• 2 y 1 y ∅, second-round preferences identical,
• 2 z ∅ z 1, second-round preferences identical.
We show that the RLDA mechanism is not strategy-proof. Consider the lottery that yields L(w) >
L(x) > L(y) > L(z). If the students report truthfully, the first-round assignment and second-round
reassignment are
µ(S) = (µ(w), µ(x), µ(y), µ(z)) = (1, 2, ∅, ∅), and
µˆ(S) = (µˆ(w), µˆ(x), µˆ(y), µˆ(z)) = (∅, 2, 1, ∅)
respectively. However, consider what happens if student x says that only school 1 is acceptable to
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her by reporting preferences r= ˆr given by 1r∅r2 and 1ˆr∅ˆr2. Then
µ(S) = (1, ∅, 2, ∅), µˆ(S) = (∅, 1, 2, ∅),
which is a strictly beneficial change for student x in the second round (and, in fact, weakly beneficial
for all students).
Note that this reassignment was not stable in the second round when students reported truth-




2 and so school
2 and student z formed a blocking pair. In other words, for this particular realization of lottery
numbers, student x is able to select a beneficial second-round assignment µˆ that was previously
unstable by changing student y’s first-round assignment so that student z cannot block µˆ.
In addition, the second-round outcome for student x under misreporting stochastically domi-
nates her outcome from truthful reporting, when all other students report truthfully and the ran-
domness is due the first-round lottery order. For if the lottery order is L(w) > L(x) > L(y) > L(z)
then student x can change her second-round assignment from 2 to 1 by reporting 2 as unacceptable,
and this is the only lottery order for which student x receives a second-round assignment of 2 under
truthful reporting. This is because if L(s) > L(x) for s ∈ {y, z} then student s is assigned to
school 2 and stays there in both rounds, if L(x) > L(w), L(y), L(z) then student x is assigned to
school 1 and stays there in both rounds, and finally if L(w) > L(x) > L(z) > L(y) then student
x is assigned to school 1 in the second round. Moreover, for any lottery order where student x
received 1 in the first or second round under truthful reporting, she also received school 1 in the
same round by misreporting. This is because any stable matching in which student x is assigned
to1 remains stable after student x truncates. Indeed, student x is not part of any unstable pair, as
she got her first choice, and any unstable pair not involving student x remains unstable under the
true preferences, as only student x changes her preferences. Hence the second-round assignment
student x receives by misreporting stochastically dominates the assignment she would have received
under truthful reporting. This violates strategy-proofness.
This example shows that, as noted in Section 3.7, PLDAmechanisms are not two-round strategy-
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proof in the finite setting. However, there are convergence results in the literature that suggest that
PLDA mechanisms are almost two-round strategy-proof in large markets. Azevedo and Leshno
(2016) have shown that if a sequence of (large) discrete economies converges to some limiting
continuum economy with a unique stable matching (defined via cutoffs), then the stable matchings
of the discrete economies converge to the stable matching of the continuum. Azevedo and Budish
(2017) have shown that Deferred Acceptance is “strategy-proof in the large”. We conjecture that
the proportion of students who are able to successfully manipulate PLDA mechanisms decreases
polynomially in the size of the market. While a formal proof of such a result is beyond the scope
of this paper, we provide a heuristic argument as follows. By definition, PLDA mechanisms satisfy
the efficiency and anonymity requirements in finite markets as well. In the second round it is
clearly a dominant strategy to be truthful, and, intuitively, for a student to benefit from a first-
round manipulation, her report should affect the second-round cutoffs in a manner that gives her
a second-round assignment she would not have received otherwise. If the market is large enough,
the cutoffs will converge to their limiting values, and the probability that she could benefit from
such a manipulation would be negligible.
Moreover, we believe that students will be unlikely to try to misreport under the PLDA mecha-
nisms.20 This is because, as Example 3.2 illustrates, successful manipulations require that students
strategically change their first-round assignment and correctly anticipate that this changes the set
of second-round stable assignments to their benefit. Such deviations are very difficult to plan and
require sophisticated strategizing and detailed information about other students’ preferences.
The heuristic argument that PLDAmechanisms are strategy-proof in the large also suggests that
our theoretical results should approximately hold for large discrete economies. A similar argument
can be used to show that an approximate version of our characterization result (Theorem 3.3)
holds for finite markets with no priorities, as PLDA mechanisms satisfy an approximate version of
the averaging axiom in large finite markets. Our type-equivalence result (Theorem 3.1) and result
showing that RLDA minimizes transfers (Theorem~3.2) should also be approximately valid in the
large market limit. Specifically, consider a sequence of markets of increasing size. If the global order
20as compared to the currently used DA mechanism.
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condition holds in the continuum limit, this should lead to approximate type-equivalence under all
PLDAs and to RLDA approximately minimizing transfers among PLDAs in the finite markets as
market size grows. Moreover, if the order condition holds, then in large finite economies and for
every permutation P , the set of students who violate a local order condition on PLDA(P ) will be
small relative to the size of the market.
3.6 Empirical Analysis of PLDA Mechanisms
In this section, we use data from the New York City (NYC) high school choice system to simulate
and evaluate the performance of centralized PLDA mechanisms under different permutations P .
The simulations indicate that our theoretical results are real-world relevant. Different choices of
P are found to yield similar allocative efficiency: the number of students assigned to their k-th
choice for each rank k, as well as the number of students remaining unassigned, are similar for
different permutations P . At the same time, the difference in the number of reassigned students is
significant and is minimized under RLDA.
Motivated by current practice, we also simulate decentralized versions of FLDA and RLDA.
In a version where students take time to vacate previously assigned seats, reversing the lottery
increases allocative efficiency during the early stages of reassignment and decreases the number of
reassignments at every stage. However, in a version where students take time to decide on offers
from the waitlist, the efficiency comparisons are reversed.21 In both versions both FLDA and RLDA
took tens of stages to converge. Our simulations suggest that decentralized waitlist mechanisms
can achieve some of the efficiency gains of a centralized mechanism but incur significant congestion
costs, and the effects of reversing the tie-breaking order before constructing waitlists will depend
on the specific time and informational constraints of the market.
21This is due to a phenomenon that occurs when the second round is decentralized (not captured by our theoretical
model), where under the reverse lottery the students with the worst lottery in the first round increase the waiting
time for other students in the second round by considering multiple offers off the waitlist that they eventually decline.
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3.6.1 Data
We use data from the high school admissions process in NYC for the academic years 2004–2005,
2005–2006, and 2006–2007, as follows.
First-round preferences. In our simulation, we take the first-round preferences  of every
student to be the preferences they submitted in the main round of admissions. The algorithm used
in practice is essentially strategy-proof (see Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005a), justifying our assumption
that reported preferences are true preferences.22
Second-round preferences. In our simulation, students either drop out of the system entirely
in the second round or maintain the same preferences. Students are considered to drop out if the
data does not record them as attending any public high school in NYC the following year (this was
the case for about 9% of the students each year).23
School capacities and priorites. Each school’s capacity is set to the number of students assigned
to it in the first-round assignment in the data. This is a lower bound on the true capacity, but lets
us compute the final assignment under PLDA with the true capacities, since the occupancy of each
school with vacant seats decreases across rounds in our setting. School priorities over students are
obtained directly from the data. (We obtain similar results in simulations with no school priorities.)
3.6.2 Simulations
We ran simulations using a centralized implementation of PLDA as well as two decentralized ver-
sions of PLDA.
Centralized PLDA. We first consider the following family of centralized PLDA mechanisms,
parameterized by a single parameter α that smoothly interpolates between RLDA and FLDA.
Each student s receives a uniform i.i.d. first-round lottery number L(s) (a normal variable with
22The algorithm is not completely strategy-proof, since students may rank no more than 12 schools. However,
only a very small percentage of students rank 12 schools. Another issue is that there is some empirical evidence that
students do not report their true preferences even in school choice systems with strategy-proof mechanisms; (see, e.g.,
Hassidim et al., 2015; Narita, 2016).
23For a minority of the students (9.2%-10.45%), attendance in the following year could not be determined by our
data, and hence we assume they drop out randomly at a rate equal to the dropout rate for the rest of the students
(8.9%-9.2%).
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mean 0 and variance 1), which generates a uniformly random lottery order.24 The second-round
‘permuted lottery’ of s is given by αL(s)+L˜(s), where L˜(s) is a new i.i.d. normal variable with mean
0 and variance 1, and α is identical for all the students. RLDA corresponds to α = −∞ and FLDA
corresponds to α =∞. For a fixed real α, every realization of second-round scores corresponds to
some permutation of first-round lottery numbers, with α roughly capturing the correlation of the
second-round order with that of the first round. We quote averages across simulations.
Decentralized PLDA. In order to evaluate the performance of waitlist systems, we also ran
simulations using two versions of decentralized PLDA with second rounds run in multiple “stages”:
Version 1. At stage `, school i has residual capacity q˜`i equal to the number of students previously
assigned to school i who rejected school i in the previous stage (and q˜1i is the number of students
assigned to school i in the first round who dropped out of the system). Each school i proposes to
the top q˜`i students on their waitlist (including students who dropped out) and removes them from
the waitlist, students who dropped out reject all offers, and all remaining students are (tentatively)
assigned to their favorite school that offered them a seat in the first round or in the second round
thus far and reject the rest. The stages of reassignment continue until there are no new proposals.
Version 2. At stage `, school i has residual capacity q˜`i equal to the number of students previously
assigned to school i who rejected school i in the previous stage (and q˜`1 is the number of students
assigned to school i in the first round who dropped out of the system). We run DA-STB on the
residual economy where each school i has capacity q˜`i and each student only finds schools strictly
better than their current assignment acceptable.25 This results in some students being reassigned
and new residual capacities for stage `+ 1, equal to the sum of the number of unfilled seats at the
end of stage ` and the number of students who left the school due to an upgrade in stage `. The
stages of reassignment continue until there are no new proposals.
Version 1 of the decentralized PLDA mechanisms mirrors a decentralized process where students
take time to make decisions. However, it does so in a rather naive fashion by assuming that students
24School preferences are then generated by considering students in the lexicographical ordering first in terms of
priority, then by lottery number. We may equivalently renormalize the set of realized lottery numbers to lie in the
interval [0, 1] before computing scores.
25We provide results using school-proposing DA, as this more closely mirrors the structure of waitlist systems.
Results using student-proposing DA were similar.
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take the same amount of time to accept an offer, to reject an offer, or to inform a school that they
were previously assigned to that they have been assigned to a different school. Version 2 captures a
decentralized process where students also take time to both make and communicate decisions, but
take much longer to tell schools that they were previously assigned to that they have been assigned
to a different school. Accordingly the efficiency outcomes at a given stage of version 2 dominate
those of version 1 at the same stage, as more information is communicated during each stage under
version 2.
Version 2 simulations a setting where the main driver behind congestion is chains of student
reassignment. Version 2 is more realistic in settings where schools are the primary drivers behind
updated information, since a school is much more likely to ask for decisions from students who are
undecided about an offer from the school rather than from students who have already accepted
an offer from the school. In many school districts information about previously assigned students
being reassigned to other schools is processed centrally, and it is also reasonable to assume that this
would occur on a slower timescale than rejections of offers. In practice we expect that the dynamics
of waitlist systems would lie somewhere on the spectrum between these two extreme versions of
decentralized PLDA.
3.6.3 Results
The results of our centralized PLDA computational experiments based on 2004–2005 NYC high
school admissions data appear in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.4. Results for 2005–2006 and 2006–2007
were similar. Figure 3.4 shows that the mean number of reassignments is minimized at α = −∞
(RLDA) and increases with α, which is consistent with our theoretical result in Theorem 3.2. The
mean number of reassignments is as large as 7,800 under FLDA compared to just 3,400 under
RLDA.
Allocative efficiency appears not to vary much across values of α: the number of students receiv-
ing at least their k-th choice for each 1 ≤ k ≤ 12, as well as the number of unassigned students, vary
by less than 1% of the total number of students. There is a slight trade-off between allocative effi-
ciency due to reassignment and allocative efficiency from assigning previously unassigned students,
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Figure 3.4: Number of reassigned students versus α. The number of reassigned students under the extreme values of
α, namely, α =∞ (FLDA) and α = −∞ (RLDA), are shown via dotted lines.
α Reassignments Unassigned k = 1 k ≤ 2 k ≤ 3
# % % % %
Round 1 (No Reassignment) 0 9.31 50.14 64.14 72.44
Round 2
FLDA: ∞ 7797 5.89 55.41 69.85 78.03
8.00 7606 5.90 55.40 69.85 78.02
6.00 7512 5.90 55.40 69.85 78.03
4.00 7325 5.89 55.38 69.84 78.02
2.00 6863 5.89 55.33 69.81 78.02
0.00 5220 5.87 54.96 69.65 77.97
-2.00 3686 5.81 54.52 69.37 77.82
-4.00 3480 5.79 54.47 69.33 77.78
-6.00 3433 5.79 54.46 69.32 77.77
-8.00 3416 5.79 54.45 69.31 77.77
RLDA: −∞ 3391 5.79 54.45 69.30 77.75
Table 3.1: Centralized PLDA simulation results: 2004–2005 NYC high school admissions.
We show the mean percentage of students remaining unassigned or getting at least their kth choice, averaged across
100 realizations for each value of α. All percentages are out of the total number of students remaining in the second
round. The data contained 81,884 students, 74,366 students remaining in the second round, and 652 schools. The
percentage of students who dropped out was 9.18%. The variation in the number of reassignments across realizations
was only about 100 students.
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with the percentage of unassigned students and percentage of students obtaining their top choice
both decreasing in α by about 0.1% and 1% of students respectively.26We further find that for most
students, the likelihoods of getting one of their top k choices under FLDA and under RLDA are
very close to each other. (For instance, for 87% of students, these likelihoods differ by less than
3% for all k.) This is consistent with what we would expect based on our theoretical finding of
type-equivalence (Theorem 3.1) of the final assignment under different PLDA mechanisms.
The results of our decentralized PLDA computation experiments appear in Table 3.2. When
implementing PLDAs in a decentralized fashion, our measures of congestion can be more nuanced.
We let a reassignment be a movement of a student from a school in C to a different school in
C, possibly during an interim stage of the second round, and let a temporary reassignment be a
movement of a student from a school in C ∪ {n+ 1} to a different school in C that is not their final
assignment. We will also be interested in the number of stages it takes to clear the market.
In the first version of decentralized PLDAs, FLDA reassigns more students than RLDA but far
outperforms RLDA in terms of minimizing congestion and maximizing efficiency. FLDA takes on
average 17 stages to converges, while RLDA requires 33. FLDA performs 780 temporary transfers
while RLDA performs 2420, creating much more unnecessary congestion. FLDA takes 2 and 5
stages to achieve 50% and 90% respectively of the total increase in number of students assigned to
their top school, whereas RLDA takes 3 and 9 stages respectively. FLDA also dominates RLDA in
terms of the number of students assigned to one of their top k choices in the first ` stages, for all
k and all `, and the percentage of unassigned students in the first ` stages for almost all small `.
In the second version of decentralized PLDAs, FLDA still reassigns more students and now
achieves less allocative efficiency than RLDA during the initial stages of reassignment. RLDA has
fewer unassigned students by stage ` than FLDA for all `. RLDA also dominates FLDA in terms of
the number of students assigned to one of their top k choices in the first 2 stages, and achieves most
of its allocative efficiency by the second stage, improving the allocative efficiency by fewer than 100
students from that point onwards. In the limit FLDA is still slightly more efficient than RLDA,
26Intuitively, prioritizing students with lower lotteries both decreases the number of unassigned students and
decreases allocative efficiency by artificially increasing the constraints from providing first-round guarantees.
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α Reassignments Unassigned k = 1 k ≤ 2 k ≤ 3
# total (# temporary) % % % %
Round 1 (No Reassignments) 0 9.31 50.14 64.17 72.45
Round 2 FLDA, Version 1
Stage 1 3461 (447) 7.89 52.68 66.62 74.47
Stage 2 2126 (206) 7.04 53.93 68.03 76.14
Stage 3 1258 (80) 6.55 54.60 68.83 76.96
Stage 4 727 (30) 6.27 54.97 69.28 77.42
Stage 5 425 (11) 6.11 55.18 69.53 77.68
Total (Stage ≈ 17) 8590 (780) 5.87 55.46 69.87 78.05
Round 2 RLDA, Version 1
Stage 1 1004 (835) 7.85 51.38 65.70 74.09
Stage 2 1077 (577) 7.18 52.24 66.72 75.15
Stage 3 838 (369) 6.78 52.82 67.39 75.83
Stage 4 640 (234) 6.52 53.23 67.86 76.30
Stage 9 180 (24) 5.97 54.22 69.02 77.45
Total (Stage ≈ 33) 5818(2419) 5.79 54.51 69.37 77.80
Round 2 FLDA, Version 2
Stage 1 4139 (457) 7.62 53.21 67.14 75.21
Stage 2 2333 (166) 6.69 54.50 68.66 76.75
Stage 3 1137 (42) 6.24 55.06 69.35 77.48
Stage 4 511 (9) 6.03 55.30 69.65 77.80
Total (Stage ≈ 12) 8503 (677) 5.89 55.47 69.87 78.04
Round 2 RLDA, Version 2
Stage 1 2863 (199) 6.15 54.14 68.85 77.24
Stage 2 489 (17) 5.88 54.38 69.16 77.58
Stage 3 165 (2) 5.82 54.46 69.26 77.69
Stage 4 63 (0) 5.79 54.49 69.30 77.73
Total (Stage ≈ 9) 3624 (220) 5.79 54.51 69.33 77.76
Table 3.2: Decentralized PLDA simulation results: 2004–2005 NYC high school admissions.
We show the mean number of reassignments (number of movements of a student from a school in C to a different
school in C) as well as the mean number of temporary reassignments (number of movements of a student from a school
in C ∪ {n+ 1} to a school in C that is not their final assignment) in parentheses. We also show mean percentage of
students remaining unassigned, or getting at least their kth choice. All figures are averaged across 100 realizations
for each value of α, and all percentages are out of the total number of students remaining in the second round. The
data contained 81,884 students, 74,366 students remaining in the second round, and 652 schools.
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and so for large ` FLDA achieves higher allocative welfare than RLDA after ` stages. However
FLDA also requires more stages to converge, taking on average 12 stages compared to 9 for RLDA.
Our empirical findings have mixed implications for implementing decentralized waitlists. Our
clearest finding is the benefit of centralization in reducing congestion. In most school districts
students are given up to a week to make decisions. If students take this long both to reject
undesirable offers and to vacate previously assigned seats, our simulations on NYC data suggest
that in the best case the market could take at least 4 months to clear. Even if students make
quick decisions, if it takes them a week to vacate their previously assigned seats, our simulations
suggest that the market would take at least 2 months to clear. In both cases the congestion
costs are prohibitive. If, despite these congestion costs, a school district wishes to implement
decentralized waitlists, our results suggest that the optimal permutation for the second-round
lottery for constructing waitlists will depend on the informational constraints in the market.
3.6.4 Strategy-proofness of PLDA
One of the aspects of the DA mechanism that makes it successful in school choice in practice is that
it is strategy-proof. While we have shown that PLDA mechanisms are two-round strategyproof in
a continuum setting, it is natural to ask to what extent PLDA mechanisms are two-round strategy-
proof in practice. We provide a numerical upper bound on the incentives to deviate from truthful
reporting using computational experiments based on 2004–2005 NYC high school data, and find
that on average a negligible proportion of students (< 0.01%) could benefit from misreporting
within their consideration set of programs. Specically, 0.8% of sampled students could misreport
in a potentially beneficial manner in at least one of 100 sampled lotteries, and no students could
benefit in more than 3 of 100 sampled lotteries from misreporting. Moreover for 99.8% of lotteries
the proportion of students who could successfully manipulate their report was at most 1%.
These upper bounds were computed as follows. Approximately 2700 students were sampled,
and RLDA was run for each of these students using 100 different sampled lotteries. For a given
student, let C be the set of schools that were a part of the student’s first round preferences in the
data. We allowed the student to unilaterally misreport in the first round, reporting at most one
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school from C in the first round instead of their true preferences. We then counted the number
of such students who by doing so could either (1) change their first-round assignment (for the
worse) but second-round assignment for the better, or (2) create a rejection cycle. This provides a
provable upper bound on the number of students who can benefit from misreporting (and possibly
reordering) a subset of C in the first round. We omit the formal details in the interest of space.
3.7 Proposals & Discussion
Summary of findings. We have proposed the PLDA mechanisms as a class of reassignment mech-
anisms with desirable incentive and efficiency properties. These mechanisms can be implemented
with a centralized second round at the start of the school year, or with a decentralized second round
via waitlists, and a suitable implementation can be chosen depending on the timing of informa-
tion arrival and subsequent congestion in the market. Moreover, the key defining characteristic of
the mechanisms in this class, the permutation used to correlate the tie-breaking lotteries between
rounds, can be used to optimize various objectives. We propose implementing centralized RLDA
at the start of the school year, as both in our theory and in simulations on data this allows us to
maintain efficiency while eliminating the congestion caused by sequentially reassigning students,
and minimizes the number of reassignments required to reach an efficient assignment.
RLDA is practical. We have shown that RLDA is an attractive choice when the objectives
are to achieve allocative efficiency and minimize the number of reassigned students. In addition,
RLDA has the nice property of being equitable in an intuitive manner, as students who receive a
poor draw of the lottery in the first round are prioritized in the second round. This may make
RLDA more palatable to students than other PLDA mechanisms. Indeed, Random Hall, an MIT
dorm, uses a mechanism for assigning rooms that resembles the reverse lottery mechanism we have
proposed. Freshmen rooms are assigned using serial dictatorship. At the end of the year (after
seniors leave), students can claim the rooms vacated by the seniors using serial dictatorship where
the initial lottery numbers (from their first match) are reversed.27
27The MIT Random Hall matching is more complicated, because sophomores and juniors can also claim the vacated
rooms, but the lottery only gets reversed at the end of freshman year. Afterward, if a sophomore switches room, her
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Optimizing other objectives. Our results suggest that PLDA mechanisms are an attractive class
of mechanisms in more general settings, and the choice of mechanism within this class will vary with
the policy goal. If, for instance, it were viewed as more equitable to allow more students to receive
(possibly small) improvements to their first-round assignment, then the FLDA mechanism that
simply runs DA again would optimize over this objective. Moreover, our type-equivalence result
(Theorem 3.1) shows that when the relative overdemand for schools stays the same this choice can
be made without sacrificing allocative efficiency.
Discussion of axiomatic characterization. We axiomatically justified the class of PLDA mech-
anisms in settings where schools do not have priorities (Theorem 3.3). In a model with priorities,
we find that natural extensions of our axioms continue to describe PLDA mechanisms, but also
include undesirable generalizations of PLDA mechanisms. Specifically, suppose that we add an
axiom requiring that for each school i, the probability that a student who reports a top choice of i
then receives it in the first or second round be independent of their priority at other schools. This
new set of axioms describes a class of mechanisms that includes the PLDA mechanisms. However,
there also exists an example market and a mechanism satisfying this new set of axioms such that
the joint distribution over the two rounds of assignments does not match any PLDA. Characterizing
the class of mechanisms satisfying these axioms in the richer setting with school priorities remains
an open question. It may also be possible to characterize PLDA mechanisms in a setting with
priorities using a different set of axioms. We leave both questions for future research.
Inconsistent preferences. Another natural question is how to deal with inconsistent student
preferences. Narita (2016) observed that in the current reapplication process in the NYC public
school system, although only about 7% of students reapplied, about 70% of these reapplicants re-
ported second-round preferences that were inconsistent with their first-round reported preferences.
Note that PLDAs allow students to report inconsistent preferences in the second round. We believe
that some of our insights remain valid if a small fraction of students have an idiosyncratic change in
preferences, or if a small number of new students enter in the second round. However, new effects
may emerge if students have arbitrarily different preferences in the two rounds. In such settings,
priority drops to the last place of the queue.
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strategy-proofness is no longer well defined, and it can be shown that the order condition is no
longer sufficient to guarantee type-equivalence and optimality of RLDA. Moreover, in such settings
the relative efficiency of the PLDA mechanisms will depend on the details of school supply and
student demand.
More than two rounds. Finally, what insights do our results provide for situations in which
assignment is done in three or more rounds? For instance, one could consider mechanisms under
which the lottery is reversed (or permuted) after a certain number of rounds and thereafter remains
fixed. At what stage should the lottery be reversed? Clearly, there are many other mechanisms




The Cutoff Structure of Top Trading
Cycles in School Choice
In this chapter, we provide a framework for optimizing over quantitative objectives when using the
Top Trading Cycles (TTC) school choice mechanism. We first develop a characterization of TTC
that explains the role of priorities in determining the TTC assignment and can be used to tractably
analyze TTC. The TTC assignment can be concisely described by admissions cutoffs, with a cutoff
pij for each pair of schools i, j that describes the minimal priority a student needs to have at school
j in order to use it to attend school i. These cutoffs parallel prices in competitive equilibrium, with
students’ priorities serving the role of endowments. We show that there is a labeling of schools
{1, .., n} such that for any i the cutoffs are ordered p1i ≥ p2i ≥ . . . pii = · · · = pni . Additionally, to
help convey to students that TTC is strategy-proof, we derive cutoffs that are independent of the
reported preferences of a given student.
To facilitate tractable analysis of TTC, we then formulate a continuum model of TTC and show
how to directly calculate the TTC assignment from the distribution of preferences and priorities
by solving a system of equations. We present closed form solutions for parameterized economies.
We also show that the discrete TTC model is a particular case of the continuum framework, as for
discrete problems the continuum TTC model calculates cutoffs that give the discrete TTC assign-
ment. We establish that the TTC assignment changes smoothly with changes in the underlying
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economy, implying that the continuum economy can also be used to approximate sufficiently similar
economies.
The tractability of our framework relies on a novel approach to analyzing TTC. A key idea that
allows us to define TTC in the continuum is that the TTC algorithm can be characterized by its
aggregate behavior over many cycles. Any collection of cycles must maintain trade balance, that is,
the number of students assigned to each school is equal to the number of students who claimed or
traded a seat at that school. For smooth continuum economies we reformulate the trade balance
equations into a system of equations that fully characterizes TTC. These equations provide a recipe
for calculating the TTC assignment.
The tractable continuum framework allows us to analyze the performance of TTC. We provide
comparative statics, calculate assignment probabilities under lotteries and evaluate welfare. In
particular, when priorities are partly determined by random lottery, the probability that a student
gains admission to a school can be directly derived as the probability her random priority is above
the required cutoffs. The cutoff representation also yields for each student a budget set of schools
at which she gained admission, and these budget sets allow tractable expressions for welfare under
random utility models.
As an illustration of the framework, we apply it to study the effects of making a school more
desirable. As a shorthand, we refer to such changes as an increase in the quality of the school.1 To
evaluate the effects of increasing the quality of a school it is necessary to account for changes in the
assignment due to changes in student preferences. First, we derive comparative statics that show
how the assignment and student welfare change with changes in a school’s quality. We decompose
the marginal change in student welfare into the direct increase in utility of students assigned to
the more desirable school and the indirect effect that arises from changes in the assignment. A
marginal increase in the quality of a popular school can have a negative indirect effect on welfare:
as some students switch into the school and gain a marginal utility increase, other students are
1Examples of such changes include increases in school infrastructure spending Cellini et al. (2010), increases in
school district funding Hoxby (2001); Jackson et al. (2016); Johnson and Jackson (2017), reduction in class size
Krueger (1999); Chetty et al. (2011) and changes in an individual school’s funding Dinerstein et al. (2014), but our
theoretical model is not specific to any of these examples.
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denied admission and can suffer substantial losses. We quantify these effects in a parametric setting,
showing that increasing the quality of a popular school can decrease the welfare gains from sorting
on idiosyncratic preferences.
This allows us to consider a school district’s problem of optimally allocating resources to improve
schools, taking utilitarian welfare as a proxy for the school district’s objective. The framework
allows us to solve for the optimal distribution of school quality under TTC for a parametric setting.
We find that the optimal distribution of quality is equitable, in the sense that it makes all schools
equally over-demanded. An equitable distribution of quality is efficient under TTC because it
allows students more choice, yielding better sorting on idiosyncratic preferences and therefore higher
welfare. This can hold even if some schools are more efficient at utilizing resources, as the benefits
from more efficient sorting can outweigh benefits from targeting more efficient schools.
As another application, we explore the design of priorities for TTC and find that it is “bossy”
in the sense that a change in the priority of a student that does not alter her assignment can
nonetheless alter the assignment of other students. This implies that it is not possible to determine
the TTC cutoffs directly through a supply-demand equation as in Azevedo and Leshno (2016).
We characterize the range of possible assignments generated by TTC after changes to the relative
priority of high-priority students, and show that a small change to the priorities will only change
the assignment of a few students.
A third application of our model provides comparisons between mechanisms in terms of assign-
ments and welfare. We solve for welfare under TTC and DA in a parametric setting and quantify
how much welfare is sacrificed due to stability. A comparison between TTC and DA across different
school choice environments corroborates a conjecture by Pathak (2016) that the difference between
the mechanisms becomes smaller with increased alignment between student preferences and school
priorities. We also compare TTC to the Clinch and Trade mechanism of Morrill (2015b) in large
economies and find that it is possible for TTC to produce fewer blocking pairs than the Clinch and
Trade mechanism.
A few technical aspects of the analysis may be of interest. First, we note that the trade
balance equations circumvent many of the measure theoretic complications in defining TTC in the
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continuum. Second, a connection to Markov chain theory allows us to show that a solution to the
marginal trade balance equations always exists, and to characterize the possible trades.
4.1 Prior Work on TTC
Since Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) introduced school choice as a mechanism design problem
and suggested the DA and TTC mechanisms as desirable solutions, TTC has been considered for
use in a number of school choice systems. However, while DA has been adopted by many school
choice systems, TTC has essentially not been implemented, leading to a number of papers studying
the relative merits of the two mechanisms for practical applications. Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005b)
discuss how the city of Boston debated between using DA and TTC for their school choice systems
and ultimately chose DA. Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009) compare the outcomes of DA and TTC for
the NYC public school system, and show that TTC gives higher student welfare. Kesten (2006)
studies the relationship between DA and TTC, and shows that they are equivalent if and only if
the priority structure is acyclic.
There are a multitude of characterizations of TTC in the literature. Abdulkadiroğlu et al.
(2017c) show that TTC minimizes the number of blocking pairs subject to strategy-proofness and
Pareto efficiency. Additional axiomatic characterizations of TTC were given by Dur (2012b) and
Morrill (2013, 2015a). These characterizations explore the qualitative properties of TTC, but do
not provide another method for calculating the TTC outcome or evaluating quantitative objectives.
Ma (1994), Pápai (2000) and Pycia and Ünver (2017) give characterizations of more general classes
of Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms in terms of clearing trade cycles. While our
analysis focuses on the TTC mechanism, we believe that our trade balance approach will be useful
in analyzing these general classes of mechanisms.
Dur and Morrill (2017) show that the outcome of TTC can be expressed as the outcome of a
competitive market where there is a price for each priority position at each school, and agents may
buy and sell exactly one priority position. Our characterization also provides a connection between
TTC and competitive markets, but requires a lower dimensional set of cutoffs and provides a method
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for directly calculating these cutoffs. He et al. (Forthcoming) propose an alternative pseudo-market
approach for discrete assignment problems that extends Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) and also
uses admission cutoffs. Miralles and Pycia (2014) show a second welfare theorem for discrete goods,
namely that any Pareto efficient assignment of discrete goods without transfers can be decentralized
through prices and endowments, but require an arbitrary endowment structure.
Several variants of TTC have been suggested in the literature. Morrill (2015b) introduces
the Clinch and Trade mechanism, which differs from TTC in that it identifies students who are
guaranteed admission to their first choice and assigns them immediately without implementing a
trade. Hakimov and Kesten (Forthcoming) introduce Equitable TTC, a variation on TTC that aims
to reduce inequity. In Chapter 4.5.2 we show how our model can be used to analyze such variants
of TTC and compare their assignments. Other variants of TTC can also arise from the choice of
tie-breaking rules. Ehlers (2014) shows that any fixed tie-breaking rule satisfies weak efficiency,
and Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2011), Jaramillo and Manjunath (2012) and Saban and Sethuraman
(2013) give specific variants of TTC that are strategy-proof and efficient. The continuum model
allows us to characterize the possible outcomes from different tie-breaking rules.
Several papers also study TTC in large markets. Hatfield et al. (2016) study the incentives for
schools to improve their quality under TTC and find that even in a large market a school may be
assigned less preferred students when it improves its quality. Our results in Chapter 4.5.1 quantify
these effects. Che and Tercieux (2015, 2018) study the properties of TTC in a large market where
the heterogeneity of items grows as the market gets large, whereas our setting considers a large
population of agents and a fixed number of item types. The results in Chapter 4.5 show that TTC
has different properties in these different large markets.
4.1.1 Practical Implications
When school districts redesigned their school choice mechanisms to improve student welfare, most
chose to implement the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism, and essentially none selected the
TTC mechanism. This is despite the fact that while TTC is Pareto efficient for students, DA
is inefficient, in that it may produce assignments that are Pareto dominated for students. For
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example, students are commonly given priority for their neighborhood schools, and DA may assign
two students to their respective neighborhood schools even if both students would prefer to swap
their assignments.2
One of the possible reasons for the lack of popularity of TTC is the way it has typically been
described. While the sequential clearing of trade cycles is simple to state, it obscures the desirable
properties of the mechanism and results in an opaque mapping between a student’s priorities
and their assignment. For example, Boston Public Schools considered both TTC and DA when
redesigning its school choice in 2005, and decided in favor of using DA, stating BPS (2005):
The behind the scenes mechanized trading makes the student assignment process less
transparent[...] and could lead families to believe they can strategize by listing a school
they don’t want in hopes of a trade.
Similarly, in Pathak (2016) Pathak writes: “I believe that the difficulty of explaining TTC, together
with the precedent set by New York and Boston’s choice of DA, are more likely explanations for why
TTC is not used in more districts.” In other words, the combinatorial description of TTC in terms
of trading cycles caused users to doubt the strategy-proofness of the mechanism, and eroded trust
in the system by making it difficult for parents verify that their children were correctly assigned.
Another major drawback of the algorithmic description of TTC is that it makes it difficult to
discern how a student’s priorities determine their assignment under TTC. This is exacerbated by
the fact that priority at a school has different implications under DA and TTC; under TTC (in
contrast to DA) it is possible for a student to gain admission to one school by having priority at
another school. This means that school boards could potentially redesign their priority structures
to obtain their goals under TTC, but in general the appropriate priority structures under DA and
TTC will be different, and current theory provides almost no guidance as to how to design such
2Such a swap will not harm any other students, but can lead to an assignment that is unstable with respect to
the priority structure. While this may allow strategic agents to form blocking pairs in other contexts (such as the
NRMP), this is not a concern for many school districts (such as the Boston Public Schools system) because of two
attributes of school choice. First, priority for a school is often determined by school zone, sibling status and lotteries.
Thus, schools do not prefer higher priority students. Second, schools cannot enroll students without the districts
approval. (The NYC high school admissions system is a notable exception, see Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009)).
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priority structures under TTC. 3
Our cutoff characterization of TTC provides a way to communicate the TTC outcome that is




allows each student to determine their assignment.4Additionally, we provide TTC cutoffs that
are independent of the reported preferences of a given student, which demonstrates that TTC
is strategy-proof. Our cutoff characterization also elucidates the role of priorities under TTC.
Students can use priority at school i to gain admission to school j if their priority at school i is
above the cutoff pji . Each student is assigned to her most preferred school for which she gained
admission. As a result, we are hopeful that our framework for understanding the TTC outcome
and designing appropriate input (such as school priorities) can increase the adoption of the Pareto
efficient TTC in practice.
Finally, cutoff representations have been instrumental for empirical work on DA and variants of
DA. Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017b) use admission cutoffs to construct propensity score estimates.
Agarwal and Somaini (2018); Kapor et al. (2016) structurally estimate preferences from rank lists
submitted to non-strategy-proof variants of DA. Both build on the cutoff representation of Azevedo
and Leshno (2016). We hope that our cutoff representation of TTC will be similarly useful for
empirical work on TTC.
4.2 TTC in School Choice
4.2.1 The Discrete TTC Model
Let S be a finite set of students, and let C = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of schools. Each school i ∈ C
has a finite capacity qi > 0. Each student s ∈ S has a strict preference ordering s over schools.
3Comparisons between DA and TTC rely on simulations, and typically use the same priority structure for both
mechanisms instead of optimizing the priority structures used for each mechanism, see for example Abdulkadiroğlu
et al. (2009); Pathak (2016).
4 This cutoff representation allows us to give the following non-combinatorial description of TTC. For each school
i, each student receives i-tokens according to their priority at school i, where students with higher i-priority receive




. Students can purchase a single school using a single
kind of token, and the required number of i-tokens to purchase school j is pji . Theorem 4.1 shows the cutoffs can be
observed after the run of TTC. We thank Chiara Margaria, Laura Doval and Larry Samuelson for suggesting this
explanation.
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Let Chs (C) = arg maxs {C} denote s’s most preferred school out of the set C. Each school i ∈ C
has a strict priority ordering i over students. To simplify notation, we assume that all students
and schools are acceptable, and that there are more students than available seats at schools.5 It
will be convenient to represent the priority of student s at school i by the student’s percentile rank
rsi = |{s′ | s i s′}| / |S| in the school’s priority ordering. Note that for any two students s, s′ and
school i we have that s i s′ ⇐⇒ rsi > rs
′
i and that 0 ≤ rsi < 1.
A feasible assignment is µ : S → C ∪ {∅} where |µ−1(i)| ≤ qi for every i ∈ C. If µ(s) = i we
say that s is assigned to i, and we use µ(s) = ∅ to denote that the student s is unassigned. As
there is no ambiguity, we let µ(i) denote the set µ−1(c) for i ∈ C ∪ {∅}. A discrete economy is
E = (C,S,S ,C , q), where C is the set of schools, S is the set of students, q = {qi}i∈C is the
capacity of each school, and S= {s}s∈S , C= {i}i∈C .
Given an economy E, the discrete Top Trading Cycles algorithm (TTC) calculates an assignment
µdTTC (· | E) : S → C ∪ {∅}. We omit the dependence on E when it is clear from context. The
algorithm runs in discrete steps, as described in Algorithm 1.
Mechanism 1 Top Trading Cycles (TTC)
1: procedure TTC(E =
(
C,S,S ,C , q
)
)
2: S ← S . Unassigned students
3: C ← C . Available schools
4: q˜ ← q . Residual capacity
5: while |S| > 0, |C| > 0 do . while there are unassigned students and available schools
6: for i ∈ C do
7: i points to and offers a seat to highest priority student in S
8: for s ∈ S do
9: s points to most preferred school in C
10: Select at least one trading cycle, i.e. a list of students s1, . . . , s`, s`+1 = s1 such that
si+1 was offered a seat at si’s most preferred available school. Assign all students in the cycle
to the school they point to.6
11: Remove the assigned students from S, reduce the capacity of the schools they were
assigned to by 1, and remove schools with no remaining capacity from C.
12: return µ
TTC satisfies a number of desirable properties. An assignment µ is Pareto efficient for students
5This is without loss of generality, as we can introduce auxiliary students and schools that represent being un-
matched.
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if no group of students can improve by swapping their allocations, and no individual student can
improve by swapping her assignment for an unassigned object. A mechanism is Pareto efficient
for students if it always produces an assignment that is Pareto efficient for students. A mechanism
is strategy-proof for students if reporting preferences truthfully is a dominant strategy. It is well
known that TTC, as used in the school choice setting, is both Pareto efficient and strategy-proof
for students (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003). Moreover, when type-specific quotas must be
imposed, TTC can be easily modified to meet quotas while still maintaining constrained Pareto
efficiency and strategy-proofness (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003).
4.2.2 Cutoff Characterization
Our first main contribution is that the TTC assignment can be described in terms of n2 cutoffs
{pij}, one for each pair of schools.
Theorem 4.1. Let E be an economy. The TTC assignment is given by
µdTTC(s | E) = maxs
{
i | rsj ≥ pij for some j
}
,
where pij is the percentile in school j’s ranking of the worst ranked student at school j that traded a
seat at school j for a seat at school i during the run of the TTC algorithm on E. If no such student
exists, pij = 1.
Proof. For each student s let B (s,p) =
{
i | rsj ≥ pij for some j
}
. It suffices to show that for each
student s it holds that µdTTC (s) ∈ B (s,p), and that if i ∈ B (s,p) then s prefers µdTTC (s) to
i, i.e. µdTTC (s) s i. The former is simple to show, since if we let j be the school such that
s traded a seat at school j for a seat at school µdTTC (s), then by definition pµdTTC(s)j ≤ rsj and
µdTTC (s) ∈ B (s,p).
Now suppose for the sake of contradiction that i ∈ B (s,p) and student s strictly prefers i to
µdTTC (s), i.e. i s µdTTC (s). As i ∈ B (s,p) there exists a school j′ such that rsj′ ≥ pij′ . Let s′ be
the student with rank rs′j′ = pij′ at school j′. (Such a student exists by the definition of pij′ .) Then by
definition student s′ traded a seat at school j′, so since rsj′ ≥ pij′ = rs
′
j′ student s is assigned weakly
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before student s′. Additionally, since i s µdTTC (s) school i must reach capacity before student s
is assigned, and so since student s′ was assigned to school i student s′ was assigned strictly before
student s. This provides the required contradiction.
Cutoffs serve a parallel role to prices in Competitive Equilibrium, and each student’s vector





combine with student s’s priorities rs to give s a budget set B (s,p) =
{
i | rsj ≥ pij for some j
}
of
schools she can attend. TTC assigns each student to her favorite school in her budget set.
The cutoffs pij in Theorem 4.1 can be easily identified after the mechanism has been run. Hence
Theorem 4.1 provides an intuitive way for students to verify that they were correctly assigned by
the TTC algorithm. Instead of only communicating the assignment of each student, the mechanism
can make the cutoffs publicly known. Students can calculate their budget set from their privately
known priorities and the publicly given cutoffs, allowing them to verify that they were indeed
assigned to their most preferred school in their budget set. In particular, if a student does not
receive a seat at a desired school i, it is because she does not have sufficiently high priority at any
school, and so i is not in her budget set. We illustrate these ideas in Example 4.1.
Example 4.1. Consider a simple economy where there are two schools each with capacity q = 120,
and a total of 300 students, 2/3 of whom prefer school 1. Student priorities were selected such that
there is little correlation between student priority at either school and between student priorities
and preferences. Figure 4.1a illustrates the preferences and priorities of each of the students. Each
colored number represents a student. The location of the student in the square indicates their
priority, with the horizontal axis indicating priority at school 1 and the vertical axis indicating
priority at school 2. The number indicates the student’s preferred school, and all students find
both schools acceptable. The color indicates the student’s assignment under TTC.
The cutoffs p and resulting budget sets B (s,p) for each student are illustrated in Figure 4.1b.
The colors in the body of the figure indicate the budget sets given to students as a function of
their priority at both schools. The colors along each axis indicate the schools that enter a student’s
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(b) Budget sets for the economy E.
Figure 4.1: The economy and TTC budget sets for Example 4.1.
example, a student has the budget set {1, 2} if she has sufficiently high priority at either school 1
or school 2. Note that students’ preferences are not indicated in Figure 4.1b as for given p each
student’s budget set does not depend on her preferences. The assignment of each student is her
favorite school in her budget set.
Figure 4.1 shows the role of priorities in determining the TTC assignment in Example 4.1.
Students with higher priority have a larger budget set of schools from which they can choose. A
student can choose her desired school if her priority for some school is sufficiently high. Priority for
each school is considered separately, and priority from multiple schools cannot be combined. For
example, a student who has top priority for one school and bottom priority at the other school is
assigned to her top choice, but a student who has the median priority at both schools will not be
assigned to school 1.
Remark. This example also shows that the TTC assignment cannot be expressed in terms of one
cutoff for each school, as the assignment in Example 4.1 cannot be described by fewer than 3 cutoffs.
4.2.3 The Structure of TTC Budget Sets
The cutoff structure for TTC allows us to provide some insight into the structure of the assignment.
For each student s, let Bi (s,p) =
{
j | rsi ≥ pji
}
denote the set of schools that enter student s’s






j∈C . A student’s budget set is the union B (s,p) = ∪iBi (s,p). Figure 4.1(b) depicts
B1 (s,p) and B2 (s,p) for the economy of Example 4.1 along the x and y axes respectively.
The following proposition shows that budget sets Bi (s,p) can be given by cutoffs pi that share
the same ordering over schools for every i. We let C(i) = {i, i+ 1, . . . , n} denote the set of schools
that have a higher index than i.




that describe the TTC assignment
µdTTC(s) = maxs
{
j | rsi ≥ pji for some i
}
,
and for any school i the cutoffs are ordered,7
p1i ≥ p2i ≥ · · · ≥ pii = pi+1i = · · · = pni . (4.1)
Therefore, the set of schools Bi (s,p) student s can afford via her priority at school i is either the
empty set φ or
Bi (s,p) = C(j) = {j, j + 1, . . . , n}
for some j ≤ i. Moreover, each student’s budget set B (s,p) = ∪iBi (s,p) is either B (s,p) = φ or
B (s,p) = C(j) for some j.
Proof. Let the schools be indexed such that they reach capacity in the order 1, 2, . . . , |C|. If a
student s was assigned (strictly) after school ` − 1 reached capacity and (weakly) before school
` reached capacity, we say that the student s was assigned in round `. Given TTC cutoffs pji




by setting p˜ji = mink≤j pki . It evidently holds that









, i.e. for each student s it holds that
maxs
{
j | rsi ≥ p˜ji for some i
}
= µdTTC(s) = maxs
{
j | rsi ≥ pji for some i
}
.
For each student s let B (s, p˜) =
{
j | rsi ≥ p˜ji for some i
}
. It suffices to show that for each
7The cutoffs p defined in Theorem 4.1 do not necessarily satisfy this condition. However, the run of TTC produces
the following relabeling of schools and cutoffs p˜ that give the same assignment and satisfy the condition: the schools
are relabeled in the order in which they reach capacity under TTC, and the cutoffs p˜ are given by p˜ij = mink≤i pkj .
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student s it holds that µdTTC (s) ∈ B (s, p˜), and that if j ∈ B (s, p˜) then s prefers µdTTC (s) to j, i.e.
µ (s) s j. The former is simple to show, since clearly p˜ ≤ p and so B (s, p˜) ⊇ B (s,p) 3 µdTTC (s)
(by Theorem 4.1).
The rest of the proof can be completed in much the same way as the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that j ∈ B (s, p˜) and student s strictly prefers j to µdTTC (s),
i.e. j s µdTTC (s). As j ∈ B (s, p˜) there exists a school i′ such that rsi′ ≥ p˜ji′ . Let s′ be the
student with rank rs′i′ = p˜
j
i′ at school i′. (Such a student exists by the definition of the cutoffs pki′ ,
k ≤ j.) Then by definition student s′ traded a seat at school i′, so since rsi′ ≥ p˜ji′ = rs
′
i′ student s is
assigned weakly before student s′. Additionally, since j s µdTTC (s) school j must reach capacity
before student s is assigned. Finally, by definition there exists some k ≤ j such that p˜ji′ = pki′ ,
and so since rs′i′ = pki′ it follows that student s′ was assigned to school k. Thus student s′ was
assigned weakly before school j reached capacity, and so strictly before student s. This provides
the required contradiction. The statements about the structure of the set of schools Bi (s,p) student
s can afford via her priority at school i and the structure of the budget set B (s,p) = ∪iBi (s,p)
follow immediately from the ordered cutoffs.
When there exist TTC cutoffs that satisfy inequality (4.1) we say that the schools are labeled in
order. The cutoff ordering proved in Proposition 4.1 implies that budget sets of different students
are nested, and therefore that the TTC assignment is Pareto efficient. The cutoff ordering is a
stronger property than Pareto efficiency, and is not implied by the Pareto efficiency of TTC. For
example, serial dictatorship with a randomly drawn ordering will give a Pareto efficient assignment,
but there is no relationship between a student’s priorities and her assignment.
Proposition 4.1 allows us to give a simple illustration for the TTC assignment when there are
n ≥ 3 schools. For each school i, we can illustrate the set of schools Bi (s,p) that enter a student’s
budget set because of her priority at school i as in Figure 4.2 (under the assumption that schools
are labeled in order). This generalizes the illustration along each axis in Figure 4.1(b), and can be
used for any number of schools. It is possible that pji = 1, meaning that students cannot use their
priority at school i to trade into school c.
Dur and Morrill (2017) provide a characterization of TTC as a competitive equilibrium where
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Figure 4.2: The schools Bi (s,p) that enter a student’s budget set because of her priority at school i. The cutoffs pji
are weakly decreasing in j, and are equal for all j ≥ i (i.e. pii = pi+1i = · · · = pni ). That is, a student’s priority at i
can add one of the sets C(1), C(2), . . . , C(i), φ to her budget set. If any school enters a student’s budget because of her
priority at i, then school i must also enter her budget set because of her priority at i.
a priority value function v(r, i) specifies the price of priority r at school i and students are allowed




where schools are labeled in order, the
TTC assignment and priority value function v (r, i) = n−min
{
j | r ≥ pji
}
constitute a competitive
equilibrium. We introduce a framework in Chapter 4.3 that allows a direct calculation of this
competitive equilibrium as a solution to a set of equations.
4.2.4 Limitations
Although the cutoff structure is helpful in understanding the structure of the TTC assignment,
there are several limitations to the cutoffs computed in Theorem 4.1 and Proposition 4.1. First,
while the cutoffs can be determined by running the TTC algorithm, Theorem 4.1 does not provide
a direct method for calculating the cutoffs from the economy primitives. In particular, it does not
explain how the TTC assignment changes with changes in school priorities or student preferences.
Second, the budget set B (s,p) given by the cutoffs derived in Theorem 4.1 does not correspond
to the set of possible school assignments that student s can achieve by unilaterally changing her
reported preferences.8,9 We therefore introduce the continuum model for TTC which allows us
8More precisely, given economy E and student s, let economy E′ be generated by changing the preferences ordering
of s from s to ′. Let µdTTC (s | E) and µdTTC (s | E′) be the assignment of s under the two economies, and let p
be the cutoffs derived by Theorem 4.1 for economy E. Theorem 4.1 shows that µdTTC (s | E) = maxs B (s,p) but
it may be µdTTC (s|E′) 6= max′ B (s,p).
9For example, let E be an economy with three schools C = {1, 2, 3}, each with capacity 1. There are three students
s1, s2, s3 such that the top preference of s1, s2 is school 1, the top preference of s3 is school 3, and student si has
top priority at school i. Theorem 4.1 gives the budget set {1} for student s1, as p1 =
( 2











, since the only trades are of seats at c for seats at the same school c. However, if s1 reports the
preference 2  1  3 she will be assigned to school 2, so an appropriate definition of budget sets should include
school 2 in the budget set for student s1. Also note that no matter what preference student s1 reports, she will not
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to directly calculate the cutoffs, allowing for comparative statics. Using the continum model, we
present in Chapter 4.3.4 cutoffs that yield refined budget sets which provide for each student the
set of schools that she could be assigned to by unilaterally changing her preferences. Thus the
appropriate cutoff structure also makes it clear that TTC is strategy-proof.
4.3 Continuum Model and Main Results
4.3.1 Model
We consider the school choice problem with a continuum of students and finitely many schools, as
in Azevedo and Leshno (2016). There is a finite set of schools denoted by C = {1, . . . , n}, and each
school i ∈ C has the capacity to admit a mass qi > 0 of students. A student s has a type θ ∈ Θ




; overloading notation we will sometimes refer to a student s by their type θ.10
We let θ denote the student’s strict preferences over schools, and let Chθ (C) = max
θ
(C) denote
θ’s most preferred school out of the set C. The priorities of schools over students are captured by
the vector rθ ∈ [0, 1]C . We say that rθi is the rank of student θ at school i, or the i-rank of student
θ. Schools prefer students with higher ranks, that is θ i θ′ if and only if rθi > rθ
′
i .
Definition 4.1. A continuum economy is given by E = (C,Θ, η, q) where q = {qi}i∈C is the vector
of capacities of each school, and η is a measure over Θ.
We make some assumptions for the sake of tractability. First, we assume that all students and
schools are acceptable. Second, we assume there is an excess of students, that is, ∑i∈C qi < η (Θ).
Finally, we make the following technical assumption that ensures that the run of TTC in the
continuum economy is sufficiently smooth and allows us to avoid some measurability issues.
Assumption 4.1. The measure η admits a density ν. That is for any measurable subset of students
be assigned to school 3, so an appropriate definition of budget sets should not include school 3 in the budget set for
student s1.
10In this continuum model all students of the same type are indistinguishable and we may assume that they are







Furthermore, ν is piecewise Lipschitz continuous everywhere except on a finite grid,11 bounded from
above, and bounded from below away from zero on its support.12
Assumption 4.1 is general enough to allow embeddings of discrete economies, and is satisfied by
all the economies considered throughout the paper. However, it is not without loss of generality,
e.g. it is violated when all schools share the same priorities over students.13
An immediate consequence of Assumption 4.1 is that a school’s indifference curves are of η-
measure 0. That is, for any i ∈ C, x ∈ [0, 1] we have that η({θ | rθi = x}) = 0. This is analogous
to schools having strict preferences in the standard discrete model. As rθi carries only ordinal
information, we may assume each student’s rank is normalized to be equal to her percentile rank
in the school’s preferences, i.e. for any i ∈ C, x ∈ [0, 1] we have that η({θ | rθi ≤ x}) = x.
It is convenient to describe the distribution η by the following induced marginal distributions.
For each point x ∈ [0, 1]n and subset of schools C ⊆ C, let Hj|Ci (x) be the marginal density of
students who are top ranked at school i among all students whose rank at every school k is no
better than xk, and whose top choice among the set of schools C is j.14 We omit the dependence on
C when the relevant set of schools is clear from context, and write Hji (x). The marginal densities
H
j|C
i (x) uniquely determine the distribution η.
11A grid G ⊂ Θ is given by G =
{
θ | ∃i s.t. rθi ∈ D
}
, where D = {d1, . . . , dL} ⊂ [0, 1] is a finite set of grid points.
Equivalently, ν is Lipschitz continuous on the union of open hypercubes Θ \G.
12That is, there exists M > m > 0 such that for every θ ∈ Θ either ν(θ) = 0 or m ≤ ν(θ) ≤M .
13We can incorporate an economy where two schools have perfectly aligned priories by considering them as a
combined single school in the trade balance equations, as defined in Definition 4.2. The capacity constraints still

















where ei is the unit vector in the direction of coordinate i. In other words, Hj|Ci (x) is the density of students θ with
priority rθi = xi and rθk ≤ xk for all k ∈ C whose most preferred school in C is j.
81
As in the discrete model, an assignment is a mapping µ : Θ→ C ∪ {∅} specifying the assignment
of each student. With slight abuse of notation, we let µ (i) = {θ | µ (θ) = i} denote the set of
students assigned to school i. An assignment µ is feasible if it respects capacities, i.e. for each
school i ∈ C we have η (µ(i)) ≤ qi. Two allocations µ and µ′ are equivalent if they differ only on a
set of students of zero measure, i.e. η ({θ | µ (θ) 6= µ′ (θ)}) = 0.
Remark 4.1. In school choice, it is common for schools to have coarse priorities, and to refine these
using a tie-breaking rule. Our economy E captures the strict priority structure that results after
applying the tie-breaking rule.
4.3.2 Main Results
Our main result establishes that in the continuum model the TTC assignment can be directly
calculated from trade balance and capacity equations. This allows us to explain how the TTC
assignment changes with changes in the underlying economy. It also allows us to derive cutoffs that
are independent of a student’s reported preferences, giving another proof that TTC is strategy-
proof.
We remark that directly translating the TTC algorithm to the continuum setting by considering
individual trading cycles is challenging, as a direct adaptation of the algorithm would require the
clearing of cycles of zero measure. We circumvent the technical issues raised by such an approach by
formally defining the continuum TTC assignment in terms of trade balance and capacity equations,
which characterize the TTC algorithm in terms of its aggregate behavior over multiple steps. To
verify the validity of our definition, we show in Subsection 4.3.3 that continuum TTC can be used
to calculate the discrete TTC outcome. We provide further intuition in Section 4.4.
We begin with some definitions. A function γ (t) : [0,∞) → [0, 1]C is a TTC path if γ is
continuous and piecewise smooth, γi (t) is weakly decreasing for all i, and the initial condition
γ (0) = 1 holds. A function γ˜ (t) : [t0,∞) → [0, 1]C˜ is a residual TTC path if it satisfies all the
properties of a TTC path except the initial condition and γ˜i (t) is defined only for t ≥ t0 > 0 and











denote the minimal time.
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For a point x ∈ [0, 1]C , let
Di (x) def= η
({
θ | rθ 6< x, Chθ (C) = i
})
denote the mass of students whose rank at some school j is better than xj and their first choice is
school i. We will refer to Di (x) as the demand for i. Recall that H ij(x) is the marginal density of
students who want i who are top ranked at school j among all students with rank no better than
x. Note that Di (x) and H ij (x) depend implicitly on the set of available schools C, as well as on
the economy E .
A TTC path γ can capture the progression of a continuous time TTC algorithm, with the
interpretation that γi (t) is the highest i-priority of any student who remains unassigned by time









i∈C can correspond to a run of TTC we introduce trade balance conditions and capacity
constraints as defined below.
Definition 4.2. Let E = (C,Θ, η, q) be an economy. We say that the (residual) TTC path γ (t)






≥ satisfy the trade balance and capacity equations for the
economy E if the following hold.
1. γ (·) satisfies the marginal trade balance equations
∑
k∈C
γ′k (t)H ik (γ (t)) =
∑
k∈C
γ′i (t)Hki (γ (t)) (4.2)




for which the derivatives exist.
















≤ qk ∀k ∈ C
(4.3)
and γi∗ (t) is constant for all t ≥ t(i∗).
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. Define the residual TTC path γ˜ (·)





i∈C˜ satisfy the trade balance and capacity equations for E˜.
A brief motivation for the definition is as follows. TTC progresses by clearing trading cycles,
and in each trading cycle the number of seats offered by a school is equal to the number of students
assigned to that school. The path γ (t) can be thought of as tracking the students who are being
offered seats by each school at time t, and γ′i (t) gives the rate at which school i is moving down its
priority list at time t. Hence γ′k (t)H ik (γ (t)) gives the rate at which students are assigned to school
i at time t due to their priority at school k,15 and equation (4.2) states that over every small time
increment the mass of students assigned to school i must be equal to the mass of offers made by
school i. While all schools have remaining capacity, every assigned student is assigned to his first
choice, and thus Di (γ (t)) gives the mass of students assigned to school i at time t ≤ t(i∗) in the
algorithm. The time t(i∗) when school i∗ fills its capacity can be calculated as a solution to Equation
(4.3). Once a school exhausts its capacity we can eliminate that school and recursively calculate
the TTC assignment on the remaining problem with n−1 schools, which is stated as condition (3).
We provide more comprehensive intuition for the definition and the results in Section 4.4.
Our main result is that the trade balance and capacity equations fully characterize and provide
a way to directly calculate the TTC assignment from the problem primitives. We show in Chapter
4.3.3 that this characterization is consistent with the discrete TTC.
Theorem 4.2. Let E = (C,Θ, η, q) be an economy. There exist a TTC path γ (·) and stopping times{
t(i)
}




i∈C that satisfy the
trade balance and capacity equations yield the same assignment µcTTC , given by
µcTTC (θ) = maxθ
{
j : rθi ≥ pji for some i
}
,
15Recall that Hik (γ (t)) gives the marginal density of students who are top ranked at school k when students with
priority higher than γ(t) have already been assigned.
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In other words, Theorem 4.2 provides the following a recipe for calculating the TTC assignment.
First, find γˆ (·) that solves the marginal trade balance equations (4.2) for all t. Second, calculate
t(i
∗) from the capacity equations (4.3) for γˆ (·). Set γ (t) = γˆ (t) for t ≤ t(i∗). To determine the
remainder of γ (·), apply the same steps to the residual economy E˜ which has one less school.16
This recipe is illustrated in Example 4.2. The TTC path used in this recipe may not be the unique
TTC path, but all TTC paths yield the same TTC assignment.
Theorem 4.2 shows that the cutoffs can be directly calculated from the primitives of the economy.
In contrast to the cutoff characterization in the standard model (Theorem 4.1), this allows us to
understand how the TTC assignment changes with changes in capacities, preferences or priorities.
We remark that the existence of a smooth curve γ follows from our assumption that η has a density
that is piecewise Lipschitz and bounded, and the existence of t(i) satisfying the capacity equations
(4.3) follows from our assumptions that there are more students than seats and all students find
all schools acceptable.
The following immediate corollary of Theorem 4.2 shows that in contrast with the cutoffs given
by the discrete model, the cutoffs given by Theorem 4.2 always satisfy the cutoff ordering.
Corollary 4.1. Let the schools be labeled such that t(1) ≤ t(2) ≤ · · · ≤ t(n). Then schools are labeled
in order, that is,
p1i ≥ p2i ≥ · · · ≥ pii = pi+1i = · · · = p|C|i for all i.
To illustrate how Theorem 4.2 can be used to calculate the TTC assignment and understand
how it depends on the parameters of the economy, we consider the following simple economy. This
parameterized economy yields a tractable closed form solution for the TTC assignment. For other
economies the equations may not necessarily yield tractable expressions, but the same calcula-
tions can be be used to numerically solve for cutoffs for any economy satisfying our smoothness












Figure 4.3: The TTC path, cutoffs, and budget sets for a particular instance of the economy E in Example 4.2.
Students in the dark blue region have a budget set of {1, 2}, students in the light blue region have a budget set of {2},
and students in the white region have a budget set of φ.
requirements.
Example 4.2. We demonstrate how to use Theorem 4.2 to calculate the TTC assignment for a
simple parameterized continuum economy. The economy E has two schools 1, 2 with capacities
q1 = q2 = q with q < 1/2. A fraction p > 1/2 of students prefer school 1, and student priorities
are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] independently for each school and independently of preferences.
This economy is described by
H (x1, x2) =
 px2 (1− p)x2
px1 (1− p)x1
 ,
where Hcb (x) is given by the b-row and c-column of the matrix. A particular instance of this
economy with q = 4/10 and p = 2/3 is illustrated in Figure 4.3. This economy can be viewed as a
smoothed continuum version of the economy in Example 4.1.





















1− t, (1− t) 1p−1
)
.




. Observe that because p > 1/2 it must be that t(1) < t(2).
























































For the remaining cutoffs, we eliminate school 1 and perform the same steps for the residual economy






= q (2− 1/p).
For the residual economy the marginal trade balance equations (4.2) are trivial, and we define





























For instance, if we plug in q = 4/10 and p = 2/3 to match the economy in Example 4.1, the
calculation yields the cutoffs p11 = p21 ≈ .54, p12 ≈ .73 and p22 ≈ .37, which are approximately the
same cutoffs as those for the discrete economy in Example 4.1.
17The original trade balance equations are
γ′1 (t) pγ2 (t) + γ′2 (t) pγ1 (t) = γ′1 (t) pγ2 (t) + γ′1 (t) (1− p) γ2 (t) ,
γ′1 (t) (1− p) γ2 (t) + γ′2 (t) (1− p) γ1 (t) = γ′2 (t) pγ1 (t) + γ′2 (t) (1− p) γ1 (t) .
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Example 4.2 illustrates how the TTC cutoffs can be directly calculated from the trade balance
equations and capacity equations, without running the TTC algorithm. Example 4.2 can also
be used to show that it is not possible to solve for the TTC cutoffs only from supply-demand









1− p11 · p12
)
= q1 = q
(1− p) ·
(






= q2 = q.
Any cutoffs p11 = p21 = x, p12 = (1 − q/p)/x, p22 = (1− 2q)x with x ∈ [1− q/p, 1] solve these




then the corresponding assignment is different from the TTC
assignment. Section 4.5.2 provides further details as to how the TTC assignment depends on
features of the economy that cannot be observed from supply and demand alone. In particular, the
TTC cutoffs depend on the relative priority among top-priority students, and not all cutoffs that
satisfy supply-demand conditions produce the TTC assignment.
4.3.3 Consistency with the Discrete TTC Model
In this section we first show that any discrete economy can be translated into a continuum econ-
omy, and that the cutoffs obtained using Theorem 4.2 on this continuum economy give the same
assignment as discrete TTC. This demonstrates that the continuum TTC model generalizes the
standard discrete TTC model. We then show that the TTC assignment changes smoothly with
changes in the underlying economy.
To represent a discrete economy E =
(
C,S,C ,S , q
)
with N = |S| students by a continuum
economy Φ (E) =
(C,Θ, η, qN ), we construct a measure η over Θ by placing a mass at (s, rs) for
each student s. To ensure the measure has a bounded density, we spread the mass of each student s
over a small region Is =
{
θ ∈ Θ |θ=s, rθ ∈ [rsi , rsi + 1N ) ∀i ∈ C
}
and identify any point θs ∈ Is
with student s. Formally, for each student s ∈ S and school i ∈ C, we identify each student
s ∈ S with the N -dimensional cube Is =s ×∏i∈C [rsi , rsi + 1N ) of student types with preferences
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s (where rsi = |{s′ | s i s′}| / |S| is the percentile rank of s at i) and define η to have constant
density 1N ·NN on ∪sIs and 0 everywhere else.
The following proposition shows that the continuum TTC assigns all θs ∈ Is to the same
school, which is the assignment of student s in the discrete model. Moreover, we can directly use
the continuum cutoffs for the discrete economy. The intuition behind this result is that TTC is
essentially performing the same assignments in both models, with discrete TTC assigning students
to schools in discrete steps, and continuum TTC assigning students to schools continuously, in
fractional amounts. By considering the progression of continuum TTC at the discrete time steps
when individual students are fully assigned, we obtain the same outcome as discrete TTC.
Proposition 4.2. Let E =
(
C,S,C ,S , q
)
be a discrete economy with N = |S| students, and
let Φ (E) =
(C,Θ, η, qN ) be the corresponding continuum economy. Let p be the cutoffs produced
by Theorem 4.2 for economy Φ (E). Then the cutoffs p give the TTC assignment for the discrete
economy E, namely,
µdTTC (s | E) = maxs
{
j | rsi ≥ pji for some i
}
,
and for every θs ∈ Is we have that
µdTTC (s | E) = µcTTC (θs |Φ (E)) .
The idea behind the proof is as follows. Fix a discrete cycle selection rule ψ. We construct a
TTC path γ such that TTC on the discrete economy E with cycle selection rule ψ gives the same
allocation as TTC (γ|Φ (E)). Since the assignment of discrete TTC is unique Shapley and Scarf
(1974), and the assignment in the continuum model is unique (Proposition 4.2), this proves the
theorem.
Proof. Consider a point during the run of discrete TTC when all schools are still available. At this
point, denote by xi the i-rank of the student pointed to by school i for all i ∈ C, and denote by




N , . . . , 1
}C
. In the next step
89
the discrete TTC clears a cycle and schools point to their favorite remaining student. Let K be the
set of schools in the cycle, and let di = 1{i∈K}. Denote by yi the i-rank of the student pointed to
by school i after the cycle is cleared for all i ∈ C, and denote by S (y) the set of assigned students
after the cycle is cleared. Note that x− y = 1N d.
Suppose that in continuum TTC there is a TTC path such that γ (t1) = x+ 1 · 1N ∈ X. First,
notice that by time t1 the continuum TTC has assigned θ ∈ Is if and only if s ∈ S (x). Second, we
will show that γ (t) = x− (t− t1) 1N d+ 1N for t ∈ [t1, t1 + 1) satisfies the trade balance equations,
and thus the continuum TTC can progress to γ (t1 + 1) = y+1 · 1N ∈ X. To see that, observe that
Hji
(
x+ 1 · 1N
)
= 1 if in the discrete TTC school j is the favorite school of the student with i-rank
xi, and Hji
(
x+ 1 · 1N
)
= 0 otherwise. On the path γ (t) we have that for every i, j ∈ K




x+ 1 · 1
N
)
· (1− (t− t1))
and if i ∈ K and j /∈ K then Hji (γ (t)) = 0.










i (γ (t)) ,









i (γ (t)) .
Thus, the trade balance equations hold for t ∈ [t1, t1 + 1), and there is a continuum TTC path such
that γ (t1) = x, γ (t2) = y.
The claim follows by induction on the number of cycles cleared so far in discrete TTC.
In other words, Φ embeds a discrete economy into a continuum economy that represents it, and
the TTC cutoffs in the continuum embedding give the same assignment as TTC in the discrete
model. This shows that the TTC assignment defined in Theorem 4.2 provides a strict generalization
of the discrete TTC assignment to a larger class of economies. We provide an example of an
embedding of a discrete economy in Section 4.4.5.
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Next, we show that the continuum economy can also be used to approximate sufficiently similar
economies. Formally, we show that the TTC allocations for strongly convergent sequences of
economies are also convergent.
Theorem 4.3. Consider two continuum economies E = (C,Θ, η, q) and E˜ = (C,Θ, η˜, q), where the
measures η and η˜ have total variation distance ε. Suppose also that both measures have full support.
Then the TTC allocations in these two economies differ on a set of students of measure O(ε|C|2).
In Chapter 4.5.2, we show that changes to the priorities of a set of high priority students can
affect the final assignment of other students in a non-trivial manner. This raises the question
of what the magnitude of these effects are, and whether the TTC mechanism is robust to small
perturbations in student preferences or school priorities. Our convergence result implies that the
effects of perturbations are proportional to the total variation distance of the two economies, and
suggests that the TTC mechanism is fairly robust to small perturbations in preferences.
4.3.4 Proper budget sets
The standard definition for a student’s budget set is the set of schools she can be assigned to by
reporting some preference to the mechanism. Specifically, let [E−s;′] denote the discrete economy
where student s changes her report from s to ′ (holding others’ reported preferences fixed), and
let






denote the set of possible school assignments that student s can achieve by unilaterally changing
her reported preferences. Note that s cannot misreport her priority.
We observed in Chapter 4.2.4 that in the discrete model the budget set B (s,p) produced by
cutoffs p = p (E) generated by Theorem 4.1 do not necessarily correspond to the set B∗ (s | E).
The analysis in this section can be used to show that the budget sets B∗ (s | E) correspond to the
budget sets B (s,p∗) for appropriate cutoffs p∗.
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Proposition 4.3. Let E = (C,S,S ,C , q) be a discrete economy, and let
P (E) =
{




where γ (·) , t(j) satisfy trade balance and capacity for Φ (E)
}










Moreover, there exists p∗ ∈ P (E) such that for every student s
B∗ (s | E) = B (s,p∗) .
Proof. Throughout the proof, we omit the dependence on E and let B∗ (s) denote B∗ (s|E). For
brevity, we also let B (s) = ⋂
p∈P(E)
B (s,p) denote the intersection of all possible budget sets of s









j∈C that satisfy trade balance
and capacity for Φ (E) such that B∗ (s) ⊆ B (s) ⊆ B (s;p∗) ⊆ B∗ (s).
We first show that B∗ (s) ⊆ B (s). Suppose i 6∈ B (s). Then there exists a TTC path γ for




. Hence for all ˜ there exists a TTC path γ˜ ∈ P ([E−s; ˜]) such




, e.g. the TTC path that follows the same valid directions as γ until it
assigns student s. By Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 4.2 for all ˜ it holds that µdTTC (s | [E−s; ˜]) =
max˜
{







. Hence for all ˜ it holds that µdTTC (s | [E−s; ˜]) 6= i and
so i 6∈ B∗ (s).
We next show that B (s) ⊆ B (s;p∗) ⊆ B∗ (s). Intuitively, we construct the special TTC path
γ∗ for E by clearing as many cycles as possible that do not involve student s. Formally, let B be an
ordering over subsets of C where: (1) all subsets containing student s’s top choice available school
i∗ (under the preferences s in E) come after all subsets not containing i∗; and (2) subject to this,
subsets are ordered via the shortlex order. Let γ∗ be the TTC path for E obtained by selecting
valid directions with minimal support under the order B. (Such a path exists since when using the
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shortlex order the resulting valid directions d are piecewise Lipschitz continuous.)
It follows trivially from the definition of B (s) that B (s) ⊆ B (s;p∗). We now show that
B (s;p∗) ⊆ B∗ (s). For suppose i ∈ B (s;p∗). Consider the preferences ′ that put school i first,
and then all other schools in the order given by s. Let E′ denote the economy [E−s;′]. It





words, if we let τ∗ = inf {τ | γ∗ (τ) 6≥ rs} be the time that the cube Is corresponding to student s
starts clearing, then school i is available at time τ s. Let γ′ be the TTC path for E′ obtained by
selecting valid directions with minimal support under the order B, and let τ ′ = inf {τ | γ′ (τ) 6≥ rs}.
We show that τ ≤ τ∗ and school i is available to student s at time τ ′.
Consider the time interval [0,min {τ∗, τ ′}]. During this time the set of valid directions along the
TTC path remain the same (i.e. dγ′dt =
dγ∗
dt ), as the set of valid directions not involving student s18
hasn’t changed, and student s19 has not yet been assigned under either TTC (γ∗|E) or TTC (γ′|E′)
so we do not need to consider the set of valid directions involving student s. Now at worst in going
from γ,E to γ′, [E−s;′] we have replaced a valid direction involving s and i∗ with a different valid
direction involving s and not involving i∗, so student s is assigned sooner in TTC (γ′|E′) than
in TTC (γ∗|E), giving τ ′ ≤ τ∗. Hence γ′ (τ ′) = γ∗ (τ ′) where τ ′ ≤ τ∗ ≤ t(i) and so school i is
available to student s when she is assigned. Hence by Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 4.2 it holds
that µdTTC (s | E′) = i and so i ∈ B∗ (s).
Proposition 4.3 allows us to construct proper budget sets for each agent that determine not
only their assignment given their current preferences, but also their assignment given any other
submitted preferences. This particular budget set representation of TTC makes it clear that it is
strategy-proof.
18We say that a valid direction ’involves’ a student s if it starts at a point x on the boundary of their cube Is and
points into the interior of the cube.
19More formally, no points in the cube corresponding to student s are assigned.
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4.4 Intuition for the Continuum TTC Model
In this section, we provide some intuition for our main results by considering a more direct adap-
tation of the TTC algorithm to continuum economies. This section can be skipped by the reader
on a first reading without loss of continuity.
Informally speaking, consider a continuum TTC algorithm in which schools offer seats to their
highest priority remaining students, and students are assigned through clearing of trading cycles.
This process differs from the discrete TTC algorithm as there is now a set of zero measure of highest
priority students at each school, and the resulting trading cycles are also within sets of students of
zero measure.
There are a few challenges in turning this informal algorithm description into a precise defini-
tion. First, each cycle is of zero measure, but the algorithm needs to appropriately reduce school
capacities as students are assigned. Second, a school will generally offer seats to multiple types of
students at once. This implies each school may be involved in multiple cycles at a given point, a
type of multiplicity that leads to non-unique TTC allocations in the discrete setting.
To circumvent the challenges above, we define the algorithm in terms of its aggregate behavior
over many cycles. Instead of tracing each cleared cycle, we track the state of the algorithm by
looking at the fraction of each school’s priority list that has been cleared. Instead of progressing
by selecting one cycle at a time, we determine the progression of the algorithm by conditions that
must be satisfied by any aggregation of cleared cycles. These yield equations (4.2) and (4.3), which
determine the characterization given in Theorem 4.2.
4.4.1 Tracking the State of the Algorithm through the TTC Path γ
Consider some point in time during the run of the discrete TTC algorithm before any school has
filled its capacity. While the history of the algorithm up to this point includes all previously cleared
trading cycles, it is sufficient to record only the top priority remaining student at each school. This
is because knowing the top remaining student at each school allows us to know exactly which
students were previously assigned, and which students remain unassigned. Assigned students are
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𝛾(𝜏)




Figure 4.4: The set of students assigned at time τ is described by the point γ (τ) on the TTC path. Students in the
grey region with rank better than γ (τ) are assigned, and students in the white region with rank worse than γ (τ) are
unassigned.
relevant for the remainder of the algorithm only insofar as they reduce the number of seats available.
Because all schools have remaining capacity, all assigned students are assigned to their top choice,
and we can calculate the remaining capacity at each school.
To formalize this notion, let τ be some time point during the run of the TTC algorithm before
any school has filled its capacity. For each school i ∈ C, let γi (τ) ∈ [0, 1] be the percentile rank of the
remaining student with highest i-priority. That is, at time τ in the algorithm each school i is offering
a seat to students s for whom rsi = γi (τ). Let γ (τ) be the vector (γi (τ))i∈C . The set of students that
have already been assigned at time τ is {s | rs 6< γ (τ)}, because any student s where rsi > γi (τ)
for some i must have already been assigned. Likewise, the set of remaining unassigned students
is {s | rs ≤ γ (τ)}. See Figure 4.4 for an illustration. Since all assigned students were assigned to
their top choice, the remaining capacity at school i ∈ C is qi − |{s | rs 6< γ (τ) and Chs (C) = i}|.
Thus, γ (τ) captures all the information needed for the remainder of the algorithm.
This representation can be readily generalized to continuum economies. In the continuum, the
algorithm progresses in continuous time. The state of the algorithm at time τ ∈ R≥ is given by
γ (τ) ∈ [0, 1]C , where γi (τ) ∈ [0, 1] is the percentile rank of the remaining students with highest
i-priority. By tracking the progression of the algorithm through γ (·) we avoid looking at individual
trade cycles, and instead track how many students were already assigned from each school’s priority
list.
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4.4.2 Determining the Algorithm Progression through Trade Balance
The discrete TTC algorithm progresses by finding and clearing a trade cycle. This cycle assigns a
set of discrete students; for each involved school i the top student is cleared and γi (·) is reduced. In
the continuum each cycle is infinitesimal, and any change in γ (·) must involve many trade cycles.
Therefore, we seek to determine the progression of the algorithm by looking at the effects of clearing
many cycles.
Suppose at time τ1 the TTC algorithm has reached the state x = γ (τ1), where γ (·) is differen-
tiable at τ1 and d = −γ′ (τ1) ≥ 0. Let ε > 0 be a small step size, and assume that by sequentially
clearing trade cycles the algorithm reaches the state γ (τ2) at time τ2 = τ1 + ε. Consider the sets of
students offered seats and assigned seats during this time step from time τ1 to time τ2. Let i ∈ C be
some school. For each cycle, the measure of students assigned to school c is equal to the measure
of seats offered20 by school i. Therefore, if students are assigned between time τ1 and τ2 through
clearing a collection of cycles, then the set of students assigned to school i has the same measure
as the set of seats offered by school i. If γ (·) and η are sufficiently smooth, the measures of both of





yielding an equation that determines d. We provide an illustrative example with two schools in
Figure 4.5. For the sake of clarity, we omit technical details in the ensuing discussion. A rigorous
derivation can be found in Appendix B.2.
We first identify the measure of students who were offered a seat at a school i or assigned to
a school j during the step from time τ1 to time τ2. If d = −γ′ (τ1) and ε is sufficiently small, we
have that for every school i
|γi (τ2)− γi (τ1)| ≈ εdi,
that is, during the step from time τ1 to time τ2 the algorithm clears students with i-ranks between
20Strictly speaking, the measure of students assigned to each school during the time step is equal to the measure
of seats at that school which were claimed by the student offered the seat or traded by the student offered the seat
during the time step (not the measure of seats offered). A seat can be offered but not claimed or traded in one of two
ways. The first occurs when the seat is offered at time τ but not yet claimed or traded. The second is when a student
is offered two or more seats at the same time, and trades only one of them. Both of these sets are of η-measure 0
under our assumptions, and thus the measure of seats claimed or traded is equal to the measure of seats offered.
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Figure 4.5: The set of students that are assigned during a small time step between τ1 and τ2. The dot indicates
γ (τ1) = x. The highlighted areas indicate the students T ji (x, εdi) who are offered a seat during this step. Student in
the blue (red) region receive an offer from school 1 (school 2). The pattern indicates whether a student received an
offer from his preferred school. Trade balance is satisfied when there is an equal mass of students in the checkered
regions.




θ ∈ Θ | rθ ≤ x, rθi > x− εdi
}
denote the set of students with ranks in this range. For all ε, Ti (x, εdi) is the set of top remaining
students at i, and when ε is small, Ti (x, εdi) is approximately the set of students who were offered
a seat at school i during the step.21
To capture the set of students that are assigned to a school j during the step, partition the set
Ti (x, εdi) according to the top choice of students. Namely, let
T ji (x, εdi)
def=
{
θ ∈ Ti (x, εdi) | Chθ (C) = j
}
,
denote the top remaining students on i’s priority list whose top choice is school j. Then the
set of students assigned to school j during the step is ∪kT jk (x, εdk), the set of students that got an
offer from some school k ∈ C and whose top choice is j.
We want to equate the measure of the set ∪kT ik (x, εdk) of students who were assigned to i
21The students in the set Ti (x, εdi) ∩ Tk (x, εdk) could have been offered a seat at school k and assigned before






with the measure of the set of students who are offered a seat at i, which is approximately the set
Ti (x, εdi). By smoothness of the density of η, for sufficiently small δ we have that
η
(
T ji (x, δ)
)
≈ δ ·Hji (x) .
Therefore, we have that22
η
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εdk ·H ik (x) ,
η (Ti (x, εdi)) = η
(





εdi ·Hki (x) .
In sum, if the students assigned during the step from time τ1 to time τ2 are cleared via a collection
of cycles, we must have the following condition on the gradient d = γ′ (τ1) of the TTC path,
∑
k∈C
εdk ·H ik (x) ≈
∑
k∈C
εdi ·Hki (x) .
Formalizing this argument yields the marginal trade balance equations at x = γ (τ1),
∑
k∈C
γ′k (τ1) ·H ik (x) =
∑
k∈C
γ′i (τ1) ·Hki (x) .
4.4.3 Interpretation of Solutions to the Trade Balance Equations
The previous subsection showed that any small step clearing a collection of cycles must correspond
to a gradient γ′ that satisfies the trade balance equations. We next characterize the set of solutions
to the trade balance equations and explain why any solution corresponds to clearing a collection of
cycles.
Let γ (τ) = x, and consider the set of valid gradients d = −γ′ (τ) ≥ 0 that solve the trade
balance equations for x ∑
k∈C
dk ·H ik (x) =
∑
k∈C
di ·Hki (x) .






Figure 4.6: Example of a graph representation for the trade balance equations at x. There is an edge from i to j if
and only if Hji (x) > 0. The two communication classes are framed.
Consider the following equivalent representation. Construct a graph with a node for each school.
Let the weight of node i be dj , and let the flow from node i to node j be fi→j = di ·Hji (x). The
flow fi→j represents the flow of students who are offered a seat at i and wish to trade it for school j
when the algorithm progresses down school i’s priority list at rate di. Figure 4.6 illustrates such a
graph for C = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Given a collection of cycles let di be the number of cycles containing node
i. It is straightforward that any node weights d obtained in this way give a zero-sum flow, i.e. total
flow into each node is equal to the total flow out of the node. Standard arguments from network
flow theory show that the opposite also holds, that is, any zero-sum flow can be decomposed into
a collection of cycles. In other words, the algorithm can find a collection of cycles that clears each
school i’s priority list at rate di if and only if and only if d is a solution to the trade balance
equations.
To characterize the set of solutions to the trade balance equations we draw on a connection
to Markov chains. Consider a continuous time Markov chain over the states C, and transition
rates from state i to state j equal to Hji (x). The stationary distributions of the Markov chain are
characterized by the balance equations, which state that the total probability flow out of state i is
equal to the total probability flow into state i. Mathematically, these are exactly the trade balance
equations. Hence d is a solution to the trade balance equations if and only if d/‖d‖1 is a stationary
distribution of the Markov chain.
This connection allows us to fully characterize the set of solutions to the trade balance equations
through well known results about Markov chains. We restate them here for completeness. Given a
transition matrix P , a recurrent communication class is a subset K ⊆ C, such that the restriction of
P to rows and columns with coordinates in K is an irreducible matrix, and P ij = 0 for every j ∈ K
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and i /∈ K. See Figure 4.6 for an example. There exists at least one recurrent communication class,
and two different communication classes have empty intersection. Let the set of communicating
classes be {K1, . . . ,K`}. For each communicating class K there is a unique vector dK that is a
stationary distribution and dKi = 0 for any i /∈ K. The set of stationary distributions of the Markov
chain is given by convex combinations of
{
dK1 , . . . ,dK`
}
.
An immediate implication is that a solution to the trade balance equations always exists. As
an illustrative example, we provide the following result for when η has full support.23 In this case,
the TTC path γ is unique (up to rescaling of the time parameter). This is because full support
of η implies that the matrix H (x) is irreducible for every x, i.e. there is a single communicating
class. Therefore there is a unique (up to normalization) solution d = −γ′ (τ) to the trade balance
equations at x = γ (τ) for every x and the path is unique.
Lemma 4.1. Let E = (C,Θ, η, q) be a continuum economy where η has full support. Then there








where d(x) is the solution to the trade balance equations at x, and d (x) is unique up to normaliza-
tion.
On the Multiplicity of TTC Paths
In general, there can be multiple solutions to the trade balance equations at x, and therefore multiple
TTC paths. The Markov chain and recurrent communication class structure give intuition as to
why the TTC assignment is still unique. Each solution dK corresponds to the clearing of cycles
involving only schools within the set K. The discrete TTC algorithm may encounter multiple
disjoint trade cycles, and the outcome of the algorithm is invariant to the order in which these
cycles are cleared (when preferences are strict). Similarly here, the algorithm may encounter
mutually exclusive combinations of trade cycles
{
dK1 , . . . ,dK`
}
, which can be cleared sequentially
23η has full support if for every open set A ⊂ Θ we have η(A) > 0.
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Figure 4.7: Illustration of the gradient field d (·) and path γ (·) (ignoring the capacity equations).
or simultaneously at arbitrary relative rates. Theorem 4.2 shows that just like the outcome of the
discrete TTC algorithm does not depend on the cycle clearing order, the outcome of the continuum
TTC algorithm does not depend on the order in which
{
dK1 , . . . ,dK`
}
are cleared.
As an illustration, consider the unique solution dK for the communicating class K = {1, 2},
as illustrated in Figure 4.6. Suppose that at some point x we have H11 (x) = 1/2, H21 (x) = 1/2
and H12 (x) = 1. That is, the marginal mass of top ranked students at either school is 1, all the
top marginal students of school 2 prefer school 1, and half of the top marginal students of school
1 prefer school 1 and half prefer school 2. The algorithm offers seats and goes down the schools’
priority lists, assigning students through a combination of two kinds of cycles: the cycle 1 	where
a student is offered a seat at 1 and is assigned to 1, and a cycle 1  2 where a student who was
offered a seat at 1 trades her seat with a student who was offered a seat at 2. Given the relative
mass of students, the cycle 1 2 should be twice as frequent as the cycles 1 	. Therefore, clearing
cycles leads the mechanism to go down school 1’s priority list at twice the speed it goes down
school 2’s list, or d1 = 2 · d2, which is the unique solution to the trade balance equations at x (up
to normalization).
Figure 4.7 illustrates the path γ (·) and the solution d (x) to the trade balance equations at x.
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Note that for every x we can calculate d (x) from H (x). When there are multiple solutions to the
trade balance equations at some x, we may select a solution d (x) for every x such that d (·) is a
sufficiently smooth gradient field. The TTC path γ (·) can be generated by starting from γ (0) = 1
and following the gradient field.
4.4.4 When a School Fills its Capacity
So far we have described the progression of the algorithm while all schools have remaining capacity.
To complete our description of the algorithm we need to describe how the algorithm detects that
a school has exhausted all its capacity, and how the algorithm continues after a school is full.
As long as there is still some remaining capacity, the trade balance equations determine the
progression of the algorithm along the TTC path γ (·). The mass of students assigned to school i
at time τ is
Di (γ (τ)) = η
({
θ | rθ 6< γ (τ) , Chθ (C) = i
})
.
Because γ (·) is continuous and monotonically decreasing in each coordinate, Di (γ (τ)) is a con-
tinuous increasing function of τ . Therefore, the first time during the run of the continuum TTC
















≤ qk ∀k ∈ C
where i∗ is the first school to reach its capacity.
Once a school has filled up its capacity, we can eliminate that school and apply the algorithm
to the residual economy. Note that the remainder of the run of the algorithm depends only on the
remaining students, their preferences over the remaining schools, and remaining capacity at each
school. After eliminating assigned students and schools that have reached their capacity we are left
with a residual economy that has strictly fewer schools. To continue the run of the continuum TTC
algorithm, we may recursively apply the same steps to the residual economy. Namely, to continue





and continue the path using a gradient
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that solves the trade balance equations for the residual economy. The algorithm follows this path
until one of the remaining schools fills its capacity, and another school is removed.
4.4.5 Comparison between Discrete TTC and Continuum TTC
Table 4.1 summarizes the relationship between the discrete and continuum TTC algorithms, and
provides a summary of this section. It presents the objects that define the continuum TTC algo-
rithm with their counterparts in the discrete TTC algorithm. For example, running the continuum
TTC algorithm on the embedding Φ (E) of a discrete economy E performs the same assignments as
the discrete TTC algorithm, except that the continuum TTC algorithm performs these assignments
continuously and in fractional amounts instead of in discrete steps.
Discrete TTC → Continuum TTC Expression Equation
Cycle → Valid gradient d (x) trade balance
equations
Algorithm progression → TTC path γ(·) γ′ (τ) = d (γ (τ))
School removal → Stopping times t(i) capacity equations
Table 4.1: The relationship between the discrete and continuum TTC processes.
Finally, we note that the main technical content of Theorem 4.2 is that there always exists




that satisfy the trade balance and capacity equations,
and that these necessary conditions, together with the capacity equations (4.3), are sufficient to
guarantee the uniqueness of the resulting assignment.
Example: Embedding a discrete economy in the continuum model
Consider the discrete economy E =
(
C,S,S ,C , q
)
with two schools and six students, C = {1, 2},
S = {a, b, c, u, v, w}. School 1 has capacity q1 = 4 and school 2 has capacity q2 = 2. The school
priorities and student preferences are given by
1 : a  u  b  c  v  w, a, b, c : 1  2,
2 : a  b  u  v  c  w, u, v, w : 2  1.
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In Figure 4.8, we display three TTC paths for the continuum embedding Φ (E) of the discrete
economy E. The first path γall corresponds to clearing all students in recurrent communication
classes, that is, all students in the maximal union of cycles in the pointing graph. The second path
γ1 corresponds to taking K = {1} whenever possible. The third path γ2 corresponds to taking
K = {2} whenever possible. We remark that the third path gives a different first round cutoff
point p1, but all three paths give the same allocation.
We calculate the TTC paths γall, γ1 and γ2. We consider only solutions d to the trade balance
equations (4.2) that have been normalized so that d · 1 = −1. For brevity we call such solutions
valid directions. The relevant valid directions are shown in Figure 4.9.
We first calculate the TTC path in the regions where the TTC paths are the same. At every
point (x1, x2) with 56 < x1 ≤ x2 ≤ 1 the H matrix is
x2 − 56 0
x1 − 56 0
, so d = [−1, 0] is the unique valid




by γ (t) = (1− t, 1). This section of










































TTC path γall clears all students in recurrent communication classes.
TTC path γ1 clears all students who want school 1 before students who want school 2.
TTC path γ2 clears all students who want school 2 before students who want school 1.
Figure 4.8: Three TTC paths and their cutoffs and allocations for the discrete economy in example 4.4.5. In each set
of two squares, students in the left box prefer school 1 and students in the right box prefer school 2. The first round
TTC paths are solid, and the second round TTC paths are dotted. The cutoff points p1 and p2 are marked by filled
circles. Students shaded dark blue are assigned to school 1 and students shaded dark light are assigned to school 2.




, and so d = [−12 ,−12] is the
unique valid direction, the TTC path is defined uniquely to lie on the diagonal γ1 (t) = γ2 (t), and





















Figure 4.9: The valid directions d (x) for the continuum embedding Φ (E). Valid directions d (x) are indicated for
points x in the grey squares (including the upper and right boundaries but excluding the lower and left boundaries), as
well as for points x on the black lines. Any vector d (x) is a valid direction in the lower left gray square. The borders
of the squares corresponding to the students are drawn using dashed gray lines.
1
3 < x2 ≤ 23 the H matrix is
0 6x2 − 2
0 0
, and so d = [0,−1] is the unique valid direction, and the






with 0 < x1 ≤ 23 , the measure of
students assigned to school 1 is at most 3, and the measure of students assigned to school 2 is 2, so






the TTC path moves parallel to the x1 axis.
We now calculate the various TTC paths where they diverge.
At every point x = (x1, x2) with 12 < x1, x2 ≤ 23 the H matrix is
0 0
0 0
 (i.e. there are no
marginal students). Moreover, at every point x = (x1, x2) with 13 < x1, x2 ≤ 12 the H matrix is16 0
0 16




The same argument with the coordinates swapped gives that H =
0 0
0 16
 when 12 < x1 ≤ 23 and
1
3 < x2 ≤ 12 . Hence in all these regions, both schools are in their own recurrent communication
class, and any vector d is a valid direction.




, the second path corresponds to taking



































with 13 < x2 ≤ 12 , the H matrix is
0 1
0 1
 and so d = [0,−1]



















, where school 1 fills.
Note that all three paths result in the same TTC allocation, which assigns students a, b, c, w
to school 1 and u, v to school 2. All three paths assign the students assigned before p1 (students
a, u, b, c for paths 1 and 2 and a, u, b for path 3) to their top choice school. All three paths assign
all remaining students to school 1.
4.5 Applications
4.5.1 Optimal Investment in School Quality
We apply our model to analyze economies where preferences for schools are endogenously deter-
mined by the allocation of resources to schools. Empirical evidence suggests that increased financing
affects student achievements Jackson et al. (2016); Lafortune et al. (2018); Johnson and Jackson
(2017) as well as demand for housing Hoxby (2001); Cellini et al. (2010), which indicate increased
demand for schools. Similarly, Krueger (1999) finds that smaller classes have a positive impact on
student performance, and Dinerstein et al. (2014) finds that increased funding for public schools
increases enrollment in public schools and reduces demand for private schools.
Under school choice, such resource allocation decisions can change the desirability of schools
and therefore change the assignment of students to schools. We explore the implication of such
changes in a stylized model. As a shorthand, we refer to an increase in the desirability of a school
as an increase in the quality of the school. We explore comparative statics of the allocation and
evaluate student welfare. Omitted proofs and derivations can be found in the Appendix B.3.
Model with quality dependent preferences We enrich the model from Chapter 4.3 to allow
student preferences to depend on school quality δ = {δi}i∈C , where the desirability of school i
is increasing in δi. An economy with quality dependent preferences is given by E = (C,Υ, υ, q),
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where C = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of schools and Υ is the set of student types. A student s ∈ Υ is
given by s = (us (· | ·) , rs), where us (i | δ) is the utility of student s for school i given δ = {δi}i∈C
and rsi is the student’s rank at school i. We assume us (i | ·) is differentiable, increasing in δi and
non-increasing in δj for any j 6= i. The measure υ over Υ specifies the distribution of student types.
School capacities are q = {qi}, where ∑ qi < 1. We will refer to δi as the quality of i.
For a fixed quality δ, let ηδ be the induced distribution over Θ, and let Eδ = (C,Θ, ηδ, q) denote
the induced economy.24 We assume for all δ that ηδ has a Lipschitz continuous non-negative density
νδ that is bounded below on its support and depends smoothly on δ. For a given δ, let µδ and{
pij (δ)
}
i∈C denote the TTC assignment and associated cutoffs for the economy Eδ. We omit the
dependence on δ when it is clear from context.
Comparative statics of the allocation The following proposition gives the direction of change
of the TTC cutoffs when there are two schools and δ` increases for some ` ∈ {1, 2}. Throughout this
subsection, when considering a fixed δ we assume that schools are labeled in order, unless stated
otherwise.
Proposition 4.4. Suppose E = (C = {1, 2} ,Υ, υ, q) and δ induces an economy Eδ such that the
TTC path γ that, if possible, assigns seats at school 1 before seats at school 2, yields p12 (δ) > p22 (δ).25
Consider δˆ that increases the quality of school 2, i.e. δˆ2 ≥ δ2 and δ1 = δˆ1, and which induces Eδˆ









Then a change from δ to δˆ induces the cutoffs pij (·) to change as follows:
• p11 and p12 both decrease, i.e., it becomes easier to trade into school 1; and
• p22 increases, i.e. higher 2-priority is required to get into school 2.
Proposition 4.4 is illustrated in Figure 4.10. As first shown in Hatfield et al. (2016), an increase
in the desirability of school 2 can cause low 2-rank students to be assigned to school 2. Note that
individual students’ budget sets can grow or shrink by more than one school.
24To make student preferences strict we arbitrarily break ties in favor of schools with lower indices. We assume the
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Figure 4.10: The effect of an increase in the quality of school 2 on TTC cutoffs and budget sets. Dashed lines indicate
initial TTC cutoffs, and dotted lines indicate TTC cutoffs given increased school 2 quality. The cutoffs p11 = p21 and
p12 decrease and the cutoff p22 increases. Students in the colored sections receive different budget sets after the increase.
Students in dark blue improve to a budget set of {1, 2} from ∅, students in light blue improve to {1, 2} from {2}, and
students in red have an empty budget set ∅ after the change and {2} before.
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When there are n ≥ 3 schools, it is possible to show that an increase in the quality of a school
` can either increase or decrease any cutoff. With additional structure we can provide precise
comparative statics that mirror the intuition from Proposition (4.4).
Consider the logit economy where students’ utilities for each school i are randomly distributed
as a logit with mean δi, independently of priorities and utilities for other schools. That is, utility
for school i is given by us (i | δ) = δi + εis with εis distributed as i.i.d. extreme value shifted to
have a mean of 0 McFadden (1973). We assume that the total measure of students is normalized
to 1, that there are more students than school seats, i.e. ∑i qi < 1, and that all students prefer any
school to being unassigned26. Schools’ priorities are uncorrelated and uniformly distributed. This
model combines heterogeneous idiosyncratic taste shocks with a common preferences modifier δi.
Proposition 4.5 gives the TTC assignment in closed form for the logit economy.




≤ · · · ≤ qn
eδn
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i′≥i eδi′ is the normalization term for schools in C(i), for all i ≥ 1 the quantity
Ri = 1−∑i′<i qi′ − piieδi qi is the measure of unassigned, or remaining, students after the cth round,
and R0 = 1.
Moreover, pij is decreasing in δ` for i < ` and increasing in δ` for j > i = `.
Figure 4.11 illustrates how the TTC cutoffs change with an increase in the quality of school `.




, which can be found in Appendix
B.3.
utility of being unassigned is −∞, so all students find all schools acceptable.
25Formally, γ is defined by requiring that for all t it holds that γ′ (t) is the valid direction at γ (t) with support
that is minimal under the order {1} < {1, 2} < {2}.
26Formally, us (φ | δ) = −∞. For welfare calculations we only consider assigned students.




i′ = 1 and set ρ1 = q1/e
δ1 .
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> 0 for all j > `, and p`` may increase or decrease depending on the specific problem parameters. Note
that although pij and pi` look aligned in the picture, in general it does not hold that pij = pi` for all j.
Remark 4.2. Proposition 4.5 can be used to calculate admission probability under multiple tie-
breaking as follows. Consider an economy where priorities are determined by a multiple tie-breaking
rule where the priority of each student at each school is generated by an independent U [0, 1] lottery
draw. As a result, students priorities will be uniformly distributed over [0, 1]C and uncorrelated
with student preferences. If in addition student preferences are given by the MNL model, this is a
logit economy. In the logit economy the ex-ante probability that a student will gain admission to





with pij given by Proposition 4.5.
Comparative statics of student welfare We consider a social planner who can affect quality
levels δ of schools in economy E . We suppose that the social planner wishes to assign students to
schools at which they attain high utility, and for the sake of simplicity consider students’ social






us (µ (s) | δ) dυ.
As a benchmark, we first consider neighborhood assignment µNH which assigns each student
to a fixed school regardless of her preferences. We assume this assignment fills the capacity of each









= 0 under neighborhood assignment. Under neighborhood assignment, the
marginal welfare gain from increasing δ` is dUNHdδ` = q`, as an increase in the school quality benefits
each of the q` students assigned to school `.
The budget set formulation of TTC allows us to tractably capture student welfare under
TTC.28 A student who is offered the budget set C(i) = {i, . . . , n} is assigned to the school ` =
arg max
j∈C(i)




Small and Rosen (1981). Let N i
be the mass of agents with budget set C(i). Then social welfare under the TTC assignment given
δ simplifies to UTTC (δ) =
∑
i
N i · U i.
This expression for welfare also allows for a simple expression for the marginal welfare gain from
increasing δ` under TTC.
Proposition 4.6. For the logit economy, the change in social welfare UTTC (δ) under TTC from









Under neighborhood assignment dUNHdδ` = q`.
Proposition 4.6 shows that under TTC a marginal increase in the quality of school ` will have
28Under TTC the expected utility of student s assigned to school µ(s) depends on the student’s budget
set B (s,p) because of the dependency of µ (s) on student preferences. Namely, E [us (µ (s) | δ)] = δµ(s) +
E
[
εµ(s)s | δµ(s) + εµ(s)s ≥ δi + εis ∀i ∈ B (s,p)
]
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two effects. As under neighborhood assignment, it will increase the utility of the q` students
assigned to ` by dδ`. In addition, the quality increase changes student preferences, and therefore
changes the assignment. The second term captures the indirect effect on welfare due to changes in
the assignment. This effect is captured by changes in the number of students offered each budget
set.
The indirect effect can be negative. In particular, when there are two schools C = {1, 2} the





















An increase in the quality of school 1 gives higher utility for students assigned to 1, which is
captured by the first term. Additionally, it causes some students to switch their preferences to
1  2, making school 1 run out earlier in the TTC algorithm, and removing school 1 from the
budget set of some students. Students whose budget set did not change and who switched to 1  2
are almost indifferent between the schools and hence almost unaffected. Students who lost school 1
from their budget set may prefer school 1 by a large margin, and hence incur significant loss. Thus,
there is a total negative effect from changes in the assignment, which is captured by the second
term.
If a positive mass of students receive the budget set {2} (that is, N2 > 0), improving the quality
of school 2 will have the opposite indirect effect. Specifically,
dUTTC
dδ2









which is larger than the marginal effect under neighborhood assignment.
If admission cutoffs into both schools are equal (that is, p12 = p22 and N2 = 0) we say that both
schools are equally over-demanded. In such a case, a marginal increase in the quality of either
29Recall that we assume that schools are labeled in order, and thus school 1 is the more selective school. We use
that N1 = q1 + q1eδ1−δ2 , N2 = q2 − q1eδ2−δ1 .
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(a) TTC, δ1 = δ2 = 1,
optimal investment.
(b) TTC, δ1 = 2, δ2 = 0. (c) Average student welfare
under TTC, δ1 + δ2 = 2.
(d) DA, δ1 = δ2 = 1,
optimal investment.
(e) DA, δ1 = 2, δ2 = 0. (f) Average student welfare
under DA, δ1 + δ2 = 2.
Figure 4.12: Illustration for Example 4.3. Figures (a) and (b) show the budget sets under TTC for different quality
levels, and Figure (c) shows the average welfare of assigned students under TTC for quality levels δ1 + δ2 = 2 for
different values of δ1 − δ2. Figures (d) and (e) show the budget sets under DA, and Figure (f) shows the average
welfare of assigned students under DA.
school will have a negative indirect effect on welfare.30
Selecting the quality distribution to maximize student welfare We now provide an illus-
trative example showing the welfare optimal quality distribution under DA, TTC and neighborhood
assignment. This example also allows us to compare welfare across mechanisms. In the examples
below we fix the school labels and consider various δ. For some values of δ the schools may be
labeled out of order.
Example 4.3. Consider a logit economy with two schools and q1 = q2 = 38 , and let Q = q1 + q2
denote the total capacity. Quality levels δ are constrained by δ1 + δ2 = 2 and δ1, δ2 ≥ 0.
30That is, if δ1 = δ2 then dUTTCdδ1 < q1 and
dUTTC
dδ2
< q2. If we fix δ1 + δ2 and consider UTTC (∆) as a function of
∆ = δ1 − δ2 the function UTTC (∆) will have a kink at ∆ = 0 (see Figure 4.12c).
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Under neighborhood assignment UNH/Q = 1 for any choice of δ1, δ2. Under TTC the unique
optimal quality is δ1 = δ2 = 1, yielding UTTC/Q = 1 + E [max (ε1s, ε2s)] = 1 + ln (2) ≈ 1.69. This
is because any assigned student has the budget set B = {1, 2} and is assigned to the school for
which he has higher idiosyncratic taste. Welfare is lower when δ1 6= δ2, because fewer students
choose the school for which they have higher idiosyncratic taste. For instance, given δ1 = 2, δ2 = 0







) ≈ 1.20. Under Deferred Acceptance (DA) the unique
optimal quality is also δ1 = δ2 = 1, yielding UDA/Q = 1 + 13 ln (2) ≈ 1.23. This is strictly lower
than the welfare under TTC because under DA only students that have sufficiently high priority
for both schools have the budget set B = {1, 2}. Two thirds of assigned students have a budget set
B = {1} or B = {2}, corresponding to the single school for which they have sufficient priority. If
δ1 = 2, δ2 = 0 welfare under DA is UDA/Q ≈ 1.11.
In Example 4.3, TTC yields higher student welfare by providing all assigned students with a
full budget set, thus maximizing each assigned student’s contribution to welfare from horizontal
taste shocks. However, the assignment it produces is not stable. In fact, both schools admit
students whom they rank at the bottom, and thus virtually all unassigned students can potentially
block with either school.31 Requiring a stable assignment will constrain two thirds of the assigned
students from efficiently sorting on horizontal taste shocks.
We next provide an example where the two schools have different capacity, with q1 > q2. To
make investment in school 1 more efficient, we assume that (despite having more students) school 1
requires the same amount of resources to increase its quality for all its students. Thus, we keep the
constraint that δ1 + δ2 = 2. It is straightforward to see that under neighborhood assignment the
welfare optimal distribution of quality is δ1 = 2, δ2 = 0. In contrast, we find the welfare optimal
distribution under TTC can be closer to egalitarian.
Example 4.4. Consider a logit economy with two schools and q1 = 1/2, q2 = 1/4, and let Q =
q1 + q2 denote the total capacity. Quality levels δ are constrained by δ1 + δ2 = 2 and δ1, δ2 ≥ 0.
Under neighborhood assignment the welfare optimal quality is δ1 = 2, δ2 = 0, yielding UNH/Q =
31Note that this is not a concern in school choice settings where blocking pairs cannot be assigned outside of the
mechanism.
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(a) TTC, δ1 = δ2 = 1. (b) TTC, δ1, δ2 = 1± ln(2)2 ,
optimal investment.
(c) Average student welfare
under TTC, δ1 + δ2 = 2.
(d) DA, δ1 = δ2 = 1. (e) DA, δ1 = 2, δ2 = 0,
optimal investment.
(f) Average student welfare
under DA, δ1 + δ2 = 2.
Figure 4.13: Illustration for Example 4.4. Figures (a) and (b) show the budget sets under TTC for different quality
levels, and Figure (c) shows the average welfare of assigned students under TTC for quality levels δ1 + δ2 = 2 for
different values of δ1− δ2. Note that δ1 = δ2 = 1 is no longer optimal. Figures (d) and (e) show the budget sets under
DA, and Figure (f) shows the average welfare of assigned students under DA.
4/3 ≈ 1.33. Under TTC assignment the unique optimal quality is δ1 = 1+ 12 ln (2) , δ2 = 1− 12 ln (2),





≈ 1.75. Under these quality levels any assigned student has the budget
set B = {1, 2}. Given δ1 = 2, δ2 = 0 welfare is UTTC/Q ≈ 1.61. The quality levels that are optimal
in Example 4.3, namely δ1 = 1, δ2 = 1, yield UTTC/Q ≈ 1.46. Under DA assignment the unique
optimal quality is δ1 = 2, δ2 = 0, yielding UDA/Q ≈ 1.45. Given δ1 = 1, δ2 = 1 welfare under DA is
UDA/Q ≈ 1.20.
Again in Example 4.4 we find that the optimal quality distribution under TTC provides all
assigned students with a full budget set, making all schools equally over-demanded. The optimal
quality distribution under neighborhood assignment and DA allocates all resources to the more
efficient school. While quality directed to the larger school affects more students and yields more
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direct benefit, under TTC an egalitarian distribution leads to more welfare gains from sorting on
horizontal tastes. For general parameters the welfare gain from sorting can be lower or higher than
the welfare gains from directing all resources to the more efficient school.
Finally, consider a central school board with a fixed amount of resources K to be allocated to
the n schools. We assume that the cost of quality δi is the convex function κi (δi) = eδi . This
specification makes bigger schools more efficient.32 Using Proposition 4.6 we solve for the optimal
distribution of school quality. Despite the heterogeneity among schools, social welfare is maximized
when all assigned students have a full budget set, which occurs when the amount allocated to each
school is proportional to the number of seats at the school.
Proposition 4.7. Consider a logit economy with cost function κi (δi) = eδi∀i and resource con-
straint ∑i κi (δi) ≤ K. Social welfare is uniquely maximized when the resources κi allocated to





and all assigned students s receive a full budget set, i.e., B (s,p) = {1, 2, . . . , n} for all assigned
students s.
Under optimal investment, the resulting TTC assignment is such that every assigned student
receives a full budget set and is able to attend their top choice school. More is invested in higher
capacity schools, as they provide more efficient investment opportunities, but the investment is
balanced across schools.
4.5.2 Design of TTC Priorities
To better understand the role of priorities in the TTC mechanism, we examine how the TTC
assignment changes with changes in the priority structure. Notice that any student s whose favorite
school is i and who is within the qi highest ranked students at i is guaranteed admission to i. In the
32Note that κi is the total school funding. This is equivalent to setting the student utility of school i to be to
us (i | κi) = log (κi) + εis = log (κi/qi) + log (qi) + εis, which is the log of the per-student funding plus a fixed school
utility that is larger for bigger schools.
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following example, we consider changes to the relative priority of such highly ranked students and
find that these changes can have an impact on the assignment of other students, without changing
the assignment of any student whose priority changed.
Example 4.5. The economy E has two schools 1, 2 with capacities q1 = q2 = q, students are equally
likely to prefer each school, and student priorities are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] independently
for each school and independently of preferences. The TTC algorithm ends after a single round,
and the resulting assignment is given by p11 = p21 = p12 = p22 =
√
1− 2q. The derivation can be
found in Appendix B.3.
Consider the set of students {s | rsi ≥ m ∀i} for some m > 1 − q. Any student in this set is
assigned to his top choice. Suppose we construct an economy E ′ by arbitrarily changing the rank
of students within the set, subject to the restriction that their ranks must remain in [m, 1]2.33 The
range of possible TTC cutoffs for E ′ is given by p11 = p21, p12 = p22 where






(1− 2q) m21−2m+2m2 and p =
√
(1− 2q) 1−2m+2m2
m2 . Figure 4.14 illustrates the range of
possible TTC cutoffs for E ′ and the economy E for which TTC obtains one set of extreme cutoffs.
Example 4.5 has several implications. First, it shows that it is not possible to directly compute
TTC cutoffs from student demand. The set of cutoffs such that student demand is equal to school
capacity (depicted by the grey curve in Figure 4.14) are the cutoffs that satisfy p11 = p21, p12 = p22
and p11p22 = 1 − 2q. Under any of these cutoffs the students in {s | rsi ≥ m ∀i} have the same
demand, but the resulting TTC outcomes are different. It follows that the mechanism requires
more information to determine the assignment. However, Theorem 4.3 implies that the changes in
TTC outcomes are small if 1−m is small.
A second implication is that the TTC priorities can be ‘bossy’ in the sense that changes in the
relative priority of high priority students can affect the assignment of other students, even when
all high priority students receive the same assignment. Notice that in all the economies considered
33 The remaining students still have ranks distributed uniformly on the complement of [m, 1]2.
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Figure 4.14: The range of possible TTC cutoffs in example 4.5 with q = 0.455 and m = 0.6. The points depict the
TTC cutoffs for the original economy and the extremal cutoffs for the set of possible economies E ′, with the range
of possible TTC cutoffs for E ′ given by the bold curve. The dashed line is the TTC path for the original economy.
The shaded squares depict the changes to priorities that generate the economy E which has extremal cutoffs. In E the
priority of all top ranked students is uniformly distributed within the smaller square. The dotted line depicts the TTC
path for E, which results in cutoffs p11 =
√
(1− 2q) 1−2m+2m2
m2 ≈ 0.36 and p22 =
√
(1− 2q) m21−2m+2m2 ≈ 0.25.
in Example 4.5, we only changed the relative priority within the set {s | ∃i s.t. rsi ≥ m}, and all
these students were always assigned to their top choice. However, these changes resulted in a
different assignment for low priority students. For example, if q = 0.455 and m = 0.4, a student
s with priority rs1 = 0.35,rs2 = 0.1 could possibly receive his first choice or be unassigned. Such
changes to priorities may naturally arise when there are many indifferences in student priorities,
and tie-breaking is used. Since priorities are bossy, the choice of tie-breaking between high-priority
students can have indirect effects on the assignment of low priority students.
4.5.3 Comparing Mechanisms
In Chapter 4.5.1 we compared the welfare effects of changes in school resource allocation under
various school choice mechanisms. Our formulation of TTC also allows us to compare TTC with
other school choice mechanisms. In this section, we provide a theoretical explanation for observed
similarities between assignments under TTC and Deferred Acceptance (DA), as well as a compar-
ison of the number of blocking pairs induced by TTC and the closely related Clinch and Trade
mechanism.
119
Both TTC and Deferred Acceptance (DA) Gale and Shapley (1962) are strategy-proof, but differ
in that TTC is efficient whereas DA is stable. Kesten (2006); Ehlers and Erdil (2010) show the
two mechanisms are equivalent only under strong conditions that are unlikely to hold in practice.
However, Pathak (2016) evaluates the two mechanisms on application data from school choice in
New Orleans and Boston, and reports that the two mechanisms produce similar outcomes. In
Chapter 4.5.1 we compared DA and TTC in terms of welfare and assignment and found that large
differences were possible.34 Pathak (2016) conjectures that the neighborhood priority used in New
Orleans and Boston led to correlation between student preferences and school priorities that may
explain the similarity between the TTC and DA allocations in these cities.
To study this conjecture, we consider a simple model with neighborhood priority. There are
n neighborhoods, each with one school and a mass q of students. Schools have capacities q1 ≤
· · · ≤ qn = q, and each school gives priority to students in their neighborhood. For each student,
the neighborhood school is their top ranked choice with probability α; otherwise the student ranks
the neighborhood school in position k drawn uniformly at random from {2, 3, . . . , n}. Student
preference orderings over non-neighborhood schools are drawn uniformly at random.
We find that the proportion of students whose assignments are the same under both mechanisms
scales linearly with the probability of preference for the neighborhood school α, supporting the
conjecture of Pathak (2016).







Proof. We use the methodologies developed in Chapter 4.3.2 and in Azevedo and Leshno (2016)
to find the TTC and DA allocations respectively. For each school, students with priority are





, and students without priority are given




, where lottery numbers at different schools are
34Che and Tercieux (2015) show that when there are a large number of schools with a single seat per school and
preferences are random both DA and TTC are asymptotically efficient and stable and give asymptotically equivalent
allocations. As Example 4.3 shows, these results do not hold when there are many students and a few large schools.
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independent. For all values of α, the TTC cutoffs are given by pij = p
j
i = 1− qinq for all i ≤ j, and
the DA cutoffs are given by pi = 1− qinq . We now derive these cutoffs.
Consider the TTC cutoffs for the neighborhood priority setting. We prove by induction on `
that p`j = 1− q`nq for all `, j such that j ≥ `.
Base case: ` = 1.
For each school i, there are measure q of students whose first choice school is i, αq of whom
have priority at i and (1−α)qn−1 of whom have priority at school j, for all j 6= i.






, . . . , 1− t√
n
)
. At the point
γ (t) = (x, x, . . . , x) (where x ≥ n−1n ) a fraction n (1− x) of students from each neighborhood have
been assigned. Since the same proportion of students have each school as their top choice, this
means that the quantity of students assigned to each school i is n (1− x) q. Hence the cutoffs are
given by considering school 1, which has the smallest capacity, and setting the quantity assigned











i,j : i≤` satisfy p
i
j = 1 − qinq . We show by induction that





are given by p`+1j = 1− q`+1nq .











` − t√n−` , p`` − t√n−` , . . . , p`` − t√n−`
)
.
Consider a neighborhood i. If i > `, at the point γ (t) = (p11, p22, . . . , p``, x, x, . . . , x) (where x ≥
n−1




of (all previously assigned and unassigned) students from neighborhood
i have been assigned in round `+ 1. If i ≤ `, no students from neighborhood i have been assigned
in round `+ 1.
Consider the set of students S who live in one of the neighborhoods `+1, `+2, . . . , n. These are
the only students who have priority at one of the remaining schools. Moreover, the same proportion
of these students have each remaining school as their top choice out of the remaining schools. This
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means that for any i > `, the quantity of students assigned to school i in round ` + 1 by time t
is a 1n−` fraction of the total number of students assigned in round ` + 1 by time t, and is given








q. Hence the cutoffs are given by considering school ` + 1,
which has the smallest residual, and setting the quantity assigned to school `+1 equal to its residual




q = q`+1 − q`, which
yields









for all j > `.
This completes the proof that the TTC cutoffs are given by pij = p
j
i = 1− qinq for all i ≤ j.
Now consider the DA cutoffs. We show that the cutoffs pi = 1− qinq satisfy the supply-demand
equations. We first remark that the cutoff at school i is higher than all the ranks of students
without priority at school i, pi ≥ n−1n . Since every student has priority at exactly one school, this
means that every student is either above the cutoff for exactly one school and is assigned to that
school, or is below all the cutoffs and remains unassigned. Hence there are nq (1− pi) = qi students
assigned to school i for all i, and the supply-demand equations are satisfied.
The students who have the same assignments under TTC and DA are precisely the students
at neighborhood i whose ranks at school i are above 1 − qinq , and whose first choice school is




nq fraction of the entire student
population, which scales proportionally with the correlation between student preferences and school
priorities.
We can also compare TTC with the Clinch and Trade (C&T) mechanism introduced by Morrill
(2015b). The C&T mechanism identifies students who are guaranteed admission to their favorite
school i by having priority rsi ≥ 1 − q and assigns them to i by ‘clinching’ without trade. Morrill
(2015b) suggests that this design choice is desirable because it can reduce the number of blocking
pairs induced by the assignment, and gives an example where the C&T assignment has fewer
blocking pairs than the TTC assignment. The fact that allowing students to clinch can change
the assignment can be interpreted as another example of the bossiness of priorities under TTC: we
can equivalently implement C&T by running TTC on a changed priority structure where students
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who clinched at school i have higher rank at i than any other student.35 The following proposition
builds on Example 4.5 and shows that C&T may produce more blocking pairs than TTC.
Proposition 4.9. The Clinch and Trade mechanism can produce more, fewer or an equal number
of blocking pairs compared to TTC.
Figure 4.15: Economy E1 used in the proof of Proposition 4.9. The black borders partition the space of students
into four regions. The density of students is zero on white areas, and constant on each of the shaded areas within a
bordered region. In each of the four regions, the total measure of students within is equal to the total area (white and
shaded) within the borders of the region.
Proof. Morrill (2015b) provides an example where C&T produces fewer blocking pairs than TTC.
Both mechanisms give the same assignment for the symmetric economy in the beginning of Example
4.5. It remains to construct an economy E1 for which C&T produces more blocking pairs than
TTC. Let economy E be defined as in Section B.3, that is, by taking an economy E with capacities
q1 = q2 = q = 0.455 where students are equally likely to prefer each school and student priorities
are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] independently for each school and independently of preferences,
and changing the ranks of top priority students (those with rank rθ1, rθ2 ≥ m = 0.6) so that they have
ranks uniformly distributed in the r˜ × r˜ square (1− r˜, 1]× (m,m+ r˜] for some r˜ ≤ (2m−1)(1−m)2m .
35For brevity, we abstract away from certain details of C&T mechanism that are important when not all schools
run out at the same round.
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, where p =√
(1− 2q) m21−2m+2m2 and p =
√
(1− 2q) 1−2m+2m2
m2 . The economy E1 is constructed by taking the
economy E and redistributing school 2 rank among students with rθ2 ≤ p ≈ 0.25 so that those with
rθ1 ≥ p ≈ 0.36 have higher school 2 rank.36 The C&T assignment for E1 is given by p11 = p22 = 0.3,
while TTC gives p11 = p ≈ 0.36 and p22 = p ≈ 0.25 (and under both p11 = p21, p12 = p22). Under TTC
unmatched students will form blocking pairs only with school 2, while under C&T all unmatched
students will form a blocking pair with either school. See Figure 4.15 for an illustration.
4.6 Discussion
Summary of findings. We have provided a cutoff characterization for the TTC outcome in
terms of n2 cutoffs, one for every pair of schools. The cutoff pij represents the lowest j-priority a
student can have in order to use that priority to obtain a seat in school i. In a continuum setting we
demonstrated how to compute these cutoffs as the solutions to a system of differential equations. In
parametrized economies we provide closed-form expressions for the TTC outcome. We consider the
problem of optimal investment in school quality, and show that under TTC the optimal invesment
levels are equitable, as the greatest utility gains in TTC come from allowing students to choose
schools based on their idiosyncratic preferences rather than based on the quality of the school.
We are hopeful that our characterization of the TTC assignment can be used to increase the use
of TTC in practice and inform optimal decision-making in other aspects of the school assignment
problem.
Communicating the TTC outcome. We can simplify how the TTC outcome is communicated





in the course of running the TTC algorithm. The cutoffs can be published to allow parents to verify
their assignment, or the budget set structure can be communicated using the language of tokens
(see footnote 4). We hope that these methods of communicating TTC will make the mechanism
36Specifically, select `1 < `2. Among students with rθ2 ≤ p and rθ1 ≥ p¯ the school 2 rank is distributed uniformly
in the range [`2, p]. Among students with rθ2 ≤ p and rθ1 < p¯ the school 2 rank is distributed uniformly in the range
[0, `1]. Within each range rθ1 and rθ2are still independent. See Figure 4.15 for an illustration.
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more palatable to students and their parents, and facilitate a more informed comparison with the
Deferred Acceptance mechanism.
Unacceptable matches and quotas. The model assumes for simplicity that all students and
schools are acceptable. It can be naturally extended to allow for unacceptable students or schools
by erasing from student preferences any school that they find unacceptable or that finds them
unacceptable. Type-specific quotas can be incorporated, as in Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003),
by adding type-specific capacity equations and erasing from the preference list of each type all the
schools which do not have remaining capacity for their type.
Optimization and counterfactuals under TTC. Our framework for understanding the TTC
outcome can also be used to inform policy decisions and perform counterfactuals using the TTC
mechanisms. While examples provided in the paper utilized functional form assumptions to gain
tractability, the methodology can be used more generally with numerical solvers. This provides
a useful alternative to simulation methods that can be more efficient for large economies, or for
calculating an average outcome for large random economies. For example, most school districts
uses tie-breaking rules, and current simulation methods perform many draws of the random tie-
breaking lottery to calculate the expected outcomes. Our methodology directly calculates the
expected outcome from the distribution.
Designing TTC priorities. Arnosti (2015); Ashlagi and Shi (2014); Ashlagi and Nikzad (2016);
Feigenbaum et al. show that the optimal choice of tie-breaking lottery can lead to significant welfare
gains when using DA. In Chapter 4.5.2 we characterize all the possible TTC outcomes for a class
of tie-breaking rules, and find that the choice of tie-breaking rule can have significant effect on
the assignment, suggesting that tie-breaking can also play a significant role in determining welfare
under TTC. Our cutoff structure for TTC also differs from the one found in Azevedo and Leshno
(2016) for DA. This demonstrates that priorities play a different role under these mechanisms, and
raises the question of how to best design priorities under TTC. Are there priorities for TTC that,
similar to neighborhood priority in DA, allow us to prioritize students for a given school? Can TTC
priorities be designed to optimize other global objectives in assigning students to schools, such as
maximizing welfare for students from disadvantaged neighborhoods or minimizing busing costs?
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Our framework opens the possibility of exploring different tie-breaking schemes when using TTC








The Information Acquisition Costs of
Matching Markets
Matching markets have been the subject of much academic research as well as substantial interest
from practitioners. In these markets agents have preferences over the individuals they are matched
to, and the assignment is not determined simply by monetary transfers. Matching theory inves-
tigates the role of marketplace rules in determining the allocation, and elucidates how matching
markets can and should compute the overall assignment from individual agent preferences. Such
models allow us to better understand decentralized markets, such as college admission, or facilitate
a better design of centralized assignment mechanisms, such as the medical match and school choice
(see, e.g. Roth and Sotomayor, 1992; Roth, 2015).
In this paper, we investigate the effects of mechanisms on how agents form their preferences.
The prevalence of incomplete information is well-studied in the context of auction markets (see
e.g. Eso and Szentes (2007); Milgrom and Weber (1982)), but is relatively unexplored in matching
market settings. This is despite the fact that in matching settings such as medical residency
matching and school choice, it is common not only for agents to have incomplete information
about their preferences, but also for them to spend a significant amount of effort investigating
potential placements before forming their final preferences. For example, in NYC public high school
admissions students must submit their preferences over more than 700 programs at more than 400
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high schools. Moreover, costly information acquisition is also an important equity problem in school
choice, as students from underprivileged backgrounds are often inadequately informed about their
options and must exert the most effort to determine their preferences (see, e.g. Hassidim et al.,
2015; Kapor et al., 2016).
Thus motivated, we study the effects of market design on costly information acquisition in a
many-to-one school choice market. In our model school priorities are common knowledge, and
students can acquire costly information about their preferences over school. We model each agent’s
information acquisition problem using the “Pandora’s box” framework of Weitzman (1979) in the
tractable continuum matching market of Azevedo and Leshno (2016). Each student knows a prior
distribution for each school’s utility to them, and must pay a cost to learn the actual utility real-
ization. The utility realizations are independent for each student, and students individually decide
on their information acquisition process. The student information acquisition problem admits an
optimal solution via a simple index policy, and allows for students to only partially collect infor-
mation.
We define stability under incomplete information for this setting: an outcome for the market
is stable with respect to acquired information and information acquisition costs. A blocking pair
is a (student, school) pair such that the student (i) has higher priority at the school than another
student assigned to that school or the school is undercapacitated, and the student either (ii) prefers
the school to their assigned school, given their acquired information, or (ii’) does not have enough
information to make a decision and is willing to pay the cost to collect further information, and
a matching and set of acquired information constitute a stable outcome if there is no blocking
pair. This definition extends the standard definition of stability, and is equivalent to the stan-
dard definition when students do not incur information acquisition costs and collect all preference
information. However, in the presence of information acquisition costs it is possible for different
sets of acquired information to lead to different stable outcomes. Hence the design of the market
mechanism can induce beliefs that lead students to acquire information differently and implement
different outcomes, even when there is a unique stable matching under full information.
In settings with costly information acquisition students need information about their possible
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matches in order to optimally acquire information, and students may benefit from waiting for
the market to resolve before acquiring information. We refine the set of stable outcomes to the
set of regret-free stable outcomes, under which the information acquired by each student is the
same as if they performed their optimal information acquisition process knowing the preferences
and information acquisition processes of all other students. In other words, each student acquires
information as if she were the last the enter the market, and no student regrets not waiting for
further information about other students’ preferences before learning her own preferences. This
means that regret-free stable matchings do not depend on student beliefs. We furnish the surprising
result that the set of regret-free stable matchings has a lattice structure, which it inherits from of
the set of stable matchings under complete information (attributed to John Conway in Knuth,
1976), and hence is non-empty and has an outcome that is unambiguously the best for all students.
We then turn to the problem of providing matching mechanisms for implementing regret-free
stable outcomes. We show that as regret-free stable matchings are characterized by cutoffs, the
student-optimal regret-free stable outcome can be implemented by learning and posting the appro-
priate admissions cutoffs. For example, given sufficient market structure, school-proposing Deferred
Acceptance can be implemented in a sequential manner to learn the regret-free stable cutoffs with
regret-free information acquisition. However, we also demonstrate that there exist economies where
regret-free stable matchings cannot be computed without incurring additional information acquisi-
tion costs, and also where the student-optimality of a regret-free stable matching cannot be verified
without incurring additional costly information acquisition. In general settings, standard mecha-
nisms can result in information deadlocks, where no information is gathered because every student
finds it strictly optimal to wait for others to acquire information first. Hence the presence of costly
information acquisition does not affect the structure of the set of stable outcomes but rather the
algorithmic questions of computing a regret-free stable outcome and verifying its optimality.
We show how to approximately compute the market-clearing admissions cutoffs when we have
historical information about demand or can estimate it by subsampling, and in such settings provide
mechanisms that implement outcomes that are student-optimal regret-free stable with respect to
perturbed school capacities. Our results illustrate that, given sufficient information about aggregate
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student demand for schools, it is possible to approximately implement a regret-free stable matching.
5.1 Prior Work
This paper contributes to the literature of matching markets with incomplete information. The
stream of work that is closest to ours is that of Aziz et al. (2016); Rastegari et al. (2013, 2014),
which analyze a matching model where there is partial ordinal information on both sides of the
market that can be refined through costly interviews. They ask computational questions regarding
the minimal number of interviews required to find a stable matching, and find that under a tiered
structure an iterative version of DA minimizes the number of required interviews. Our finding
that a sequential version of DA implements a regret-free stable matching when agents are willing
to inspect all schools they can attend is a particular case of this result where the preferences of
one side are known. Drummond and Boutilier (2013, 2014) consider more general algorithms that
acquire information through both interviews and comparisons and provide algorithms that achieve
approximately stable matchings with low information costs. Lee and Schwarz (2009); Kadam (2015)
also study information sharing through interviews.
Several papers consider other aspects of imperfect information in matching markets, without
allowing agents to search for information. Liu et al. (2014) suggest a notion of stability under
asymmetric information between agents. Chakraborty et al. (2010) consider agents with incom-
plete information who update their preferences after seeing the matching. Ehlers and Massó (2015)
demonstrate that there is a strong connection between ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable
mechanisms under incomplete information and Nash equilibria of the mechanism under corre-
sponding complete information settings. We similarly define a notion of stability under incomplete
information and find a strong parallel with the structure of stable matchings under complete infor-
mation.
Empirical work demonstrates that incomplete information is important in the school choice
setting. Kapor et al. (2016) provides empirical evidence that many students participating in a school
choice mechanism are not well informed, and make mistakes when reporting their preferences, and
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Dur et al. (2015) provides evidence that different parents exert different levels of efforts in learning
about school choice.
There is also a growing literature about information acquisition in market design. In an auction
setting, Kleinberg et al. (2016) shows that descending price auction create optimal incentives for
value discovery. Chen and He (2015) study how the DA and Boston mechanisms give participating
agents incentives to learn their preferences and preferences of others, but limit attention to the
decision of whether to learn the full ordinal or cardinal valuation for all schools. Bade (2015);
Harless and Manjunath (2015) consider information acquisition in assignment problems without
stability constraints.
The rational inattention literature that stemmed from the macroeconomic literature also looks
at information acquisition by agents. This literature uses a framework introduced by Sims (2003)
where the costs of signals are given by information theoretic measures of the informativeness of the
signals. Matějka and McKay (2015) shows that in that framework agent’s choices can be formulated
as a generalized multinomial logit, and Steiner et al. (2017) give a tractable formulation for the
choices of agents with endogenous information acquisition in a dynamic setting. Our approach
differs in that our model uses a different cost structure, and focuses on the interaction between
information acquisition and market mechanisms.
A related question is the communication complexity of transmitting known preference to a
mechanism. Gonczarowski et al. (2015) consider the communication complexity of finding a stable




boolean queries. Ashlagi et al. (2018) find that the
communication complexity of finding a stable matching is low under assumptions on the structure
of the economy and a Bayesian prior. Their Communication-Efficient Deferred Acceptance protocol
utilizes messages about both acceptances and rejections. The analysis in both papers differs from
ours in that they assume agent know their full preferences (for example, can report their first choice)
and only consider the cost of communicating that information to the mechanism.
Finally, our work contributes to the growing number of papers exploring the use of sequential
or multi-round school choice mechanisms. Bo and Hakimov (2017) and Ashlagi et al. (2018) pro-
pose the Iterative Deferred Acceptance mechanism (IDAM) and Communication-Efficient Deferred
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Acceptance mechanism respectively, which allow for multiple rounds of message-passing where stu-
dents can learn the set of schools with which they are likely to be matched. Such mechanisms are
also currently used in practice; Dur et al. (2015) empirically study a public school system in Wake
County that implements an iterative mechanism, Gong and Liang (2016) theoretically and empiri-
cally consider a college admissions system in Inner Mongolia that implements an iterative version
of Deferred Acceptance, and Bo and Hakimov (2017) propose IDAM in response to a sequential
mechanism previously used for college admissions in Brazil. We hope that our findings can be used
to better design sequential school choice mechanisms in these cities, and many others across the
world.
5.2 Model
We present a model where students learn their preferences through costly information acquisition.
The set of schools is denoted by C = {1, . . . , n}, and each school i ∈ C has capacity to admit
qi > 0 students. A student is given by a quadruple s = (F s, cs, rs, vs). School priorities are publicly
known, and captured by the vector rs ∈ [0, 1]C . School i prefers student s over student s′ if and only
if rsi > rs
′
i . We say that rsi is the rank of student s at school i. Student s needs to perform costly
information acquisition to learn her value for attending each school. Initially student s knows that
the value for attending school i is distributed according to prior F si , and may pay a inspection cost
of csi > 0 to learn the realized value vsi . Student s privately knows F s, cs (importantly, the designer
does not know these parameters). Students must inspect a school in order to attend it. We assume
that vsi is independently drawn across students and schools.1
With slight abuse of notation, we use a student type θ = θ (s) =
(
F θ, cθ, rθ
)
to denote the
initially known information of a student s =
(
F θ, cθ, rθ, vs
)
. We refer to θ ∈ Θ as a student type,
and refer to s = (θ, vs) ∈ S as the student’s realized preference. Formally, Θ = FC × RC × [0, 1]C ,
where F is the set of probability distribution functions, and S = Θ × RC . We will use s and θ
interchangeably to index F θ, cθ, rθ. Given a type θ the realized values are randomly distributed
1This implies that preferences of other students do not provide a student any information about vs.
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vs ∼ F θ, and with slight abuse of notation we write s ∼ F θ.
Definition 5.1. An discrete economy is given by E = (C, S, q), where S = {s1, . . . , sN} is the set
of students and q = {qi}i∈C is the vector of quotas at each school.
We make the following assumptions. First, all students and colleges are acceptable. Second, as
rsi carries only ordinal information, it is normalized to be equal to the percentile rank of student s in
college i’s preferences, i.e. rsc = |{s′ | s c s′}| / |S|. Third, school have strict priorities, i.e., rsi 6= rs
′
i
if s 6= s′. Fourth, the priors F θ are such that students have strict preferences, i.e., P (vsi = vsi′) = 0
for all s and i 6= i′. Last, we assume there is an excess of students, that is, ∑i∈C qi < |S|.
It will useful to consider continuum economies where there is no aggregate uncertainty. The
realized preferences vs of a single student given his type θ (s) are random. In the continuum
economy there is a continuous mass of students of any given type θ, and although the realized
preferences of an individual student are random, the aggregate distribution over s = (θ, v) is known
from the initial information F θ. Formally, a continuum economy is described by a measure η over
S. We require that the measure η is consistent with initial information, that is, for any A ⊂ Θ and
sets Vi ⊂ RC we have that





dF θ (v) dη (θ) .
Definition 5.2. A continuum economy is given by E = (C,S, η, q), where q = {qi}i∈C is the vector
of quotas at each school, and η is a probability measure over S that is consistent with initial
information.
We make the same assumptions about continuum economies as for finite economies: namely
that all students and colleges are acceptable; rsi is normalized so that for any i ∈ C and x ∈ [0, 1],
we have that η
({
(θ, v) ∈ S| rθi ≤ x
})
= x; school priorities are strict, i.e. for any x ∈ [0, 1] we
have η
({
(θ, v) ∈ S| rθi = x
})
= 0; student preferences are strict, i.e. for any x ∈ [0, 1] we have
η({s = (θ, vs) ∈ S|vsi = x}) = 0; and there is an excess of students,
∑
i∈C qi < η (S) = 1. In what
follows, we will define concepts for both the discrete and continuum economy, and let η (·) denote
the cardinality of a set in the discrete economy, and the measure in the continuum economy.
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As in the standard matching model, a matching is a mapping µ : S → C ∪ {∅} specifying the
assignment of each student. Overloading notation, for school i ∈ C let µ (i) denote the set µ−1 (i) ⊆
S of students assigned to school i. For each student s ∈ S and school i ∈ C, let the inspection
indicator χsi be an indicator function that is 1 if student s has inspected school i and 0 otherwise.2
We denote the preference information revealed from inspections χ by v|χ = {vsi | χsi = 1}.
A matching µ is feasible with respect to inspections χ if for each school i ∈ C we have that µ(i)
is η-measurable and η (µ(i)) ≤ qi, and, for each student s, if µ(s) 6= ∅ then then χsµ(s) = 1. This
last condition is tantamount to assuming that a student must inspect a school in order to attend
it. A feasible outcome is a matching and inspection pair (µ, χ) such that µ is feasible with respect
to χ. Given (µ, χ) the utility of student s is us (µ, χ) = vsµ(s) −
∑
i∈C χsi csi .
5.2.1 Stability with Costly Information Acquisition
Consider a feasible outcome (µ, χ). As in the complete information setting, a student-school pair
(s, i) forms a blocking pair if: (i) student s has higher priority than some student who is assigned




i | s′ ∈ µ (i)
}
or η (µ (i)) < qi; and
(ii) student s inspected school i and knows she prefers school i over her assigned school µ (s),
namely χsi = 1 and vsi > vsµ(s).3 When information acquisition is costly for students there may
be a student-school pair (s, i) where (i) holds and student s did not inspect school i. We extend
the standard definition and say that (s, i) forms a blocking pair if (i) holds; and (ii’) s has not yet
inspected school i and prefers to pay the inspection cost csi and be assigned to the better school of i










≥ vsµ(s). An outcome (µ, χ) is stable if
there are no pairs (s, i) that block by satisfying either (i),(ii) (i.e. the classical stability condition)
or (i),(ii’).
We remark that stability of (µ, χ) depends only on student’s initial information θ (s) and pref-
erences revealed by inspections v|χ. Simple examples show that if χ 6= χ′ are different inspections
2We are implicitly assuming that two students with the same type and values inspect the same schools.
3Recall that feasibility requires that χsµ(s) = 1.
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and µ is a matching, it is possible that the outcome (µ, χ) is stable but the outcome (µ, χ′) is not.4
Given a matching µ define the budget set of student s by
Bs (µ) =
{
i ∈ C | rsi ≥ rs
′
i for some s′ ∈ µ (i)
}
∪ {i ∈ C | η (µ (i)) < qi} .
The budget set Bs (µ) is the set of schools such that (s, i) satisfy condition (i). A stable outcome
(µ, χ) must assign student s to a school i ∈ Bs (µ) if s so desires, and the student s cannot be
assigned to any school in the complement set C \Bs (µ). We say that a school i is available to s if
i ∈ Bs (µ), otherwise school i is unavailable to s. The following straightforward lemma characterizes
stable outcomes in terms of budget sets.
Lemma 5.1. A feasible outcome (µ, χ) is stable if and only if for every student we have that
µ (s) = arg max
i∈C
{vsi | i ∈ Bs (µ) , χsi = 1} ,












5.2.2 Regret-Free Stable Outcomes
To reach an outcome, students must perform inspections to acquire information about their values.
These inspections might induce regret. Sometimes this regret is unavoidable: e.g., a student will
regret having inspected a school with low value. Other times, regret is avoidable: e.g. a student
will regret inspecting a school that is not available to her, or inspecting schools in the wrong order.
In other words, a student should carefully select her inspections based on her available information.
Below we characterize the information acquisition process that maximizes the student’s expected
payoff given all potential information, including her initial information and information that could
4For example, if there are only two schools, both of which are very costly to inspect compared to the possible
values they may yield, then a student who has inspected and is matched to the first but has not inspected the second
(χ) might not wish to pay the inspection cost for the second school, causing the current matching to be stable.
However, if she had inspected the second schoool (χ′), she may realize a high value for it and thus form a blocking
pair with it.
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be provided by the market. We determin how market information can affect the student’s infor-
mation acquisition decision. This allows us to define regret-free stable matchings where agents
acquired information optimally.
Consider a student s who possesses initial information θ (s) = (F s, cs, rs) and needs to select
which schools to inspect. Since inspections are costly, student s will want to inspect a school only
if inspecting the school can lead to being assigned to that school and receiving a higher value. In
particular, student s will not want to inspect a school i if she knows that school i filled its capacity
with higher priority students, and therefore she will not be assigned to the school i regardless of
her value vsi . Thus, the set of schools that student s would like to inspect depends on her potential
matches and the preferences of other students.
To fix ideas, first consider the isolated information acquisition problem where student s = (θ, vs)
is given a subset of schools C ⊆ C to choose from, each of which guarantees her admission. Student
s needs to acquire information to form her preferences and then select her assigned school from
C. If χs is s’s inspection indicator and i∗ ∈ C is her selected school her utility is vsi∗ −
∑
i∈C χsi csi .
The adaptive inspection strategy that maximizes the student’s expected utility given the initial
information F θ is derived by Weitzman (1979) and is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2. (Weitzman 1979) Consider a student s = (θ, vs) with initial information F θ and
inspection costs cθ that can adaptdively inspect schools and choose a school from C ⊂ C. For each
school i, define a index vθi to be the unique solution to the equation Ev˜i∼F θi
[
max{0, (v˜i − vθi )}
]
= cθi .
Sequentially inspect schools one by one in decreasing order of their index vθi .5 Continue inspecting
the following school until the score of the next school to be inspected is below the maximal realized
value among inspected schools.6
We denote the inspections resulting from this optimal strategy by χopt
(
F θ, cθ, vs;C
)
.
The optimal inspection policy is an index policy, where students use the prior information F θ
5In case of multiple schools with equal index vθi=vθi′ , break the tie by first inspecting the school min {i, i′}.




if vθj∗ > maxi∈I vsi
and stop otherwise.
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to compute indices vθi for each school i and inspect schools in decreasing order of their index.7 The




i∈C , and the
realized values {vsi }i∈C . The following example illustrates this.
Example 5.1. Suppose that C = C = {1, 2}. Let [x; p] denote the probability distribution which
assigns probability p to the value x and 1 − p to 0. Consider a student with v1 ∼ F1 = [10; 1/2],
and v2 ∼ F2 = [4; 3/4] and let the inspection costs be c1 = 3, c2 = 1. Then the optimal inspection
strategy is to first inspect school 1, and continue to inspect school 2 only if v1 = 0. If instead
C = {2} the optimal inspection strategy is to only inspect school 2.
Knowing the set of available schools C helps the student in Example 5.1 to conduct the adaptive
information acquisition that maximizes her expected utility. If the student does not know C she
her inspection strategy may be sub-optimal in two ways. First, the student may inspect school 1
when it is not available, wasting the cost c1. Second, the student should not inspect school 2 before
she inspects school 1 or learns that school 1 is not available, because it is likely that she will not
choose to inspect school 2 after inspecting school 1.
When student s is part of a matching market, the set of schools that are available to her depends
on the resulting matching outcome, and therefore on the preferences of other students. Suppose
that student s were to delay her information acquisition until the rest of the market resolved and the
matching µ is realized. Arriving last to the market, student s can learn the set of schools available to
her, which is Bs (µ) by Lemma 5.1. The student can optimize her information acquisition by using
her initial information F θ, cθ as well as the market information Bs (µ), and applying Lemma 5.2.
We say that the outcome (µ, χ) is regret-free stable if every students follows the optimal inspection
policy informed by all available market information, that is, every student inspected schools as if
she was the last to the market.
Definition 5.3. An outcome (µ, χ) is regret-free stable if (µ, χ) is stable and every student s in-
spected the optimal set of schools given her available set of schoolsBs (µ), that is χs = χopt (F s, cs, vs;Bs (µ))
for all s ∈ S. We let MRF (E) denote the set of regret-free stable outcomes for the economy E.
7Such a policy can also be constructed by mapping the problem to a multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem; see e.g
Olszewski and Weber (2015) for details.
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When an outcome is not regret-free stable some students can benefit from delaying their infor-
mation acquisition until the remainder of the market resolved. Note that while the definition of
regret-free stability is ex post in flavor, as it is stated in terms of each student’s realized preferences
vs, it only imposes the restriction that the student follows the ex ante optimal inspection strategy
given θ and Bs (µ) = Bθ (µ) (before observing vs). A regret-free stable outcome could be ex post
suboptimal, e.g. a student s may inspect a school i 6= µ (s) with low realized value vsi and ex post
observe that the inspection cost ci was wasted, but student s could do no better given all available
information from θ (s) and the market information.
Remark. To verify whether (µ, χ) is regret-free stable it is sufficient to know vs|χ, χs and F s, cs for
each s, and the students’ values for uninspected schools is not necessary.
5.3 The Structure of Regret-Free Stable Outcomes
In this section we provide several results about the structure of regret-free stable outcomes. We show
that the set of regret-free stable outcomes is a non-empty lattice and give a concise characterization
of regret-free stable outcomes in terms of cutoffs.
We begin by exploring how the demand of student s depends on the set of available schools.
Consider a student s with available schools C ⊂ C. If s optimally acquires information, she inspects
χs = χopt
(
F θ, cθ, vs;C
)
. Denote the resulting demand of s by
Ds (C) = arg max
{
vi | i ∈ C, χopt
(





which is the most preferred inspected school. Note that Ds (C) depends only on information that
is revealed to s. The following lemma shows that Ds (·) satisfies WARP, and we can construct a
full preference ordering Ψ(s) that yields the same demand.
Proposition 5.1 (Reduction to demand from complete information). Let s = (F s, cs, rs, vs) be a
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realized student. There exist an ordering Ψ(s) such that for all C ⊂ C we have that
Ds (C) = max
Ψ(s)
(C) .













It is straightforward to verify that Ds (C) = maxΨ(s) (C).
That is, if we only observe the eventual selection from a set of available schools C, the student
s is indistinguishable from a student with complete preference information and preferences Ψ(s).
Given only initial information θ, the demand of θ from a set C is uncertain, as the realized values
vs are unknown. An immediate corollary is the distribution of demand of θ from a set C is identical
to the distribution of argmaxΨ(s) (C), where Ψ(s) is the random preference ordering induced by
drawing a random student s =
(
F θ, cθ, rθ, vs
)
from the distribution vs ∼ F θ.
Proposition 5.1 also allows a characterization of regret-free stable outcomes in terms of cutoffs,
as in the complete information model of (Azevedo and Leshno, 2016). Cutoffs P = {Pi}i∈C ∈ RC
are admission thresholds for each school. Cutoffs P determine the budget set of a student s to be
Bs (P ) = {i ∈ C | rsi ≥ Pi} ,
which is the set of schools where s has better rank than the cutoff at that school. Note that Bs (P )
depends only on rs and can be calculated from P and the initial information θ (s).
The demand of student s given cutoffs P is defined to be equal to Ds (C) for a set of available
schools equal to his budget set C = Bs (P ); for succinctness we will write this as Ds (P ). Note that
within the definition of Ds (P ) we require that student acquire information optimally. Aggregate
demand for school i given cutoffs P is defined to be the mass of students that demand school i,
Di (P ) = Di (P |η) = η ({s ∈ S |Ds (P ) = i}) .
We define market-clearing cutoffs as in Azevedo and Leshno (2016) and show there is a one-to-one
correspondence between market-clearing cutoffs and regret-free stable outcomes. Note that the
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effect of information acquisition is captured within the definition of Di (·).
Definition 5.4. A vector of cutoffs P is market-clearing if it matches supply and demand for all
schools with non-zero cutoffs:
Di (P ) ≤ qi for all i and Di (P ) = qi if Pi > 0.
We can now state our characterization of regret-free stable outcomes.
Theorem 5.1. An outcome (µ, χ) is regret-free stable if and only if there exist market-clearing
cutoffs P such that for all s




F θ, cθ, vs;Bs (P )
)
Theorem 5.1 shows an equivalence between market clearing cutoffs and regret-free stable out-
comes. Because demand D (·) provides us with sufficient information to determine whether P are
market clearing cutoffs, demand D (·) is also sufficient to determine whether a matching µ yields
a regret-free stable outcome with some χ. Using Proposition 5.1, for any market with informa-
tion acquisition E = (C,S, η, q) we can construct a full information economy E that has the same
demand, and therefore the economy E has the same market clearing cutoffs as E.
Theorem 5.2. For every continuum economy E there exists a regret-free stable outcome. Moreover,
the set of regret-free stable outcomes (µ, χ) is a non empty lattice under the order  defined by
(µ, χ)  (µ′, χ′) iff vsµ(s) (ω) ≥ vsµ′(s) (ω) ∀s ∈ S.
Proof. The theorem follows from the reduction shown in Proposition 5.1 to the complete informa-
tion setting, and analogous results by Blair (1988) on the lattice structure of many-to-one stable
matchings in the complete information setting.
Uniqueness of the regret-free stable outcome will require that the distribution of student types
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be regular. As student types have probabilistic demand, we will need to expand the definition of
regularity beyond that found in Azevedo and Leshno (2016).
Definition 5.5. We say that θ =
(
F θ, cθ, rθ
)






An measure η is regular if η ({s | θ (s) is not regular}) = 0 and the image under D (· | η) of
the closure of the set
{




Intuitively, a type θ is regular if there are no ties, and so there is always a unique decision for
whether to continue to inspect, and if so which school to inspect. A measure η is regular if there
is no positive measure of irregular students and the implied demand is sufficiently smooth.
Theorem 5.3. Suppose η is a regular measure. Then for almost every q with∑i qi < 1 the economy
E = (C,S, η, q) has a unique regret-free stable outcome.
Proof. If η satisfies η ({s | θ (s) is not regular}) = 0 then for every cutoff P demand D (P |η) is
uniquely specified, and so there is a unique reduction to the complete information setting. The
theorem follows from the reduction shown in Proposition 5.1 to the complete information setting,
and analogous results by Azevedo and Leshno (2016) in this setting.
5.4 Mechanisms
To this point we have discussed properties of regret-free stable outcomes. We now turn to the
process by which a market-maker might implement such outcomes. In general, the market arrives
at an outcome (µ, χ) following a sequential process in which students provide information to the
market, the market provides information to students, students inspect schools to obtain more
information, and the process repeats. We can describe any such market procedure as a dynamic
mechanism.
The mechanism relies on the information it receives from students. We will be interested in
two kinds of mechanisms. First, we consider direct mechanisms in which students report all of
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their private information and thereby delegate all decision-making. Second, we consider choice
mechanisms, which are restricted in the nature of information that can be passed between the
mechanism and the students. Choice mechanisms can only inform students about the availability
of schools, and can only collect ordinal preference information from students.
5.4.1 Direct Mechanisms
In a direct mechanism the students fully delegate their decisions to the mechanism. We can think
of a direct mechanism as the following iterative process. At any given state of the mechanism,
we can write χˆ to denote the indicator for the set of inspections the mechanism has conducted
so far. Then, for each student s, the mechanism knows vs|χˆ and knows F s, cs, rs by assumption.
Based on this information the mechanism can either decide to stop acquiring information and
output the outcome (µ, χˆ) for some matching µ, or to decide on the behalf of some students to
inspect additional schools. We denote the information available in economy E = (C,S, η, q) after
inspections χ by Idirect (E , χ) = (ν, q, v|χ, χ), where ν is defined by ν (A) = η ({s | θ (s) ∈ A}) for
A ⊂ Θ. We denote that set of all possible inspection indicators by X and use 0 ∈ X to denote
the initial state where no student has inspected any school. Let Idirect denote the collection of all
possible information sets Idirect (E , χ).
Definition 5.6. A direct mechanism M is a mapping








that takes as input all the information available to the mechanism given previous inspections
and returns either a next step of the inspection process, as described by tuple (S, i) of a set
S ⊆ S of students to inspect the school i ∈ C, or a final outcome (µ, χ) where χ is the current
inspection indicator. To ensure termination of the mechanism, we require that iterated applications
of the mechanism starting with Idirect (E , 0) will ultimately produce an outcome (µ, χ), which is the
outcome of the mechanism.8
8More formally, the mapping M induces a mapping M ′ : Idirect → Idirect defined by M ′ (Idirect (E , χ)) =
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Imposing that the mechanism produces a regret-free stable matching ensures that the mech-
anism makes inspection decisions that are aligned with the optimal solution to each student’s
single-agent inspection problem.
Definition 5.7. A mechanism M is (student-optimal) regret-free stable if for any economy E =
(C,S, η, q) the mechanism outputs a regret-free stable outcome (µ, χ).
5.4.2 Choice-Based Mechanisms
Direct mechanisms require that students directly report their initial information and all inspected
values. However, students may not to communicate detailed cardinal information about their
priors and costs. This may preclude the use of direct mechanisms in practice. We therefore con-
sider mechanisms with lower communication requirements, where students provide only information
about their preferred choice(s) from given sets of schools.
A choice-based mechanism is an iterative process where the mechanism provides information
to students, students choose which schools to inspect, provide information back to the mechanism,
and so on. Choice-based mechanisms do not have access to students’ private information, and
therefore cannot directly inform students which schools they should inspect. The mechanism can
only provide information to students about which schools are available to them. Because we are
interested in producing regret-free stable outcomes, which do not depend on students’ beliefs about
other students’ preferences, we restrict our attention to mechanisms that only inform a student
whether (i) it is certain that school i is available to her (A), (ii) it is certain that school i is
unavailable to her (R), or (c) it is uncertain whether school i is available or not (W). We use
Accept (A), Reject (R) and Wait-list (W) to denote these three possible messages.
Students receiving an AWR message can choose which schools to inspect, and inform the mech-
anism of their choices. To simplify notation, we write the response of the student as a refinement
of a preference ordering. Given s, χs define <s|χs by i s|χs i′ if χsi = χsi′ = 1 and vsi > vsi′ ,
Idirect (E , χ′), where: if M (Idirect (E , χ)) = (S, i) then we let χ′ be the inspections after the students in S have
inspected school i, i.e. (χ′)sj = 1 ⇔
(
χsj = 1 or s ∈ S, j = i
)
; and if M (Idirect (E , χ)) = (µ, χ) then we let χ′ = χ.
It is sufficient to require that if I = (ν, q, v|χ, χ) is a fixed point of the mapping M ′ then M (I) = (µ, χ) for some
matching µ and the same inspections χ.
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and i ∼s|χs φ if χsi = 0. Here we are using symbol φ to denote non-inspected schools. Let
L (C ∪ {φ}) denote all transitive relations over C and the non-inspection symbol φ. For an econ-
omy E = (C,S, η, q) and χ an inspection indicator, the information available to a choice-based




s∈S , q, χ
)
. Let Ichoice denote the collection of all possible
information sets Ichoice (E , χ).
Definition 5.8. An Accept-Waitlist-Reject (AWR) mechanism M is is defined via a mapping








that takes all the information available to the mechanism given previous inspections and returns
either a AWR message for each student about each school, or a outcome (µ, χ) where χ is the
current inspection indicator. We require that iterated applications of the mechanism starting with
Ichoice (E , 0) ultimately produces an outcome (µ, χ), which is the outcome of the mechanism.
We formally define general mechanisms, choice-based mechanisms and AWR mechanisms as
dynamic games of incomplete information in the appendix.
5.5 Implementing Regret-Free Stable Matchings
We have shown that regret-free stable matchings inherit the lattice structure of of stable matchings
in the complete information setting, and can also be characterized using market-clearing cutoffs. In
this section, we explore the mechanism design problem of implementing regret-free stable outcomes.
We first show that regret-free stable matchings can be implemented by posting market-clearing
cutoffs, and that information about these cutoffs is sufficient for regret-free information acquisition.
We then show that in the incomplete information setting, the difficulties lie not in the existence
of regret-free stable matchings, but in computing and verifying the stability and optimality of
these matchings in a regret-free manner. While standard mechanisms popularized in the complete
information setting can discover the market-clearing cutoffs, in many markets they will necessarily
incur regret. This is because such mechanisms rely on students gathering and reporting information
about their preferences and can result in information deadlocks, where no information is gathered
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because every student waits for others to acquire and report information first. Moreover, even
when these mechanisms discover a regret-free stable matching, they will not be able to check if the
matching is student-optimal without incurring regret.
Our conclusion is that information acquisition problems can be mitigated by posting market-
clearing cutoffs. Cutoffs provide each agent with sufficient information to perform their inspections
in a regret-free stable manner. The natural question, then, is how the market designer should
determine which cutoffs to post. Market-clearing cutoffs can be learned and posted by the market
designer without incurring regret if there is sufficient information about aggregate demand, either
from historical data or from structured demand. We also show that even if market-clearing cutoffs
can only be approximated, this is sufficient to implement a matching that is regret-free stable with
respect to capacities that are close to the true capacities. Hence learning and posting cutoffs allows
us to break the information deadlock and reach a regret-free stable outcome.
5.5.1 All You Need are Cutoffs
Recall from Theorem 5.1 that an outcome (µ, χ) is regret-free stable if and only if there exist
market-clearing cutoffs P such that (a) each student follows the Weitzman optimal inspection
strategy over her budget set as described by P , and (b) each student is matched to the school in
her budget set that is most preferred, given the information revealed by the aforementioned optimal
inspection strategy. Note, then, that if a student knows her budget set in advance, then she can
optimally solve her information acquisition problem by proceeding as in a single-agent Pandora’s
Box problem to resolve her own incomplete information. An implication is that any matching
mechanism that proceeds by committing to a collection of market-clearing acceptance cutoffs for
the schools, then allowing each student to unilaterally optimize her inspection strategy and select
her most-demanded school, will necessarily result in a regret-free stable match.
Theorem 5.4. Let E = (C,S, η, q) be a continuum economy, and let P be the student-optimal
market-clearing cutoffs in E. Then Mechanism 2 is regret-free stable.
Proof. We show that Mechanism 2 produces the student-optimal regret-free stable matching when
all students report truthfully, and hence truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium that produces
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Mechanism 2 Acceptance with Market-Clearing Cutoffs (AwMC)
1: procedure AwMC(C,S, q, P )
Message Passing from Platform to Students
2: for s ∈ S do
3: for i ∈ C do
4: if rsi ≥ Pi then
5: Send message ‘i accepts’ to s
Message Passing from Students to Platform
6: for Student s in S do
7: Student s reports top choice school is that accepted them
8: µ(s)← is
9: return µ
the student-optimal regret-free stable matching. Indeed, the mechanism presents each student s
with their budget set Bµ (s) = {i ∈ C | rsi ≥ Pi (η)}, and student s is guaranteed to be matched to
their reported favorite school is ∈ Bµ(s). Thus each student is presented precisly the single agent
problem on Bµ (s). Solving this problem yields inspection strategy χs = χOPT (by definition of
χOPT ), followed by truthfully reporting the students true favorite school: is = Ds (P ∗ (η)). By
construction, demand exactly matches supply under this truthful reporting, so the output µ is the
student-optimal regret free stable matching for E = (C,S, η, q).
This result states that advance knowledge of market-clearing cutoffs are sufficient for regret-free
stability. Indeed, posting cutoffs in advance of any information acquisition removes all uncertainty
on the part of the agents about which schools they could match with. This, in turn, removes the
possibility of regretting one’s choice to explore the value of a match on the grounds that this school
was ultimately unattainable. We note that this lack of regret does not depend on the posted cutoffs
being market-clearing, but only that the mechanism commits to honoring the implied budget set
for each student. Thus, for any economy E = (C,S, η, q) and any (not necessarily market-clearing)
cutoffs P , there exists a choice of capacities q′ such that P are the student-optimal market-clearing
cutoffs in E ′ = (C,S, η, q′), and hence Mechanism 2 is regret-free stable with respect to E ′. We will
make use of this fact when discussing notions of approximation in Section 5.5.3.
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5.5.2 Regret-Free Choice-Based Mechanisms and Information Deadlock
Theorem 5.4 shows that knowing market-clearing cutoffs in advance of the market mechanism
is sufficient for implementing a regret-free stable matching. Knowing market-clearing cutoffs in
advance can be strong requirement. Indeed, aggregate uncertainty about agents’ demands might
make it difficult for the mechanism designer to know this information before interacting with the
students. One might hope to avoid this impasse by way of a mechanism that reaches a stable
matching without necessarily determining each student’s full budget set. After all, each student’s
demand is ultimately described by a single ordering over all schools that is consistent across budget
sets, which seems to suggest that it might not be necessary to fully learn every student’s budget
set in order to find a stable match. However, even though the realized demand is described by
a single consistent ordering, the student cannot know this ordering a priori precisely because it
depends on the values, which are only revealed after costly exploration. In other words, while the
realized demand is ordered consistently, the order in which a student would wish to explore depends
crucially on her budget set, and hence revealing the budget set can be crucial for avoiding wasteful
exploration and regret.
It is perhaps useful to once again consider the school-proposing DA mechanism, which we
recall can be interpreted as discovering the market-clearing cutoffs over time. Initially only the
highest-ranked students are admitted to the schools of their choice, consistent with implicit cutoffs
that are initially high, and these cutoffs then decrease (i.e., lower-ranked students are accepted)
until the market clears. This choice-based approach does not post cutoffs in advance, but rather
discovers them through repeated interaction with students. This provides hope that a mechanism
that proceeds in multiple rounds can elicit enough information to find appropriate market-clearing
cutoffs in a regret-free manner.
Indeed, we will show that under certain sufficient conditions on student preferences, the following
iterative implementation of the school-proposing Deferred Acceptance is regret-free stable. The
key idea is that while students’ information acquisition problems are interconnected and can create
information deadlocks, school priorities also provide students with partial information, and this
may be sufficient to both start and finish the information acquisition process.
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Algorithm 5.1 (Iterative Deferred Acceptance.). At each step:
• Each school i proposes to the top qi students who have not yet rejected them.
• Each student (irrevocably) rejects some of the schools that have proposed to them.
The algorithm terminates when no new proposals are performed, at which point all students are
asked for their top choice school among all those that have proposed to them and which they have
not rejected, and are assigned to school.
Theorem 5.5. Suppose that at least one of the following conditions hold:
1. All students inspect all schools in their budget set and do not have indifferences, i.e. E [vsi ] =




= 0 for all s ∈ S and i 6= j.
2. For all m ≥ mini qi the same students occupy the top m ranks at all schools, i.e. for all i, j ∈
C,
{




s | rsj ≥ 1− m|S|
}
. (Recall that rsi is normalized to be the percentile
rank of student s in school i’s priorities.)
Suppose all agents only perform regret-free inspections and report truthfully. Then Mechanism 5.1
almost surely implements the school-optimal regret-free stable matching.
Proof. The intuition is that our conditions guarantee that at all stages of proposal, there are
students who have sufficient information about their budget set to both inspect some schools and
reject some proposals. (This requires that students do not have indifferences in their preferences.)
We show this formally for both cases.
Case (1). Suppose that all students inspect all schools in their budget set, i.e. condition (1)
holds. First, assuming truthful reporting, it is regret-free for every student to inspect all schools
that proposed to them. This is because if school i has proposed to student s, it is not full of
students it prefers to s, so for all realized preferences v and for all outcomes (µ, χ) ∈ MRF (E) it
holds that i ∈ Bs (µ). Since s is willing to inspect any school in her budget set it follows that it is
optimal for student s to inspect school i.
Next, suppose students do not have indifferences in their preferences, i.e. vsi 6= vsj for all s and
i 6= j. Then it is regret-free for each student to reject all the schools that proposed to them except
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the one with the highest observed value. This is because if student s has inspected both i and j
and vsi > vsj then µ (s) 6= j for all µ ∈ MRF (v) and it is optimal for s to reject the school with
lower observed value.
When the algorithm terminates either all schools are at capacity or all students are assigned,
since during each step all students reject all the schools that proposed to them except one, and so
the algorithm terminates with a regret-free stable outcome.
Case (2). Suppose that for all m ≥ mini qi the same students occupy the top m ranks at
all schools, i.e. condition (2) holds. Let q = mini qi. It follows that there is a set S (0) of
students who are in the top q at all schools, and for all m > q there is a student sm who is m-th
ranked at all schools. Hence there is a unique regret-free stable matching, and Mechanism 5.1
essentially performs serial dictatorship and tells each student her (unique) budget set in order of
her rank. When students don’t have indifferences in their preferences, it follows that at each step
some students reject all the schools that proposed to them except one, and so when the algorithm
terminates it outputs a regret-free stable matching.
We show that there is a unique regret-free stable matching. Fix v and let µ, µ′ ∈MRF (v). Let
s1, s2, . . . , sq be an arbitrary ordering of the students in S (0) and sm be the m-ranked student for
















i.e. the budget set of sm is the set of schools with residual capacity once all students ranked higher
than sm have chosen their school from their budget set. Hence by induction Bs (µ|v) = Bs (µ′|v)
for all s and so µ (s) = µ′(s) for all s.
Theorem 5.5 demonstrates that for certain priorities and preferences iterative Deferred Accep-
tance, which is a choice-based mechanism, can discover market-clearing cutoffs in a regret-free
stable manner. This mechanism is iterative, and one can show that this is necessary: even under
the conditions laid out in Theorem 5.5, no one-shot mechanism — choice-based or otherwise — can
be regret-free stable. We provide an example in Appendix C.2.1.
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Furthermore, the matching found by the school-proposing DA mechanism is not student-
optimal. Can one find a student-optimal matching in a regret-free manner? The original proof
of Gale and Shapley of the existence of a student-optimal stable matching is constructive: they
furnished an algorithm, the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm, and demonstrated
that it always finds the student-optimal stable matching in polynomial time. An analogous al-
gorithm for identifying the student-optimal regret-free stable matching could also be defined in
our incomplete information setting, but would require students to provide information about both
their priors and values and may induce students to acquire information in a way that incurs re-
gret. In fact, for many economies, verifying that the student-optimal regret-free stable matching
is the student-optimal one necessitates incurring regret with positive probability in the inspection
process. This is because in regret-free stable matchings students cannot inspect outside of their
budget set, and in many economies with positive probability the student-optimal regret-free stable
matching does not provide students with their full budget set. We provide an example that ad-
mits no student-optimal regret-free stable mechanism in Appendix C.2.2. The intuition behind the
example is that the act of verification requires some student to perform more information acqui-
sition than is allowed under the regret-free stable inspection policy, and if the existing matching
is student-optimal it is then costly for them to acquire the necessary information. This mirrors
the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox, whereby under costly information acquisition equilibrium market
prices cannot be stable, as this would eliminate the benefit of acquiring this information (Grossman
and Stiglitz, 1980).
We next show that the conditions of Theorem 5.5 are necessary, in the sense that there is no (even
non-choice-based) mechanism that is regret-free stable for general economies. In the more general
case where students can suffer regret by inspecting the schools out of order, it may be impossible for
any (even multi-round) mechanism to find a regret-free stable matching without incurring regret.
Perhaps more fundamentally, this example shows that any mechanism that converges to a stable
matching in a regret-free manner (such as school-proposing DA) relies heavily on an assumption
that there always exist students willing to inspect some schools in their budget set.
Theorem 5.6. Let M be a mechanism. Then there exists an economy E = (C,S, q) such that,
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when each student reports Is = (F s, cs) truthfully, with positive probability mechanism M does not
implement a regret-free stable matching.
Remark. For convenience, we state and prove Theorem 5.6 for finite economies; we note that the
result can be extended to continuum economies with minor adjustments.
Proof. Consider an economy E with three schools C = {1, 2, 3} with capacities q1 = q2 = q3 = 2
and three students S = {x, y, z}.9
Suppose that school priorities are given by
priority at 1 : ry1 > rz1 > rx1
priority at 2 : rz2 > rx2 > r
y
2





and that student values at each school are U [0, 1] variables, i.e. with priors F si (x) = x ∀x ∈ [0.1]
and student costs for inspection are given by cx1 = c
y
2 = cz3 = 0.1, cx2 = c
y
3 = cz1 = 0.2 and cx3 = c
y
1 =
cz2 = 0.3. Note that this means vx1 = v
y
2 = vz3 =
√
1− 0.2 ≈ 0.89, vx2 = vy3 = vz1 =
√
1− 0.4 ≈ 0.77
and vx3 = v
y
1 = vz2 =
√
1− 0.6 ≈ 0.63 and so the order in which students {x, y, z} wish to inspect
schools is exactly the reverse of their priority at each school, e.g. student x wishes to inspect 1 then
2 then 3, and have bottom, middle and top priority out of {x, y, z} at those schools respectively.
We will show that for all students s, there exists a school i = β (s) such that, with positive
probability, in every regret-free stable matching µ ∈MRF (E) student s only inspects i. Also, with
positive probability, in every regret-free stable matching µ′ ∈MRF (E) school i is not in student s’s
budget setBµ′ (s). To see why this implies the theorem, note that under MechanismM , one of x, y, z
must be the first student in {x, y, z} to perform an inspection with positive probability. Without
loss of generality we may suppose that student is x. If x first inspects β (x) then with positive
probability, in any regret-free stable matching µ′ ∈MRF (E) student x regrets her inspection. If x
9Note that strictly speaking, as we assumed that there are more students than seats, the economy should have
seven students S={x, y, z, d1, d2, d3, d4} where the di are four dummy students who have lower priority at every
school than the students in {x, y, z} and who have arbitrary preferences. For simplicity we omit these students in the
description of the economy; however note that the proof applies as written to both economies.
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first inspects some school other than β (x) then with positive probability for any regret-free stable
matching µ ∈ MRF (E) student x regrets her inspection. Hence with positive probability there
exists a student who regrets her inspection process, and so with positive probability M does not
implement any regret-free stable matching.
We now turn to proving the claim: for all students s, there exists a school i = β (s) such that
with positive probability every regret-free stable matching involves student s inspecting only i, and
with positive probability no regret-free stable matching has school i in student s’s budget set. In
particular, we show that 1 = β (x) satisfies the required properties. Note that since all priorities
and costs are symmetric, the same arguments can be used to show that 2 = β (y) and 3 = β (z)
satisfy the required properties.




3 ≥ 0.9, and vy1 , vy3 , vz1 , vz2 ≤ 0.5. Note that it then holds that
Dx (C) = 1, Dy (C) = 2 and Dz (C) = 3. Now it is easy to check that for all ω ∈ X the only
regret-free stable matching µ ∈MRF (E) is (µ (x) , µ (y) , µ (z)) = (1, 2, 3), since if any school i was
not assigned to any of x, y, z (i.e. µ (i) ∩ {x, y, z} = ∅) then it would form a blocking pair with the
student in {x, y, z} whose top choice school is i. Hence Bµ (x) = C, so x inspects school 1 first, and
since vx1 ≥ 0.9 > vx2 , vx3 it follows that x only inspects school 1.




1 ≥ 0.9 and vy2 , vy3 , vz2 , vz3 ≤ 0.5. Note then that Dy (C) =
Dz (C) = 1. Moreover, since vy1 ≥ vy2, vy3 ≥ 0.5 ≥ vy2 , vy3 and y has top priority at 1 it follows that in
any regret-free stable matching µ ∈ MRF (E) student y inspects 1, and since Dy (C) = 1 student
y is assigned to 1, i.e. µ (y) = 1. Since q1 = 2 and z has second priority at 1 a similar argument
shows that µ (z) = 1. Hence for all regret-free stable matchings µ ∈ MRF (E) it follows that 1 is
full of students it prefers to x, and 1 6∈ Bµ (x).
Note that if no student has performed any inspections then we are unable to discern whether
either these events is true, and for any student any inspection they perform will incur regret in
either one event or the other, i.e. any inspections incurs regret with positive probability.
This example shows that there does not exist any mechanism that always finds a regret-free
stable matching in a regret-free manner. This makes it even more surprising that, for any realization
of preferences, the set of regret-free stable matchings MRF (E) not only has a student-optimal
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member, but also inherits the lattice structure induced by the deterministic economy with students
Ψ (s). The intuition behind the difficulty in finding regret-free stable matchings is that in order
to identify the appropriate deterministic preferences that rationalize demand under incomplete
information, students need to know both their reservation values and their realized values.
To build additional intuition for Theorem 5.6, let us briefly demonstrate why Mechanism 5.1
might not be regret-free in a general economy. In the first round of Mechanism 5.1, every student s
is proposed to by all schools except β (s). When students were willing to inspect all schools in their
budget set this was enough to induce some inspections and rejections. However, in general, there
is an inspection order that maximizes the resulting expected payoff, and with positive probability
students do not inspect school some schools in their budget set. Hence even though every student
knows some of the schools in their budget set, no student s wants to start inspecting schools until
she knows for sure whether β (s) is in her budget set. In other words, it is strictly optimal for each
student to wait until the mechanism forces them to perform inspections.
This intuition illustrates a more general principle: in the presence of costly information acqui-
sition, iterative mechanisms without an activity rule may result in an information deadlock, where
no actions are taken because every agent can achieve higher utility if another agent acts first.
5.5.3 Regret-Free Learning
While it may not always be possible to discover market-clearing cutoffs through observed choice,
the structure of regret-free stable matchings gives us hope that they can still be learned and
implemented in an approximate manner. We show that when we have sufficient initial information
or market structure, cutoff mechanisms that use estimated cutoffs implement outcomes that are
regret-free stable with respect to slightly perturbed school capacities.
Before formalizing these ideas, we first turn to the following question: How do we estimate
population demand? In matching markets with one-sided incomplete information, the preferences
of the side with full information are a key source of information. For example, in Theorem 5.5,
condition (2) guarantees that at any point in iterative Deferred Acceptance there are students who
have full information about their budget set. For more general priority structures, there will be
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students who have such information at the outset of the mechanism.
Definition 5.9. Let E = (C, S, q) be an economy. A student s has free market information if for
all schools i student s is either in the top qi percentile of students or the bottom 1−∑j qj percentile
of students, i.e. ∀irsi 6∈
⌈
1−∑j qj , 1− qi). We let Sf (E) = {s | ∀i rsi 6∈ ⌈1−∑j qj , 1− qi)} denote
the set of students with free market information in E.
Knowing only their priors and school priorities, students with free market information can
determine both their budget sets and their preferences in a regret-free manner.
Hence we may estimate market demand as follows. In some markets historical demand is
sufficient for estimating population demand. For example, in college admissions in many countries
aggregate student demand for different university courses do not vary much from year to year and
historical demand can be used to estimate current demand. Even when such prior information
is not available, as long as there are students with free information we can start learning about
student preferences. For example, if running iterative Deferred Acceptance assigns some students
before reaching a deadlock, the demand of the assigned students could be used to estimate the
demand of the remaining students.
Estimated Cutoffs are Robust
We now formalize the claim that outcomes of cutoff mechanisms are robust to errors in estimated
demand. The intuition behind these results is that demand with costly information acquisition
satisfies WARP (Proposition 5.1), and so all questions about cutoff mechanisms under costly in-
formation acquisition reduce to analogous questions about cutoff mechanisms in markets without
costly information acquisition.




from posting cutoffs P when using Mechanism 2 is
regret-free stable for capacities qP that are slightly perturbed from the true capacities, and differs
from the regret-free stable assignment under q for only a small number of students.
Theorem 5.7. Let E be a continuum economy, let µ be a regret-free stable matching for E corre-






be the outcome of running Mechanism 2 on E with cutoffs P , and for all i let qPi =∣∣∣{s |µP (s) = i}∣∣∣. Then (µP , χP) is regret-free stable with respect to qP , ∥∥∥qP − q∥∥∥
2
≤ ‖P − P ∗‖2,
and
∣∣∣{s |µ (s) 6= µP (s)}∣∣∣ ≤ ‖P − P ∗‖2.





with respect to D (P ). Moreover, each student’s assignment µ (s) is equal to their demand Ds (P ),
which is determined by their budget set Bs (P ). Finally, in moving from P to P ∗ only ‖P − P ∗‖2
students receive different budget sets. The result follows.
When the error in the estimated cutoffs is due to sampling error, the outcome is regret-free
stable for capacities that are normally distributed around the market-clearing demand.
Definition 5.10. For a capacity vector q′ = (q′1, . . . , q′n)
T we let Σq′ denote the matrix with entries
Σqij =

−qiqj if i 6= j
qi (1− qi) if i = j.
Proposition 5.2 (Distribution of approximately feasible capacities). Suppose the continuum econ-




be a randomly drawn finite economy, with k students drawn independently according to η, ω drawn
















where N (·|·) denotes a C-dimensional normal distribution with given mean and covariance.






a=1Xa, where Xa =
Dθ (P ∗) is a random variable with θ ∼ η capturing the demand of a single student drawn randomly
from η and the Xa are independently drawn.
10Note that qi = qi for all overdemanded schools i, i.e. those such that P ∗i > 0.
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Hence the mapping from cutoffs to demand is continuous, so approximate cutoffs yield regret-
free stable outcomes for approximately feasible capacities. We similarly show in Appendix C.3.1
that the mapping from demand to market-clearing cutoffs is continuous, and estimated cutoffs are
robust to errors due to sampling. Thus in order to obtain a desirable estimate of the market-clearing
cutoffs P it suffices to furnish an accurate estimate of demand D.
Examples
These results suggest that if we use cutoff mechanisms based on estimated population demand, the
resulting outcomes will be robust to small biases or noise due to sampling error. We illustrate this
intuition in the following examples.
Example 5.2. In this example, we show how to implement an approximately regret-free sta-
ble matching in a setting with historical demand data. Suppose that this year’s economy E =(
C, Sk, bqkc
)





is given by drawing αk students independently also from η for
some fixed α > 0. Then the student-optimal market-clearing cutoffs Pˆ for the economy Ehist
give an unbiased estimator for the student-optimal market-clearing cutoffs both for E and for
E = (C,S, η, q), and we can show that in this year’s economy E posting Pˆ implements a regret-free
stable matching with respect to capacities qˆkk that are close to qk. Specifically, if we let P ∗ be the
market-clearing cutoffs of E = (C,S, η, q) and q = D (P ∗|η) then we can use classic results about













for Σq defined as in Definition 5.10. The full proof can be found in Appendix C.3.2.
For large economies the capacities that make the outcome regret-free stable converge to the
true capacities, and the variance depends only on q and α. Moreover, in the absence of historical
information (α = 0) the cutoff mechanism can perform arbitrarily poorly, whereas more accurate
11See, e.g. Newey and McFadden (1994) for details.
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historical information (α→∞) leads to smaller perturbations in the capacities.




is given by drawing k students
independently from a distribution η (Γ∗), where student demand Ds (P |η (Γ)) is parametrized by
Γ = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γn). Suppose also that some positive fraction α of students have free market
information. Then by first obtaining preferences from the students with free market information,
we can estimate Γ∗ and provide an estimate Pˆ for the student-optimal market-clearing cutoffs for
E. We can also show that posting Pˆ implements a regret-free stable matching with respect to
capacities qˆkk that are close to qk.
Formally, consider the mechanism MF that runs in two rounds. In the first round it proposes
to all students s ∈ Sf (E), assigns them each to their chosen school and obtains their aggregate
demand qˆfi k for each school i, and uses this demand to provide an estimate Γˆ for Γ∗. In the second
round it runs Mechanism 2 with cutoffs Pˆ on a residual economy Er computed as follows. The
cutoffs Pˆ are the market-clearing cutoffs for an estimated residual economy Eˆr = (C, Sr, qˆrk), where
Eˆr is given by drawing k −
∣∣∣Sf (E)∣∣∣ students without free market information in E independently




and the residual capacity for each school i is qˆri = qi− qˆfi . The residual
economy Er =
(
C, Sk \ Sf (E) , qˆrk
)
is given by removing the students in Sf (E) from E and
reducing capacities accordingly at their assigned schools.
Let α denote the measure of students in E who have free market information, let Dfi (Γ) denote
the proportion of students in Sf (E) who demand school i as a function of Γ, and let qfi = αD
f
i (Γ∗)
be the target first-round capacities. Define target capacities q = D (P ∗|η (Γ∗)) in terms of the
market-clearing cutoffs P ∗ of E = (C,S, η (Γ∗) , q). We can show that Mechanism MF implements



















and Σq,Σqf defined as in Definition 5.10. (Note that
α ≤ mini qi + 1 −∑i qi def= α∗, and α = α∗ is achieved when schools have aligned preferences, i.e.
condition (2) in Theorem 5.5.) The idea is that since in the first round we assign only students
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in Sf (E), the budget set and demand of these students is that same whether we assign them in
the first round, or in the second round after posting the cutoffs Pˆ . Hence the outcome after both
rounds is regret-free stable with respect to realized demand. Convergence and variance expressions
can be derived using two-step GMM. The full proof can be found in Appendix C.3.2.
For large economies the capacities that make the outcome regret-free stable converge to the true





in the absence of free market information (α = 0) the cutoff mechanism can perform arbitrarily
poorly, whereas priorities that yield more students with free market information (α→ α∗) or more
accurate estimates of Γ∗ (A → 0) lead to smaller perturbations in the capacities. Finally, the
first round in this mechanism corresponds to the first round of iterative school-proposing Deferred
Acceptance. If we allow for further rounds of proposals, we can further reduce the noise in the
perturbed capacities.
5.6 Discussion
Summary of findings. We have proposed regret-free stability as a suitable solution concept
in matching markets with costly information acquisition. We have also shown that, surprisingly,
regret-free stable matchings always exist and the set of regret-free stable matchings has a lattice
structure. However, we have also shown that the effect of costly information acquisition is that
it may be impossible to compute a regret-free stable matching in a regret-free manner, and that
standard matching market mechanisms can result in information deadlocks. We have also provided
some mechanisms for when we are willing to relax feasibility and provide varying amounts of
information in order to achieve a regret-free outcome, and shown that for large economies they




students, where k is the number of
students in the market.
Approximation algorithms. Our results demonstrate that in general there is a tradeoff between
the regret of a mechanism, the feasibility of the solution, and the amount of information provided
to the mechanism. We have provided one class of mechanisms that relax the feasibility constraint
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in order to achieve optimal regret. It may also be possible to relax the regret of the mechanism in
order to achieve exact feasibility, or to increase the number of rounds of communication in order
to better approximate both. We leave these questions open for future work.
Activity rules. We demonstrated that in the presence of costly information acquisition standard
matching mechanisms can create situations where it is strictly optimal for every agent to wait
for other agents to move first. This illustrates a more general principle, that in the presence of
costly information acquisition iterative mechanisms will need an activity rule to converge. Another
relevant question is what the appropriate design of activity rules is for such situations.
Stable matchings. We have concentrated our efforts on mechanisms that implement regret-free
stable matchings. However, we have also provided a more general notion of stability in incomplete
information settings. Is this more general space of outcomes predictive and does it have attractive
structural properties? We selected the class of regret-free stable matchings as they compare each
agent’s utility only with her own utility under other information acquisition strategies. However
it may be possible to improve social welfare by moving to a stable matching that transfers utility
from one student to another. Are there stable matchings that are more desirable than the student-
optimal regret-free stable matching? Our notion of stability under incomplete information can also
be naturally extended to settings with two-sided incomplete information, as well as to settings
with more general models for costly information acquisition, such as rational inattention models,
or other models where agents may refine their priors for a cost. All of these questions become much
more interesting in these general settings. We leave them open for future investigation.
Practical market design. Finally, what implications do our results have for practical appli-
cations? Colleges in many countries, such as China, India and Australia post historical cutoffs
for admission into college programs. Our results on mechanisms with historical cutoffs suggests
that if colleges capacities are flexible this can eliminate unnecessary preference formation by appli-
cants. In Israel colleges post a pair of cutoffs for each program; students above the higher cutoff
are guaranteed admission, students below the lower cutoff are advised to consider other options,
students between the cutoffs are advised to wait for further information on enrolment for that
year, and the cutoffs are updated as students register for programs. This very closely mirrors our
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Accept-Waitlist-Reject mechanisms and suggests that they can be of practical use. Our result on
information deadlock also brings to mind the behavior of participants reacting to activity rules
such as deadlines and exploding offers in other markets. In markets such as job markets and Ph.D.
admissions, participants often wait until the last minute before expressing their preferences. Clearly
costly information acquisition is an important issue in many other markets, and we leave further
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A.1 Definitions and Notation
We begin with some general notation and definitions. Let µ be the initial assignment under DA-
STB, and let P be a permutation. We say that a school i reaches capacity under a mechanism with
output assignment µ if η(µ(i)) = qi.
We re-index the schools in C ∪ {n+ 1} so that Ci ≥ Ci+1. Moreover, we assume that this
indexing is done such that if the order condition is satisfied, then CˆPi ≥ CˆPi+1 (where the cutoffs
CˆP are as defined by PLDA(P )) holds simultaneously for all permutations P .
Recall that in DA each student is given a score rsi = psi + L(s), and in PLDA(P ) this leads
to a second-round score rˆsi = pˆsi + P (L(s)) = P (L(s)) + ni1{µ(s)=i} + psi1{µ(s)6=i}. Throughout the
Appendix, for convenience, we slightly change the second-round score of a student s under PLDA
with permutation P to be rˆsi = P (L(s)) + ni1{L(s)≥Ci} + psi1{L(s)<Ci}, meaning that we give each
student a guarantee at any school for which she met the cutoff in the first round. By consistency
of preferences, it is easily seen that this has no effect on the resulting assignment or cutoffs.
We say that a student can afford a school in a round if her score in that round is at least as
large as the school’s cutoff in that round. We say that the set of schools a student can afford in
the second round (with her amended second-round score) is her affordable set.
Throughout the Appendix, we let Xi = {i, . . . , n+ 1} be the set of schools at least as affordable
as school i, and we let γi be the proportion of students whose first-round affordable set is Xi.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We first prove Theorem 3.1 in the case where all schools have one priority group. We then show
that if the order condition holds, all PLDA mechanisms assign the same number of seats at a given
school i to students of a given priority class pi. Hence, by restricting to the set of students with
priority class pi, we can reduce the general problem to the case where all schools have one priority
group. This shows that all PLDA mechanisms produce type-equivalent assignments.
Lemma A.1. Assume that each school has a single priority group, p = 1. If the order condition
holds, all PLDA mechanisms produce type-equivalent assignments.
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Proof. Let P be a permutation. Assume that the order condition holds. By Theorem 3.4, we may
assume that the global order condition holds. Hence the schools in C ∪ {n+ 1} can be indexed so
that Ci ≥ Ci+1 and CˆPi ≥ CˆPi+1 for all permutations P (simultaneously).
We first present the relevant notation that will be used in this proof. We are interested in sets
of schools of the form Xi = {i, . . . , n+ 1}. Let
βi,j = η({s ∈ S : i is the most desirable school in Xj with respect to ˆs})
be the measure of the students who, when their set of affordable schools is Xj , will choose i (when
following their second-round preferences). Note that βi,j = 0 for all j > i.
Let Es(C) and EˆsP (CˆP ) be the first-round affordable set and (total) affordable set for student
s when running PLDA with permutation P . Note that for each student s ∈ S, there exists some i
such that Es(C) = Xi, and since the order condition is satisfied, there exists some j ≤ i such that
EˆsP (CˆP ) = Xj . The fact that EˆsP (CˆP ) = Xj for some j is a result of the order condition: students’
amended second-round scores guarantee that Es(C) ⊆ EˆsP (CˆP ) (every school affordable in the first
round is guaranteed in the second) and hence that j ≤ i. Let γPi = η({s ∈ S : EˆsP (CˆP ) = Xi}) be
the fraction of students whose (total) affordable set in PLDA(P ) is Xi.1 We note that by definition
of PLDA, η({s ∈ S : θs = θ, EˆsP (CˆP ) = Xi}) = ζ({θ})γPi ; that is, the students whose affordable
sets are Xi “break proportionally" into types. For a school i, this means that the measure of
students assigned to i is therefore ∑j≤i βi,jγPj .
Let P ′ be another permutation, and define γP ′i similarly. We will prove by induction that
there exist PLDA(P ′) cutoffs CˆP ′ such that γP ′i = γPi for all i ∈ C ∪ {n+ 1}. Note that by the
proportional breaking into types of γPi and γP
′
i , this will imply type-equivalence.
Assume that the PLDA(P ′) cutoffs CˆP ′ are chosen such that γP ′j = γPj for all j < i, and i is
maximal such that this is true. Then we have that∑j≤i−1 βi,jγPj = ∑j≤i−1 βi,jγP ′j . Assume w.l.o.g.
that γPi > γP
′






j , where the first inequality follows
since i cannot be filled beyond capacity. If the second inequality is strict, then under P ′, i is not full,
1Note that η (S) = 1, as η is a probability distribution over S.
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and therefore CˆP ′i = 0. However, this means that all students can afford i under P ′, and therefore
γP
′








j ≥ γPi , a contradiction. If the second inequality is an equality,
then βi,i = 0 and no students demand school i under the given affordable set structure. It follows
that we can define the cutoff CˆP ′i such that γP
′
i = γPi . This provides the required contradiction,
completing the proof.
Now consider when schools have possibly more than one priority group. We show that if the
order condition holds, then all PLDA mechanisms assign the same measure of students of a given
priority type to a given school. It is not at all obvious that such a result should hold, since priority
types and student preferences may be correlated, and the relative proportions of students of each
priority type assigned to each school can vary widely. Nonetheless, the order condition (specifically,
the equivalent global order condition) imposes enough structure so that any given priority type is
treated symmetrically across different PLDA mechanisms.
Theorem A.1. If the order condition holds, then for all priority classes pi and schools i all PLDA
mechanisms assign the same measure of students of priority class pi to school i.
Proof. Fix a permutation P . By Theorem 3.4, we may assume that the global order condition
holds.
We show that PLDA(P ) assigns the same measure of students of each priority type to each
school i as RLDA. The idea will be to define cutoffs on priority-type-specific economies, and show
that these cutoffs are the same as the PLDA cutoffs. However, since cutoffs are not necessarily
unique in the two-round setting, care needs to be taken to make sure that the individual choices
for priority-type-specific cutoffs are consistent across priority types.
The proof runs as follows. We first define an economy Epi for each priority class pi that gives only
as many seats as are assigned to students of priority class pi under RLDA. We then invoke the global
order condition and Theorems 3.4 and 3.1 to show that all PLDA mechanisms are type-equivalent
on each Epi. We also use the global order condition to argue that it is sufficient to consider affordable
sets, and also to select “minimal” cutoffs. Then we construct cutoffs CPpi,i using the economies Epi
and show that they are (almost) independent of priority type. Finally, we show that this means
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that CPpi,i also define PLDA cutoffs for the large economy E and conclude that PLDA(P ) assigns
the same measure of students of each priority type to each school i as RLDA.
(1) Defining little economies Epi for each priority type.
Fix a priority class pi. Let qpi be a restricted capacity vector, where qpi,i is the measure of
students of priority class pi assigned to school i under RLDA. Let Spi be the set of students s such
that ps = pi, and let ηpi be the restriction of the distribution η to Spi. Let Epi denote the primitives
(C,Spi, ηpi, qpi). Recall that CˆR are the second-round cutoffs for RLDA on E . It follows from the
definition of Epi that CˆRpi are also the second-round cutoffs for RLDA on Epi.
Let C˜Ppi be the second-round cutoffs of PLDA(P ) on Epi. We show that the cutoffs C˜Ppi defined
for the little economy are the same as the consistent second-round cutoffs CˆPpi for PLDA(P ) for the
large economy E , that is, C˜Ppi = CˆPpi .
(2) Implications of the global order condition.
We have assumed that the global order condition holds. This has a number of implications for
PLDA mechanisms run on the little economies Epi. For all p, the local order condition holds for
RLDA on Epi. Hence, by Theorem 3.4, the little economies Epi each satisfy the order condition.
Moreover, by Theorem 3.1, all PLDA mechanisms produce type-equivalent assignments when run
on Epi. Finally, if we can show that for every permutation P , PLDA(P ) assigns the same measure of
students of each priority type pi to each school i (namely (qpi)i) as RLDA, then E satisfies the global
order condition if and only if for all p the little economy Epi satisfies the global order condition.
The global order condition also allows us to determine aggregate student demand from the
proportions of students who have each school in their affordable set. In general, if affordable sets
break proportionally across types, and if for each subset of schools X ⊆ C we know the proportion
of students whose affordable set is X, then we can determine aggregate student demand. The
global order condition implies that for any pair of permutations P, P ′, the affordable sets from both
rounds are nested in the same order under both permutations. In other words, for each priority
class pi there exists a permutation σpi such that the affordable set of any student in any round of any
PLDA mechanism is of the form {σpi(i), σpi(i+ 1), . . . , σpi(n), n+ 1}. Hence when the global order
condition holds, to determine the proportion of students whose affordable set is X, it is sufficient
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to know the proportion of students who have each school in their affordable set.
Another more subtle implication of the global order condition is the following. In the second
round of PLDA, for each permutation P and school i there will generically be an interval that CˆPi
can lie in and still be market-clearing. The intuition is that there will be large empty intervals
corresponding to students who had school i in their first-round affordable set, and whose second-
round lottery changed accordingly. When the global order condition holds, we can without loss of
generality assume that as many as possible of the cutoffs for a given priority type are 0 or 1, and
the global order condition will still hold.
Formally, for cutoffs C we can equivalently define priority-type-specific cutoffs Cpi,i = (bCi −
piic)+. Note the cutoffs Cpi are consistent across priority types, namely: (1) cutoffs match for
two priority types with the same priority group at a school, pii = pi′i ⇒ Cpi,i = Cpi′,i and Cˆpi,i =
Cˆpi′,i; and (2) there is at most one marginal priority group at each school, Cpi,i, Cpi′,i ∈ (0, 1) ⇒ pii =
pi′i.Moreover, if cutoffs Cpi are consistent across priority types, then there exist cutoffs C from which
they arise.
Suppose that we set as many as possible of the priority-type-specific cutoffs CˆPpi to be extremal;
i.e., we let CˆPpi,i be 1 if no students have i in their affordable set, and let CˆPpi,i be minimal otherwise.
We show that under this new definition, Cpi, CˆPpi satisfies the local order condition consistently with
all other PLDAs.
Specifically, let
fPpi,i(x) = |{` : ` ≥ Cpi,i or P (`) ≥ x}|
be the proportion of students of priority class pi who have school i in their affordable set if the
first- and second-round cutoffs are Cpi,i and x respectively. Notice that f is decreasing in x. Define














Since E satisfies the global order condition, for all pi there exists an ordering σpi such that




σpi(2) ≥ · · · ≥ CˆP
′
σpi(n) for all permutations P
′. We
show that the global order condition implies that the newly defined cutoffs CˆP satisfy C˜Ppi,σpi(1) ≥
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C˜Ppi,σpi(2) ≥ · · · ≥ C˜Ppi,σpi(n). This is because the global order condition implies that fPpi is increasing























and so since we set C˜Ppi,σpi(j) to be minimal and f
P
pi,σpi(j) (·) is decreasing it follows that C˜Ppi,σpi(j) ≤
C˜Ppi,σpi(i).
(3) Cutoffs C˜Ppi,i are (almost) independent of priority type.
We now show that C˜Ppi,i depends on pi only via pii, and does not depend on pij for all j 6=
i. Since Epi satisfies the order condition, all PLDA mechanisms on Epi are type-equivalent, and
the proportion of students who have each school in their affordable set is the same across all













. This means that C˜Ppi,i satisfies the following equation in









= 2− CˆRpi,i − Cpi,i. (A.1)
(We note that an application of the intermediate value theorem shows that this equation always
has a solution in [0, 1], since fPpi,i(0) = 1 − Cpi,i, fpi,i(1) = 1, fpi,i is continuous and decreasing on
[0, 1], and we are in the case where 1− Cpi,i ≤ CˆRpi,i ≤ 1. Hence C˜Ppi,i is defined by fPpi,i and fRpi,i.) In
other words, the value of C˜Ppi,i is defined by fPpi,i(·), fRpi,i(·), and CˆRpi,i, which in turn are defined by
Cpi,i and the permutations P or R. Since Cpi,i depends on pi only through pii, it follows that C˜Ppi,i
depends on pi only through pii. In other words the C˜Ppi,i define cutoffs C˜Pi that are independent of
priority type.
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(4) C˜Pi are the PLDA cutoffs.
Finally, we remark that C˜Pi are market-clearing cutoffs. This is because we have shown that
for each priority class pi, the number of students assigned to each school i is the same under
RLDA and under the demand induced by the cutoffs C˜Pi , and we know that the RLDA cutoffs are
market-clearing for E .
Hence C˜Pi give the assignments for PLDA on E , and since C˜Pi was defined individually for
each priority class pi on Epi, it follows that PLDA(P ) assigns the same measure of students of each
priority type to each school i as RLDA.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.1
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Fix a priority class pi. By Theorem A.1, for every school i, all PLDA
mechanisms assign the same measure qpi,i of students of priority class pi to school i.
Consider the subproblem with primitives Epi = (C, qpi,Spi, ηpi). By Lemma A.1, for all θ ∈ Θ and
i,
ηpi({s ∈ Spi : θs = θ, µˆP (s) = i}) = ηpi({s ∈ Spi : θs = θ, µˆP ′(s) = i}).
Since ηpi is the restriction of η to spi, it follows that all PLDA mechanisms are type-equivalent.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3
We first note that with a single priority class, the first round corresponds to the random serial
dictatorship (RSD) mechanism of Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1998), where the (random) order of
students is the single order of tie-breaking. Hence instead of referring to the first-round mechanism
as DA-STB, we will sometimes refer to it as RSD.
Recall the cutoff characterization of the set of stable matchings for given student preferences
and responsive school preferences (encoded by student scores rsi = psi +L(s)) (Azevedo and Leshno,
2016). Namely, if C ∈ RN+ is a vector of cutoffs, let the assignment µ defined by C be given by
assigning each student of type s to her favorite school among those where her score weakly exceeds
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the cutoff, µ(s) = maxs({si ∈ C : rsi ≥ Ci} ∪ {n+ 1}). The cutoffs C are market-clearing if
under the assignment µ defined by C, every school with a positive cutoff is exactly at capacity,
η(µ(si)) ≤ qi for all i ∈ C, with equality if Ci > 0. The set of all stable matchings is precisely given
by the set of assignments defined by market-clearing vectors (Azevedo and Leshno, 2016).
Under PLDA(P ), a student of type s has a second-round score rˆsi = P (L(s)) + 1{L(s)≥Ci} at
school i for each school i ∈ C ∪ {n+ 1} (assuming that scores are modified to give guarantees to
students who had a school in their first-round affordable set, instead of just students assigned to
the school in the first round). In a slight abuse of notation, we will sometimes let CˆP refer to
the second-round cutoffs from some fixed PLDA(P ) (not necessarily corresponding to the student-
optimal stable matching given by PLDA).
The proof that any PLDA satisfies the axioms essentially follows from Proposition 3.1. We
note that averaging follows from the continuum model, which preserves the relative proportion of
students with different reported types under random lotteries and permutations of random lotteries.
Hence it suffices to show that any mechanism M satisfying the axioms is a PLDA.
We will show that the reassignment produced by M is type-equivalent to the reassignment
produced by some PLDA. If we assume, that conditional on their reports, students’ assignments
under M are uncorrelated, we are able to explicitly construct a PLDA that provides the same joint
distribution over assignments and reassignments as M . We provide a sketch of the proof before
fleshing out the details.
Fix a distribution of student types ζ. Since the first round of our mechanism M is DA-STB
and M is anonymous, this gives a distribution η of students that is the same (up to relabeling of
students) at the end of the first round. For a fixed labeling of students, it also gives a distribution
over first-round assignments µ and a distribution over second round assignments µˆ.
We first invoke averaging to assume that all ensuing constructions of aggregate cutoffs and
measures of students assigned to pairs of schools in the two rounds are deterministic. Specifically,
since the first-round assignment µ is given by STB, and the mechanism satisfies the averaging
axiom, we may assume that each pathwise realization of the mechanism gives type-equivalent (two-
round) assignments. Hence, for the majority of the proof we perform our constructions of aggregate
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cutoffs and measures of students pathwise, and assume that any realization of the lottery numbers
produces the same cutoffs and measures of students. (In particular, the quantities Cˆi, ρi,j , γi,j that
we will later define will be the same across all realizations.)
Outline of Proof. We use constrained Pareto efficiency to construct a first-round overdemand
ordering 1, 2, . . . , n, n+ 1, as in (Ashlagi and Shi, 2014), where school i comes before j in an ordering
for the first (second) round if there exists a non-zero measure of students who prefer school i to
j in the first (second) round but who are assigned to j in the first (second) round. (In the case
of the second-round ordering, we require that these students’ second-round assignments j not be
the same as their first-round guarantees.) The existence of these orderings follows from the facts
that the first-round mechanism, DA-STB, is Pareto efficient, that the two-round mechanism is
constrained Pareto efficient. We let Xi = {i, i+ 1, . . . , n, n+ 1} denote the set of schools after i in
the first-round overdemand ordering, and let X˜i = {σ(i), σ(i+ 1), . . . , σ(n+ 1)} denote the set of
schools after σ(i) in the second-round overdemand ordering.
We next note that instead of assignments µ and µˆ, we can think of giving students first- and
second-round affordable sets E(s), Eˆ(s) so that µ and µˆ are given by letting each student choose her
favorite school in her affordable set for that round. We use weak two-round strategy-proofness and
anonymity to show that two students of different types face the same joint distribution over first-
and second-round affordable sets. This allows us to construct the permutation P by constructing
proportions γi,j of students whose first-round affordable set was Xi and whose (total) affordable
set was X˜j . This is the most technical step in the proof, and so we separate it into several steps.
The crux of the analysis is the fact that for any school i and set C′ 63 i of schools, two students
with top choices C′ who are assigned to a school they weakly prefer to i the first round have the
same conditional probability of being assigned to a school in C′ in the second round.2We term this
the “prefix property” and prove it in Lemma A.2.
Finally, we construct the lottery L and verify that if second-round scores are given by first
prioritizing all guaranteed students over non-guaranteed students and subsequently breaking ties
2The formal statement also takes into account how demanded the schools they weakly prefer to i are, and is given
in terms of student types who were assigned to i, and lottery numbers.
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according to the permuted lottery P ◦L, then PLDA(P ) gives every student the same pair of first-
and second- round assignments as M .
Formal Proof. We now present the formal proof. Since we are assuming that the considered
mechanism M is weakly strategy-proof, we assume that students report truthfully and so we con-
sider preferences instead of reported preferences. We will explicitly specify when we are considering
the possible outcomes from a single student misreporting.
(2a) Definitions
Let the schools be numbered 1, 2, . . . , n such that Ci ≥ Ci+1 for all i. The intuition is that
this is the order in which they reach capacity in the first round. We observe that all reassignments
are index-decreasing. That is, for all i, j, if there exists a non-zero measure of students who are
assigned to i in the first round and to j in the second round, and j 6= n+ 1, then i ≥ j. This follows
since the mechanism respects guarantees, student preferences are consistent, and the schools are
indexed in order of increasing first-round affordability. Throughout this section we will denote the
outside option n+ 1 either by 0 or ∅, to make it more evident that indices are decreasing.
Next, we define a permutation σ on the schools. We think of this as giving a second-round
overdemand (or inverse affordability) ordering, where in the second round the schools fill in the
order sσ(1), sσ(2), . . . , sσ(n). We will eventually show that M gives the same outcome as a PLDA
with cutoffs that are ordered Cˆσ(1) ≥ Cˆσ(2) ≥ · · · ≥ Cˆσ(n). We require that σ satisfies the following
property. For all i, j, if there exists a non-zero measure of students with consistent preferences
who have second-round preference reports  such that i  j, and who are not assigned to j in
the first round, but are assigned to j in the second round, then i = σ(i′) and j = σ(j′) for some
i′ < j′. We assume that σ is the unique permutation satisfying this property that is maximally
order-preserving. That is, for all pairs of schools i, j for which no non-zero measure of students of
the above type exists, σ(i) < σ(j) iff i < j. We also define σ(n+ 1) = n+ 1. An ordering σ with
the required properties exists since the mechanism is constrained Pareto efficient. In particular, if
there is a cycle of schools i1, i2, . . . , im where for each j there is a set of students Sj with non-zero
measure who prefer ij+1 to their second-round assignment ij and who are not assigned to ij in the
first round, then pˆsjij = p
sj
ij
for each sj ∈ Sj , and so there is a Pareto-improving cycle that respects
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second-round priorities.
Let C′ be a set of schools, and let  be a preference ordering over all schools. We say that C′
is a prefix of  if i′  i for all i′ ∈ C′, i 6∈ C′. For a set of schools C′, let i(C′) = max (C′) be the
maximum index of a school in C′. We may think of i(C′) as the index of the most affordable school
in C′ in the first round.
For a student type θ = (, ˆ), an interval I ⊆ [0, 1], and a set of schools C′, let ρθ(I, C′) be the
proportion of students with type θ who, under the mechanism M , have a first-round lottery in the
interval I and are assigned to a school in C′ in the second round. When C′ = {i′} we will sometimes
write ρθ(I, i′) instead of3 ρθ(I, {i′}). In this section, for brevity, when defining preferences  we
will sometimes write : [si1 , si2 , . . . , sik ] instead of si1  si2  · · ·  sik .
(2b) Constructing the permutation P .
We now construct the permutation P as follows. For all pairs of indices i, j, we define a scalar
γi,j , which we will show can be thought of as the proportion of students (of any type) whose first-
round affordable set (the set of schools at which their priority meets the first-round cutoffs) is Xi
and whose affordable set (the set of schools at which their modified priority, which gives them top
priority at all schools in their first-round affordable sets, meets the second-round cutoffs) is X˜j .
Now, for all pairs of indices i, j such that σ(j) < i, we define student preferences θi,j = (i,j
, ˆi,j) such that
i,j : [sσ(j), si−1, si, n+ 1] and ˆi,j : [sσ(j), n+ 1],
with all other schools unacceptable. (We remark that in the case where σ(j) = i− 1, the first two
schools in this preference ordering coincide.) We note that the full-support assumption implies that
there is a positive measure of such students. Let ρi,j be the proportion of students of type θi,j whose
first-round assignment is i and whose second-round assignment is school σ(j). Intuitively, ρi,j is
the proportion of students who can deduce that their lottery number is in the interval [Ci, Ci−1],
and whose second-round affordable set contains X˜j .
For a fixed index i, we define γi,j for j = 1, 2, . . . , n to be the unique solutions to the following




γi,j = 0 for all j such that σ(j) ≥ i
γi,1 + · · ·+ γi,j = ρi,j for all j such that σ(j) < i.
Note that by this definition it holds that γ1,j = 0 for all j. We may intuitively think of γi,j as the
proportion of students of type θi,j whose first-round lottery is in [Ci, Ci−1] and whose second-round
affordable set contains σ(j) but not σ(j − 1). (This is not quite the case, as we let γi,j = 0 for all
j such that σ (j) ≥ i. More precisely, if σ (j) < i then γi,j is the proportion of students of type θi,j
whose first-round lottery is in [Ci, Ci−1] and whose second-round affordable set contains σ (j), but
not σ (j′), where j′ = max {j′′ : σ (j′′) < i}.) Note that if σ(j) ≥ i then school σ (j) will be in the
first-round affordable set for all students whose first-round lottery is in [Ci, Ci−1], and we define
γi,j = 0 and keep track of these students separately.
We also define γi,n+1 to be




Since transfers are index-decreasing, we may intuitively think of γi,n+1 as the proportion of students
of type θi,j assigned to school i in the first round whose only available school in the second round
comes from their first-round guarantee.
We define the lottery P from γi,j as follows. We break the interval [0, 1] into (n+ 1)2 intervals,
I˜i,j , where the interval I˜i,j has length γi,j , and the intervals are ordered in decreasing order of the
first index i,4
I˜n+1,n+1, I˜n+1,n, . . . , I˜1,2, I˜1,1.
The permutation P maps the intervals back into [0, 1] in decreasing order of the second index}
4Specifically, let I˜i,j = [Ci−1 −
∑
j′≤j γi,j′ , Ci−1 −
∑





P (I˜2,1)P (I˜∅,1)P (I˜∅,2)P (I˜1,∅)P (I˜2,∅)P (I˜∅,∅)
Figure A.1: Constructing the permutation P for n = 2 schools, where σ is the identity permutation. The intervals
I˜i,j for i ≤ σ(j) = j < n+ 1 are empty by definition, as all transfers are index-decreasing.
j,5
P (I˜n+1,n+1), P (I˜n,n+1), . . . P (I˜2,1), P (I˜1,1).
In Figure A.1, we show an example with two schools, and write ∅ instead of n+ 1 for brevity.
We note that ∑n+1j=1 γi,j = Ci−1 − Ci, which is the proportion of students whose first-round
affordable set is Xi. We may interpret γi,j to be the proportion of students who can deduce that
their lottery number is in the interval [Ci, Ci−1], and whose second-round affordable set is X˜j , and
so∑n+1i=1 γi,j is the proportion of students whose second-round affordable set is X˜j . We remark that
there may be multiple values of i, j for which γi,j = 0 (i.e. there are no students whose first-round
affordable set is Xi and second-round affordable set is Xj), but that this does not affect our ability
to assign students to all possible pairs of schools that are consistent with consistent preferences and
the first- and second-round overdemand orderings. For example γ1,j = 0 for all j, but any student
whose first-round affordable set is X1 is able to attend their top-choice school in round 1 and her
second-round affordable set is inconsequential.
We show that there exists a PLDA mechanism with permutation P , where the students with
first-round scores in I˜i,j are precisely the students with a first-round affordable set Xi and a second-
round affordable set X˜j (where the second-round affordable set is the set of schools for which a
student’s unmodified second-round score psi + P (L (s)) meets the cutoff), and that this PLDA
mechanism gives the same joint distribution over first- and second-round assignments as M . To
do this, we first show that this distribution of first- and second-round affordable sets gives rise to
5Specifically, let Cˆσ(j) = 1−
∑
i′,j′:j′≤j γi′,j′ , and let P (I˜i,j) = [Cˆσ(j−1) −
∑




the correct joint first- and second-round assignments over all students. We then use anonymity
to construct L in such a way as to have the correct first- and second-round assignment joint
distributions for each student. Finally, we verify that these second-round affordable sets give the
student-optimal stable matching under the second round school preferences given by P .
(2c) Equivalence of the joint distribution of assignments given by affordable sets and
M .
Fix student preferences θ = (, ˆ). We show that if we let γi,j be the proportion of students
with preferences θ who have first- and second-round affordables Xi and X˜j respectively, then we
obtain the same joint distribution over assignments in the first and second rounds for students with
preferences θ as under mechanism M . In doing so, we will use the following “prefix lemma”.
The “prefix lemma” states that for every set of schools C′, there exist certain intervals of the form
Iji = [Ci, Cj ] such that for any two student types whose top set of acceptable schools under second-
round preference reports is C′, the proportion of students with lotteries in Iji who are upgraded to
a school in C′ in the second round is the same for each type.
We define a prefix of preferences  to be a set of schools C′ that is a top set of acceptable
schools under ; that is, for all i′ ∈ C′ and j 6∈ C′, it holds that i′  j.
Lemma A.2 (Prefix Property). Let i < j be schools, and let C′ 63 i, j be a set of schools such that
i(C′) ≤ i. Let θ = (, ˆ) and θ′ = (′, ˆ′) be consistent preferences such that C′ is a prefix of , ˆ
and some students with preferences θ are assigned to each of schools i and j in the first round,
and similarly C′ is a prefix of ′, ˆ′ and some students with preferences θ′ are assigned to each of
schools i and j in the first round. Then
ρθ([Cj , Ci], C′) = ρθ′([Cj , Ci], C′).
That is, the proportion of students of type θ whose first-round lotteries are in the interval [Cj , Ci]
and who are assigned to a school in C′ in the second round is the same as the proportion of students
of type θ′ whose first-round lotteries are in the interval [Cj , Ci] and who are assigned to a school in
C′ in the second round.
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Sketch of proof of Lemma A.2. The idea of the proof is to use weak strategy-proofness and first-
order stochastic dominance to show that the probabilities of being assigned to C′ (conditional
on certain first-round assignments) are the same for students of type θ or θ′. We then invoke
anonymity to argue that proportions of types of students assigned to a certain school are given by
the conditional probabilities of individual students being assigned to that school. We present the
full proof at the end of Section 3.3.1.
We now show that the mechanism M and the affordable set distribution γi,j produce the same
joint distribution of assignments.
Students with two acceptable schools.
To give a bit of the flavor of the proof, we first consider student preferences θ of the form
: [k, l, n+ 1] and ˆ : [k, n+ 1], where all other schools are unacceptable.
There are five ordered pairs of schools that students of this type can be assigned to in the two
rounds. Namely, if we let (i, j) denote assignment to i in the first round and to j in the second
round, then the ordered pairs are (k, k), (l, k), (l, n+ 1), (n+ 1, k), and (n+ 1, n+ 1). Since
the proportion of students with each first-round assignment is fixed, it suffices to show that the
mechanism M and the mechanism that assigns first- and second-round affordable set distributions
according to γi,j produce the same proportion of students assigned to (l, k) and the same proportion
of students assigned to (n+ 1, k).
Let Ikl = [Cl, Ck], and let I
max{k,l}
n+1 = [0, Cmax{k,l}]. The proportions of students with pref-
erences θ who are assigned to (l, k) and (n+ 1, k) under M are given by ρθ([Cl, Ck], k) and
ρθ([0, Cmax{k,l}], k) respectively. We want to show that this is the same as the proportion of students
with preferences θ who are assigned to (l, k) and (n+ 1, k) respectively when first- and second-round
affordable sets are given by the affordable set distribution γi,j . We remark that when k > l this
holds vacuously, since all the terms are 0. Hence, since for any school k the proportion of students
with preferences θ who are assigned to k in the first round does not depend on θ, it suffices to
consider the case where k < l.
Let θ′ = (′, ˆ′) be the preferences given by ′: [k, k + 1, . . . , l − 1, l, n+ 1] and ˆ′ : [k, n+ 1],
where only the schools between k and l are acceptable in the first round, only k is acceptable in
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the second round, and all other schools are unacceptable.
For all pairs of indices i, j such that j < i, let θ′i,j = (i,j , ˆi,j) be the student preferences such
that  i,j : [j, i− 1, i, n+ 1] and ˆi,j : [j, n+ 1], with all other schools unacceptable. (In the case
where i = j + 1, we let the first two schools under the preference ordering  i,j coincide.) We note
that θ′i,j = θi,σ−1(j), where θi,j was defined in (2b), and that for i > σ(j) we previously defined
ρi,j =
∑
l≤j γi,l to be the proportion of students of type θi,j whose first-round assignment is i and
whose second-round assignment is school j.
The proportion of students with preferences θ who are assigned to (l, k) under M is given by
ρθ([Cl, Ck], k) =ρθ






















γi,j (by the definition of γi,j),
which is precisely the proportion of students with preferences θ who are assigned to (l, k) if the first-
and second-round affordable sets are given by γi,j . Note that all θ′i,k and ρi,σ−1(k) in the summation
are well-defined, since the sum is over indices satisfying k < i.
Similarly, let θ′′ = (′′, ˆ′′) be the preferences given by ′′: [k, l, l + 1, . . . , n, n+ 1] and ˆ′′ :
[k, n+ 1], where only k and the schools with indices greater than l are acceptable in the first
round, only k is acceptable in the second round, and all other schools are unacceptable. Then the
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proportion of students with preferences θ who are assigned to (n+ 1, k) under M is given by
ρθ([0, Cl], k) =ρθ






















γi,j (by the definition of γi,j),
which is precisely the proportion of students with preferences θ who are assigned to (n+ 1, k) if
the first- and second-round affordable sets are given by γi,j .
(2c.ii.) Students with general preferences.
We now consider general (consistent) student preferences θ of the form (, ˆ), where
: [i1, i2, . . . , ik, n+ 1] and ˆ : [i1, i2, . . . , il, n+ 1],
for some k > l and where all other schools are unacceptable. We wish to show that for every pair
of schools i, i′ ∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik, n+ 1}, the mechanism M and the mechanism that assigns first- and
second-round affordable set distributions according to γi,j produce the same proportion of students
assigned to (i, i′). It suffices to show that for every prefix C′ of the preferences ˆ and every school
k′ ∈ {i2, . . . , ik, n+ 1}, the mechanism M and the mechanism that assigns first- and second-round
affordable set distributions according to γi,j produce the same proportion of students assigned to i
in the first round and some school in C′ in the second round. We say that the students are assigned
to (i, C′).
Fix a prefix C′ of ˆ and a school i = ik′ satisfying k′ ≤ k. Let l′ ≤ l be such that C′ =
{i1, i2, . . . , il′}. If k′ ≤ l′ then k′ ∈ C′, and so in any mechanism that respects guarantees, the
proportion of students with preferences θ assigned to (i, C′) is the same as the proportion of students
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assigned to i in the first round.
Recall that i (C′) is the school in C′ satisfying i (C′) ≥ i′∀i′ ∈ C′, i.e. the school in C′ that was
least affordable in the first round. (Note that this is not necessarily il′ , the school in C′ that is least
preferred by a student of type θ.) If k′ > l′ and i ≤ i(C′), then in the first round, whenever the
school i is available in the first round, so is the preferred school i(C′); thus, for any school i, the
proportion of students assigned to i in the first round is 0. It follows that in any mechanism that
respects guarantees, the proportion of students assigned to (i, C′) is 0.
From here on, we may assume that k′ > l′ (i.e., i 6∈ C′) and i > i(C′). Since i > i(C′),
the proportion of students with preferences θ who are assigned to (i, C′) under M is given by
ρθ([Ci, Ci(C′)], C′). Let i(σ(C′)) be the school j ∈ C′ such that σ−1(j) is maximal, that the school in
C′ that is most affordable in the second round.
Let θ′ = (′, ˆ′) be the preferences given by ′
ˆ′ : [i(σ(C′)), C′ \ i(σ(C′)), i(C′) + 1, i(C′) + 2, · · · , i− 1, i, n+ 1],
where i (σ (C′)) is the most preferred, followed by all schools in C′ and all other schools between
i(C′) and i are acceptable in the same order as first round overdemand, and
ˆ′ : [i(σ(C′)), C′ \ i(σ(C′)), n+ 1],
where i (σ (C′)) is the most preferred and all other schools in C′ are ordered arbitrarily.
Since k′ > l′, i > i(C′), and the preferences θ are consistent, the preferences θ′ are well defined.
Let θ′′ = (′′, ˆ′′) be the preferences given by the same first-round preferences ′′=′ as θ and
second-round preference ˆ′′ : [i(σ(C′)), n+ 1] that only find i (σ (C′)) acceptable.
Recall that for all j > i(σ(C′)), θ′j,i(σ(C′)) = (j,i(σ(C′)), ˆj,i(σ(C′))) are the student preferences
such that
j,i(σ(C′)): [i(σ(C′)), j − 1, j, n+ 1] and ˆj,i(σ(C′)) : [i(σ(C′)), n+ 1],
with all other schools unacceptable. Additionally, recall that ρj,σ−1(i(σ(C′))) is the proportion of
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students of type θj,i(σ(C′)) whose first-round assignment is j and whose second-round assignment is
i(σ(C′)). Let Cˆ = {i1, i2, . . . , ik′−1} be the schools in C′ that are preferred to school i under  and
let i(Cˆ) be the school preferable to i under  that is most affordable in the second round.
Then the proportion of students with preferences θ who are assigned to (i, C′) under M is given
by ρθ([Ci, Ci(Cˆ)], C′), where
ρθ([Ci, Ci(Cˆ)], C′) = ρθ
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j,i(σ(C′))([Cj , Cj−1], i(σ(C′)))










γj,j′ (by the definition of γj,j′),
which is precisely the proportion of students with preferences θ who are assigned to (i, C′) if the
first- and second-round affordable sets are given by γj,j′ . Note that all θ′j,i(σ(C′)) and ρj,σ−1(i(σ(C′)))









≥ i (σ (C′)).
(2d) Constructing the lottery L.
Fix a student s who reports first- and second-round preferences θ = (, ˆ). Suppose that s
is assigned to schools (i, j) in the first and second rounds respectively. We first characterize all
first- and second-round budget sets consistent with the overdemand orderings that could have led
191
to this assignment. Let i = min {i′ | maxXi′ = i}, let j = min
{





j′ | maxˆ X˜j′ ∪ {i} = j
}
. Then the set of first- and second-round budget sets that student
s could have been assigned by the mechanism is given by {Xi′ , Xj′∪{i} : i ≤ i′ ≤ i, j ≤ j′ ≤ j}. (We
remark that the asymmetry in these definitions is due to the existence of the first-round guarantee
in the second-round budget sets.)
Conditional on s being assigned to schools (i, j) in the first and second rounds respectively, we as-
sign a lottery number L(s) to s distributed uniformly over the union of intervals ∪i′,j′:i≤i′≤i,j≤j′≤j I˜i′,j′ ,





independent of all other students’ assignments.
We show that this is consistent with the first round of the mechanism being RSD. We have
shown in (1) that if for each pair of reported preferences θ = (, ˆ) ∈ Θ, a uniform proportion γi′,j′
of students with reported preferences θ are given first- and second-round budget sets Xi′ , {iθ} ∪
X˜j′ (where iθ = maxXi is the first-round assignment of such students), we obtain the same
distribution of assignments as M . Since M is anonymous and satisfies the averaging axiom, and
since |I˜i′,j′ | = γi′,j′ , it follows that each student’s first-round lottery number is distributed as
Unif[0, 1].
Given the constructed lottery L, we construct the second-round cutoffs Cˆi for the PLDA and
verify that the assignment µ˜ is feasible and stable with respect to the schools’ second-round prefer-
ences, as defined by P ◦L and the guarantee structure. Specifically, in PLDA, each student with a
first-round score l and a first-round assignment i′ has a second-round score rˆi = P (l) + 1(i′ = i) at
each school i ∈ C, and students are assigned to their favorite school i at which their second-round
score exceeds the school’s second-round cutoff, rˆi ≥ Cˆi (or to the outside option n+ 1).
Recall that the schools are indexed so that C1 ≥ C2 ≥ · · · ≥ Cn+1, and that the permutation σ is
chosen so that the second-round overdemand ordering is given by σ(1), σ(2), . . . , σ(n+ 1) = n+ 1,
and so it should follow that the second-round cutoffs Cˆi satisfy Cˆσ(1) ≥ Cˆσ(2) ≥ · · · ≥ Cˆσ(n+1).
By the characterization of stable assignments given by Azevedo and Leshno (2016), it suffices
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to show that if each student with a first-round assignment i′ and second-round lottery num-
ber in [Cˆσ−1(i), Cˆσ−1(i−1)] is assigned to her favorite school in {i′} ∪ X˜i, where we define X˜i =
{σ(i), σ(i+ 1), . . . , σ(n+ 1)}, then the resulting assignment µˆ is equal to the second-round assign-
ment µ˜ of our mechanism M , and satisfies that η(µˆ−1(i)) ≤ qi for any school i, and η(µˆ−1(i)) = qi
if Cˆi > 0.
For fixed i, j, let Cˆσ(j) = 1−
∑
i′,j′:j′≤j γi′,j′ and let Cˆi,σ(j) = Cˆσ(j−1) −
∑
i′≤i γi′,j . (We remark
that since γi,j refers to the i-th school to fill in the first round, i, and the j-th school to fill in the
second round, σ(j), the Cˆ are indexed slightly differently than γi,j is.)
We use the averaging assumption and the equivalence of assignment probabilities that we have
shown in (1) to conclude that if µˆ is the assignment given by running DA with round scores rˆ and
cutoffs Cˆ, then µ˜ = µˆ.
This is fairly evident, but we also show it explicitly below. Specifically, consider a student s ∈ S
with a first-round lottery number L(s) and reported preferences θ = (, ˆ). Let i, j be such that
L(s) ∈ ∪i′,j′:i≤i′≤i,j≤j′≤j I˜i′,j′ , where i = min {i′ | maxXi′ = i}, j = min
{
j′ | maxˆ X˜j′ ∪ {i} = j
}
,
and j = max
{
j′ | maxˆ X˜j′ ∪ {i} = j
}
. Then, because of the way in which we have constructed
the lottery L, it holds that (µ(s), µ˜(s)) = (i, j).
Moreover, since
P (L(s)) ∈ P (∪i′,j′:i≤i′≤i,j≤j′≤j I˜i′,j′)
= ∪i′,j′:i≤i′≤i,j≤j′≤jP (I˜i′,j′)
where P (I˜i′,j′) ∈ [Cˆσ(j′), Cˆσ(j′−1)], it holds that under µˆ, student s receives her favorite school in
{i}∪ X˜j′ for some j ≤ j′ ≤ j, which is the school j. Hence µ˜(λ) = µˆ(λ) = j. It follows immediately
that the assignment µˆ is feasible, since it is equal to the feasible assignment µ˜.
Finally, let us check that the assignment is stable. Suppose that Cˆj > 0. We want to show that









Consider student preferences θ = (,) given by : [j, 1, 2, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . , n+ 1]. Then∑
i′ ρi′,σ−1(j) is the proportion of students of type θ who are assigned to school j in the second
round, which, by assumption, is also the probability that a student with preferences θ is assigned
to j in the second round. But since M is non-wasteful, this means that η(µ˜−1(j)) = qj . It follows
from constrained Pareto efficiency that the output of M is the student-optimal stable matching.
Proof of Lemma A.2. Here, we prove the prefix property. We first observe that any schools reported
to be acceptable but ranked below j in the first round are inconsequential. Moreover, since M
respects guarantees, weak two-round strategy-proofness implies that any schools reported to be
acceptable but ranked below j in the second round are inconsequential. Hence it suffices to prove
the lemma for first-round preference orderings  and ′ for which j is the last acceptable school.
Suppose that the lemma holds for i = i (C′). Then if i (C′) = i′ < i it holds that
ρθ
(








































[Cj , Ci] , C′
)
,
where the first and last equalities follow from Bayes’ rule, and the second equality holds since the
lemma holds for i = i (C′), and the theorem follows. Hence it suffices to prove the lemma for
i = i (C′).
Let i1, . . . , ik be the indices of the schools in C′, in increasing order. We observe that i = i (C′) <
j.
Since we wish to prove that the lemma holds for all pairs θ, θ′ satisfying the assumptions, it
suffices to show that the lemma holds for a fixed preference θ when we vary only θ′. Therefore, we
may, without loss of generality, fix the preferences θ to satisfy that
: [i, i1, . . . , ik−1, j, n+ 1] and ˆ : [i, i1, · · · , ik−1, n+ 1],
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and all other schools are unacceptable. That is, type θ prefers first school i = i (C′), which is
the least overdemanded school in C′, and then all other schools in C′ in the same order as the
overdemand ordering. In the first round school j is also acceptable, and in the second round only
schools in C′ are acceptable.
We remark that given the first-round ordering, the worst school in C′ and the school j (namely, i
and j) are the only acceptable schools to which students of type θ will be assigned in the first round.
Moreover, the proportion of students with preferences θ (or θ′) who can deduce that their score is
in [Cj , Ci] is precisely Ci − Cj , since such students are assigned in the first round to some school
not in C′ that they weakly prefer to j, and all such schools are between i and j in the overdemand
ordering. Similarly, the proportion of students with preferences θ (or θ′) who can deduce that their
lottery number is in [Ci, 1] is precisely 1 − Ci, since such students are assigned in the first round
to a school in C′. (Note that students with preferences θ′ may be able to deduce that their lottery
number falls in a subinterval of the interval we have specified. However, this does not affect our
statements.)
To compare the proportion of students of types θ and θ′ whose scores are in [Cj , Ci] and who are
assigned to C′ in the second round, we define a third student type θ′′ as follows. Let θ′′ = (′, ˆ)
be a set of preferences where the first-round preferences are the same as the first-round preferences
of θ′, and the second-round preferences are the same as the second-round preferences of type θ.
Let s be a student with preferences θ, and similarly let s′ be a student with preferences θ′. We
use the two-round strategy-proofness of the mechanism to show that s has the same probability
of being assigned to some school in C′ in the second round as if she had reported type θ′′, and
similarly for s′. Since the proportion of students of either type being assigned to a school in C′ in
the first round is the same and the mechanism respects guarantees, this is sufficient to prove the
prefix property.
Formally, let ρ be the probability that s is assigned to some school in C′ in the second round if
she reports truthfully, conditional on being able to deduce that her first-round score is in [Cj , Ci],
and let ρ′ be the probability that s′ is assigned to some school in C′ in the second round if she
reports truthfully, conditional on being able to deduce that her first-round score is in [Cj , Ci]. (We
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note that given her first-round assignment µ (ρ′), the student s′ may actually be able to deduce
more about her first-round score, and so the interim probability after knowing her assignment that
s′ is assigned to some school in C′ in the second round if she reports truthfully is not necessarily
ρ′.) Let ρ′′ be the probability that a student with preferences θ′′ and a first-round score in [Cj , Ci]
chosen uniformly at random is assigned to some school in C′ in the second round. It follows from
the design of the first round and from anonymity that ρ is the probability that a student with
preferences θ and a lottery number in [Cj , Ci] chosen uniformly at random is assigned to some
school in C′ in the second round, and similarly for ρ′.
Proving the lemma is equivalent to proving ρ=ρ′. We show that ρ=ρ′′=ρ′. Note that the first
equality is between preferences that are identical in the second round, and the second equality is
between preferences that are identical in the first round.
We first show that ρ=ρ′′; that is, changing just the first-round preferences does not affect the
probability of assignment to C′. This is almost immediate from first-order stochastic dominance
of truthful reporting, since the second-round preferences under θ and θ′′ are identical. (This also
illustrates the power of the assumption that the second-round assignment does not depend on first-
round preferences. It implies that manipulating first-round reports to obtain a more fine-grained
knowledge of the lottery number does not help, since assignment probabilities are conditionally
independent of the lottery number.) We present the full argument below.
Let ρˆ be the probability that a student with preferences θ who is unassigned in the first round is
assigned to a school in C′ in the second round. We note that since the last acceptable school under
preferences θ and θ′′ is j, the set of students with preferences θ who are unassigned in the first
round is equal to the set of students with preferences θ with lottery number in [0, Cj ], and similarly
the set of students with preferences θ′′ who are unassigned in the first round is equal to the set of
students with preferences θ′′ with lottery number in [0, Cj ]. Hence, the fact that θ and θ′′ have the
same second preferences gives us that ρˆ is also the probability that a student with preferences θ′′
who is unassigned in the first round is assigned to a school in C′ in the second round.
The probability of being assigned in the second round to a school in C′ when reporting θ is
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given by:
(1− Ci) + (Ci − Cj)ρ+ Cj ρˆ,
The probability of being assigned in the second round to a school in C′ when reporting θ′′ is given
by:
(1− Ci) + (Ci − Cj)ρ′′ + Cj ρˆ.
It follows from first-order stochastic dominance of truthful reporting for types θ and θ′ that ρ=ρ′′.
We now show that ρ′=ρ′′. This is a little more involved, but essentially relies on breaking the
set of students with first-round score in [Cj , Ci] into smaller subsets, depending on their first-round
assignment, and using first-order stochastic dominance of truthful reporting to show that in each
subset, the probability of an arbitrary student being assigned to a school in C′ in the second round
is the same for students with either set of preferences θ′ or θ′′.
We first introduce some notation for describing the first-round preferences of θ′ and θ′′. Let
{j1 ≤ · · · ≤ jm} be the schools between i(C′) and j in the overdemand ordering, corresponding to
schools that a student with preferences θ′ and a lottery number in [Cj , Ci] could have been assigned
to in the first round. Formally, we define them to be the indices j′ for which j′ 6∈ C′, i(C′) < j′ ≤ j,
j′ ′ j and j′ is relevant in the first-round overdemand ordering, that is, k′ < j′ for all k′ such that
k′ ′ j′. We observe that jm = j. For l = 1, . . . ,m, let ρ′l be the probability that a student with
preferences θ′ who was assigned to school jl is assigned to a school in C′ in the second round.
The set of students with preferences θ′ assigned to school jl in the first round is precisely the
set of students with preferences θ′ whose first-round lottery number is in [Cjl , Cjl−1 ] and similarly
the set of students with preferences θ′′ assigned to school jl in the first round is precisely the set of
students with preferences θ′′ whose first-round lottery number is in [Cjl , Cjl−1 ]. If we define j0 = i,
it follows that (Ci − Cj) = ∑ml=1(Cjl−1 − Cjl), and that




Let ρ′′l be the probability that a student with preferences θ′′ who was assigned to school jl is
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assigned to a school in C′ in the second round. Then it also holds that
(Ci − Cj)ρ′′ =
m∑
l=1
(Cjl−1 − Cjl)ρ′′l .
We show now that ρ′l = ρ′′l for all l, which implies that ρ′ = ρ′′.
Consider a student sl who reported ′=′′ in the first round and was assigned to school jl. Note
that such a report is consistent with either reporting θ′ or θ′′, and since the first-round reports of
these types are the same and the first-round mechanism is DA-STB there exists some set of lottery
numbers Ll such that students of type θ′ or θ′′ are assigned to jl in the first round if and only
if their lottery lies in Ll. The probabilities that this student is assigned in the second round to
a school in C′ when reporting θ′ and θ′′ are given by ρ′l and ρ′′l respectively. Now for any fixed
lottery L (s), truthful reporting is a dominant strategy in the second round for types θ and θ′. It
follows that ρ′l = ρ′′l .
This completes the proof of the lemma.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Suppose that the order condition holds. In what follows, we will fix a permutation P and show
that PLDA(P ) satisfies the local order condition and is type-equivalent to the reverse lottery RLDA
mechanism. As this holds for every P , it follows that the global order condition holds.
(1) Every school has a single priority group.
We first consider the case where ni = 1 for all i; that is, every school has a single priority
group. Recall that the schools are indexed according to the first-round overdemand ordering, so
that C1 ≥ C2 ≥ · · · ≥ Cn ≥ Cn+1. Since the local order condition holds for RLDA, let us assume
that they are also indexed according to the second-round overdemand ordering under RLDA, so
that CˆR1 ≥ CˆR2 ≥ · · · ≥ CˆRn ≥ CˆRn+1.
The idea will be to construct a set of cutoffs C˜P directly from the permutation P and the cutoffs
CˆR, show that the cutoffs are in the correct order C˜P1 ≥ C˜P2 ≥ · · · ≥ C˜Pn ≥ C˜Pn+1, and show that
the cutoffs C˜P and resulting assignment are market-clearing when school preferences are given by
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the amended scoring function with permutation P .
(1a) Definitions.
As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, let βi,j = η({s ∈ S : argmaxˆsXj = i}) be the measure of
students who, when their set of affordable schools is Xj , will choose i. Let Es(C) be the set of
schools affordable for student s in the first round under PLDA with any permutation, let Eˆs(CˆR)
be the set of schools affordable for type s in the second round under RLDA, and let Eˆs(CˆP ) be
the set of schools affordable for type s in the second round under PLDA(P ).
Let γRi = η({s ∈ S : Eˆs(CˆR) = Xi}) be the fraction of students whose affordable set in the
second round of RLDA is Xi, and let γPi = η({s ∈ S : Eˆs(CˆP ) = Xi}) be the fraction of students
whose affordable set in PLDA(P ) is Xi.
Let nˆ be the smallest index such that school nˆ does not reach capacity when it is not offered to
all the students. In other words, nˆ is the smallest index such that every student has school nˆ in her
affordable set under RLDA, i.e., nˆ ∈ Eˆs(CˆR). Since the local order condition holds for RLDA, we
may equivalently express nˆ in terms of cutoffs as the smallest index such that (1−Cnˆ)+(1−CˆRnˆ ) ≥ 1.
Such an nˆ always exists, since every student has the outside option n+ 1 in her affordable set.
(1b) Defining cutoffs for PLDA.
Let us define cutoffs C˜P as follows. For i ≥ nˆ let C˜Pi = 0. For each permutation P , define a
function
fPi (x) = |{` : ` ≥ Ci or P (`) ≥ x}|
representing the proportion of students who have i in their affordable set with first- and second-
round cutoffs Ci, x under the amended scoring function with permutation P . Since P is measure-
preserving, fPi (x) is continuous and monotonically decreasing in x.
For i < nˆ, we inductively define C˜Pi to be the largest real smaller than C˜Pi−1 satisfying
























+ (Ci−1 − Ci)









where in the first equality we are using that Ci−1 ≥ Ci, the first inequality follows from the
definition of C˜Pi=1, and the last inequality holds since CˆRi−1 ≥ CˆRi .
It follows from the intermediate value theorem that the cutoffs C˜P are well defined and satisfy
C˜P1 ≥ C˜P2 ≥ · · · ≥ C˜Pn ≥ C˜Pn+1.
(1c) The constructed cutoffs clear the market.
We show that the cutoffs C˜P and resulting assignment (from letting students choose their
favorite school out of those for which they meet the cutoff) are market-clearing when the second-
round scores are given by rˆsi = P (L(s)) + ni1{L(s)≥Ci} + psi1{L(s)≥Ci}. We call the mechanism with
this second-round assignment MP .
The idea is that since the cutoffs C˜Pi are decreasing in the same order as Ci and CˆRi , the
affordable sets are nested in the same order under both sets of second-round cutoffs. It follows that
aggregate student demand is uniquely specified by the proportion of students with each school in








. It follows that
C˜P are market-clearing and give the PLDA(P ) cutoffs, and so PLDA(P ) satisfies the local order
condition (with the indices indexed in the same order as with RLDA). We make the affordable set
argument explicit below.
Consider the proportion of lottery numbers giving a (total) affordable set Xi. Since CˆR1 ≥ CˆR2 ≥











if i < nˆ and by 0 if i > nˆ, where we define fP0 (x) = 1 for all P and x. Similarly, since C˜P1 ≥ C˜P2 ≥









if i < nˆ, which is precisely γRi , and by 0 if i > nˆ.
Hence, for all i < nˆ, the measure of students assigned to school i under both RLDA and MP is∑
j≤i βi,jγRj = qi, and for all i ≥ nˆ, the measure of students assigned to school i is
∑
j≤nˆ βi,jγRj < qi.
It follows that the cutoffs C˜P are market-clearing when the second-round scores are given by
rˆsi = P (L(s))+ni1{L(s)≥Ci}+psi1{L(s)≥Ci}, and so PLDA(P )= MP satisfies the local order condition.
(2) Some school has more than one priority group.
Now consider when schools have possibly more than one priority group. We show that if RLDA
satisfies the local order condition, then PLDA(P ) assigns the same number of students of each
priority type to each school i as RLDA, and within each priority type assigns the same number
of students of each preference type to each school as RLDA. We do this by first assuming that
PLDA(P ) assigns the same number of students of each priority type to each school i as RLDA,
and showing that this gives consistent cutoffs.
We note that this proof uses very similar arguments to the proof of Theorem A.1.
(2a) Defining little economies Epi for each priority type.
Fix a priority class pi. Let qpi be a restricted capacity vector, where qpi,i is the measure of
students of priority class pi assigned to school i under RLDA. Let Spi be the set of students s such
that ps = pi, and let ηpi be the restriction of the distribution η to Spi. Let Epi denote the primitives
(CSpi, ηpi, qpi, ).
Let C˜P pi be the second-round cutoffs of PLDA(P ) on Epi. By definition, CˆRpi are the second-
round cutoffs of RLDA on Epi. We show that the cutoffs C˜P pi defined for the little economy are the
same as the consistent second-round cutoffs CˆPpi for PLDA(P ) run on the large economy E , that is,
C˜P pi = CˆPpi .
(2b) Implications of RLDA satisfying the local order condition.
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Since RLDA satisfies the local order condition for E , RLDA also satisfies the local order condition
for Epi for all pi. It follows from (1) that the global order condition holds on each of the little
economies Epi. Hence by Theorem 3.1 all PLDA mechanisms produce type-equivalent assignments
when run on Epi. Moreover, as in the proof of Theorem A.1, the global order condition on Epi also
allows us to determine aggregate student demand in Epi from the proportions of students who have
each school in their affordable set.
Finally, as in the proof of Theorem A.1, we may assume that for each pi and school i the








, where for each permutation P ,
fPpi,i(x) = |{l : l ≥ Cpi,i or P (l) ≥ x}| is the proportion of students of priority class pi who have
school i in their affordable set if the first- and second-round cutoffs are Cpi,i and x respectively.
It follows that C˜Ppi,i depends on pi only via pii, and does not depend on pij for all j 6= i. This
is because C˜Ppi,i is defined by fPpi,i(·), fRpi,i(·), and CˆRpi,i, which are in turn defined by Cpi,i and the
permutations P and R. Moreover, Cpi,i depends on pi only through pii. Hence, if pi, pi′ are two
priority vectors such that pii = pi′i, then C˜Ppi,i = C˜Ppi′,i, and so the C˜Ppi,i are consistent across priority
types and define cutoffs C˜Pi that are independent of priority type.
(3) C˜Pi are the PLDA cutoffs.
Finally, we show that C˜Pi are market-clearing cutoffs. By (1), for each priority class pi, the
number of students assigned to each school i is the same under RLDA as under the demand
induced by the cutoffs C˜Pi , and we know that the RLDA cutoffs are market-clearing for E .
Hence C˜Pi give the assignments for PLDA on E , and since C˜Pi was defined individually for each
priority class pi for Epi it follows that PLDA(P ) assigns the same measure of students of each priority
type to each school i as RLDA.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 4
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B.1 Omitted Proofs for Section 4.3
Definitions and Notation
We begin with some additional definitions and notation that will be used in the proofs in this
section.
In Appendix 4.4.1 we outlined how the TTC path γ can be interpreted as tracking the pro-
gression of the algorithm. Throughout the proofs, we make use of this interpretation and will
frequently fix an economy E1 and a TTC path γ and let TTC (γ|E) denote the continuous-time




i∈C be stopping times




i∈C satisfy the capacity equations. Let the schools be labeled such that
t(i1) ≤ t(i2) ≤ · · · ≤ t(in), and let t(i0) = 0. We will refer to the progression of the algorithm from
time t(i`−1) to time t(i`) as Round ` of TTC(γ).
Let x, x be vectors. We let (x, x] = {x : x 6≤ x and x ≤ x} denote the set of vectors that are
weakly smaller than x along every coordinate, and strictly larger than x along some coordinate.
Let K ⊆ C be a set of schools. For all vectors x, we let piK (x) denote the projection of x to the
coordinates indexed by schools in K.
The following notation is used to incorporate information about the set of available schools. For
an economy E and TTC path γ yielding TTC cutoffs p we let C (x) =
{
j | ∃i s.t. pji ≤ xi
}
denote
the set of schools available to students with rank x. We denote by
Θi|C =
{
θ ∈ Θ|Chθ (C) = i
}
the set of students whose top choice in C is i, and denote by ηi|C the measure of these students.




. In an abuse of notation, for a set A ⊆ [0, 1]C , we
will often let η (A) denote η
({
θ ∈ Θ | rθ ∈ A
})
, the measure of students with ranks in A, and let
ηi|C (A) denote η
({
θ ∈ Θi|C | rθ ∈ A
})
, the measure of students with ranks in A whose top choice
1The economy E can either be a continuum economy, or a discrete economy E, in which case we let TTC (γ|E)
denote TTC (γ|Φ (E)).
2We will omit the dependence on the economy when it is evident from context.
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school in C is i.
We will also find it convenient to define sets of students who were offered or assigned a seat
along some TTC path γ. These will be useful in considering the result of aggregating the marginal
trade balance equations. For each time τ let
Ti (γ; τ) def= {θ ∈ Θ | ∃τ ′ ≤ τ s.t. rθi = γi(τ ′) and rθ ≤ γ(τ ′)}
denote the set of students who were offered a seat by school i before time τ , let







denote the set of students who were assigned a seat at school i before time τ , and let T i|C (γ; τ) def=
{θ ∈ Θ | rθ  γ(τ) and Chθ (C) = i} denote the set of students who would be assigned a seat at
school i before time τ if the set of available schools was C and the path followed was γ.3
For each interval T = [t, t] let Ti (γ;T ) def= Ti (γ; t) \∪t<tTi (γ; t) be the set of students who were
offered a seat by school i at some time τ ∈ T , and let T i|C(T ; γ) def= T i|C (γ; t) \ T i|C (γ; t) be the
set of students who were assigned to a school i at some time τ ∈ T , given that the set of available
schools was C (γ (τ)) = C for each τ ∈ T . For each union of disjoint intervals T = ∪nTn similar
define Ti (γ;T ) def= ∪nTi (γ;Tn) and T i|C(T ; γ) def= ∪nT i|C (Tn; γ). Figure B.1 illustrates examples
of Ti and T i for an economy with two schools.
Finally let us set up the definitions for solving the marginal trade balance equations. For a set
of schools C and individual schools i, j ∈ C, recall that
H
j|C













θ ∈ Θj|C | rθ ∈
[
(xi − ε) · ei, x
)})
is the marginal density of students pointed to by school i at the point x whose top choice school in
3Note that Ti (γ; τ) and T i (γ; τ) include students who were offered or assigned a seat in the school in previous
rounds.
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Figure B.1: The sets Ti (γ; t) and T i (γ; t) for an economy with two schools and a fixed path γ and time t. Ti (γ; t)
denotes the set of students who were offered a seat by school i by time t, and T i (γ; t) denotes the set of students who
were assigned to school i by time t. Students in each set are shaded in grey. Note that students are no longer offered
seats once they are assigned, and so only students with priorities on the path γ are offered seats by both schools.
C is j.
Let HC (x) be the |C| × |C| matrix with (i, j)th entry HC (x)i,j = Hj|Ci (x). Let H˜C (x) be the
















j (x) is the row sum of H (x), and the normalization v satisfies v ≥ maxj vj .
H˜C (x) is a transformation of HC (x) that will be convenient for formalizing the connection with
continuous time Markov chains presented in Appendix 4.4.3.
Recall that a TTC path γ satisfies the trade balance equations for an economy E = (C,Θ, η, q)
if the following holds:
∑
k∈C
γ′k (t)H ik (γ (t)) =
∑
k∈C
γ′i (t)Hki (γ (t)) ∀i ∈ C, times t.
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These may be equivalently stated in terms of the matrix H˜ (γ (t)) as follows:
γ′ (t) = γ′ (t) · H˜ (γ (t)) .
Let γ (τ) = x. If d = −γ′ (τ) ≥ 0 solves the trade balance equations for x with available schools
C ∑
k∈C
dk ·H i|Ck (x) =
∑
k∈C
di ·Hk|Ci (x) ∀i ∈ C,
or equivalently
d = d · H˜ (x)
we say that d is a valid gradient at x with available schools C, and if in addition d · 1 = −1 then
we say that d is a valid direction at x with available schools C. We omit the references to x and C
when they are clear from context.
Let MC (x) be the Markov chain with state space C, and transition probability from state i to
state j equal to H˜C (x)i,j . We remark that such a Markov chain exists, since H˜C (x) is a (right)
stochastic matrix for each pair C, x.
We will also need the following definitions. For a matrix H and sets of indices I, J we let HI,J
denote the submatrix of H with rows indexed by elements of I and columns indexed by elements
of J . Recall that, by Assumption 4.1, the measure η is defined by a probability density ν that is
right-continuous and piecewise Lipschitz continuous with points of discontinuity on a finite grid.
Let the finite grid be the set of points {x |xi ∈ Di∀i}, where the Di are finite subsets of [0, 1]. Then
there exists a partition R of [0, 1]C into hyperrectangles such that for each R ∈ R and each face of
R, there exists an index i and yi ∈ Di such that the face is contained in {x |xi = yi}.
The following notion of continuity will be useful, given this grid-partition. We say that a
multivariate function f : Rn → R is right-continuous if f (x) = limy→x,y≥x f (y), where x, y are
vectors in Rn and the inequalities hold coordinate-wise. For an m × n matrix A, let 1 (A) be the
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m× n matrix with entries
1 (A)ij =

1 if Aij 6= 0,
0 if Aij = 0.
We will want some way of comparing two TTC paths γ and γ˜ obtained under two continuum
economies differing only in their measures η and η˜.
Definition B.1. Let γ and γ˜ be increasing continuous functions from [0, 1] to [0, 1]C with γ (0) =
γ˜ (0). We say that γ (τ) is dominated by γ˜ (τ) via school i if
γi (τ) = γ˜i (τ) , and
γj (τ) ≤ γ˜j (τ) for all j ∈ C.
We also say that γ is dominated by γ˜ via school i at time τ . If γ and γ′ are TTC paths, we
can interpret this as school j being less demanded under γ, since with the same rank at j, in γ
students are competitive with fewer ranks at other schools i. Equivalently, the same rank at j is
less valuable under γ than under γ˜, as it provides the same opportunities for assignment as lower
ranks at other schools (i.e. worse opportunities) under γ compared to γ˜. Another interpretation is
that more students have been offered seats by the time t at which we reach students with a given
j-rank under γ than under γ˜. A third interpretation is that fewer students are offered / trade away
seats at school i at time t under γ than under γ˜.
Basic Lemmas
We will also make use of the following lemmas.
Lemma B.1. Let E = (C,Θ, η, q) be a continuum economy such that H˜ (x) is irreducible for all x
and C. Then there exists a unique valid TTC path γ. Within each round γ (·) is given by
dγ (t)
dt
= d (γ (t))
where d (x) is the unique valid direction from x = γ (t) that satisfies d (x) = d (x) H˜ (x).
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Moreover, if we let A (x) be obtained from H˜ (x) − I by replacing the nth column with the all
ones vector 1, then
d (x) = [0, 0, . . . , 0,−1]A (x)−1 .
Proof. It suffices to show that d (·) is unique. The existence and uniqueness of γ (·) satisfying
dγ(t)
dt = d (γ (t)) follows by invoking Picard-Lindelöf as in the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Consider the equations,
d (x) H˜ (x) = d (x)
d (x) · 1 = −1.
When H˜ (x) is irreducible, every choice of n − 1 columns of H˜ (x) − I gives an independent set
whose span does not contain 1. Therefore if we let A (x) be given by replacing the nth column in
H˜ (x)− I with 1, then A (x) has full rank, and the above equations are equivalent to
d (x)A (x) = [0, 0, . . . , 0,−1] ,
i.e. d (x) = [0, 0, . . . , 0,−1]A (x)−1 .
Hence d (x) is unique for each x, and hence γ (·) is uniquely determined.
We now show that any two non-increasing continuous paths γ, γ˜ starting and ending at the same
point can be re-parametrized so that for all t there exists a school i (τ) such that γ is dominated by γ˜
via school i (τ) at time t. We first show that, if γ (0) ≤ γ˜ (0), then there exists a re-parametrization
of γ such that γ is dominated by γ˜ on some interval starting at 0.
Lemma B.2. Suppose γ, γ˜ are a pair of non-increasing functions [0, 1]→ [0, 1]C such that γ (0) ≤
γ˜ (0). Then there exist coordinates i, j, a time t and an increasing function g : R → R such that
γj (g (t)) = γ˜j (t), and for all τ ∈ [0, t] it holds that
γi (g (τ)) = γ˜i (τ) and γ (g (τ)) ≤ γ˜ (τ) .
That is, if we renormalize the time parameter τ of γ (τ) so that γ and γ˜ agree along the ith
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coordinate, then γ is dominated by γ˜ via school i at all times τ ∈ [0, t], and is also dominated via
school j at time t.
Proof. The idea is that if we take the smallest function g such that there exists a coordinate i such
that for all τ sufficiently small γi (g (τ)) = γ˜i (τ), then γ (g (τ)) ≤ γ˜ (τ) for all τ sufficiently small.
The lemma then follows from continuity. We make this precise.





= γ˜i (τ) for all τ .








of schools j along which the
γ curve renormalized along coordinate i has larger j-value at time τ than γ˜j has at time τ , and








where the renormalized γ curve is equal
to γ˜. It suffices to show that there exists i, j and a time t such that κ(i)> (τ) = ∅ for all τ ∈ [0, t]
and j ∈ κ(i)= (t).
Since γ and γ˜ are continuous, there exists some maximal t(i) > 0 such that the functions κ(i)> (·)









then by continuity there exists some time t ≤ t(i) and school j such that j ∈ κ(i)= (t)
and we are done. Hence we may assume that for all i it holds that κ(i)> (τ) = C
(i)




for some fixed non-empty set C(i)> . We will show that this leads to a contradiction.









for all τ ∈ (0, t), where the equality follows
from the definition of g(j) and the inequality since j ∈ C(i)> . But this completes the proof, since it
implies that for all i there exists j such that g(j) (τ) > g(i) (τ) for all τ ∈ (0, t), which is impossible
since there are a finite number of schools i ∈ C.
We are now ready to show that there exists a re-parametrization of γ such that γ always is
dominated by γ˜ via some school.
Lemma B.3. Suppose t ≥ 0 and γ, γ˜ are a pair of non-increasing functions [0, t] → [0, 1]C such
that γ (0) ≤ γ˜ (0) = 1 with equality on at least one coordinate, and 0 = γ (1) ≤ γ˜ (1) with equality
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on at least one coordinate. Then there exists an increasing function g : [0, t]→ R such that for all
τ ≥ 0, there exists a school i such that γ (g (τ)) is dominated by γ˜ (τ) via school i.
Proof. Without loss of generality let us assume that t = 1. Fix a coordinate i. We define g(i)
to be the renormalization of γ so that γ and γ˜ agree along the ith coordinate. Formally, let













is dominated by γ˜ (τ). The idea is to pick g to be
equal to g(i) in A(i). In order to do this formally, we need to show that the sets A(i) cover [0, 1],
and then turn (a suitable subset of) A(i) into a union of disjoint closed intervals, on each of which
we can define g(·) ≡g(i) (·).
We first show that ∪iA(i) = [0, 1]. Suppose not, so there exists some time τ such that for all
i ∈ X def=
{
k : τ ≥ t(k)
}




> γ˜j (τ). Note that for such i, j, since
γj is non-increasing this implies that γj (0) ≥ γ˜j (τ), and so the function g(j) (·) is defined at τ , i.e.




. In other words, since γ is non-increasing, for all
i ∈ X there exists j such that g(i) (τ) < g(j) (τ), and since γj (0) ≥ γ˜j (τ) it also holds that j ∈ X.
This is a contradiction since X is finite but non-empty (since γ(0) ≤ γ˜ (0) = 1, with equality on at
least one coordinate).
We now turn (a suitable subset of A(i)) into a union of disjoint closed intervals. By continuity,
A(i) is closed. Consider the closure of the interior of A(i), which we denote by B(i). Since the interior
of A(i) is open, it is a countable union of open intervals, and hence B(i) is a countable union of
disjoint closed intervals. To show that ∪i∈CB(i) = [0, 1], fix a time τ ∈ [0, 1]. As ∪iA(i) = [0, 1],




≤ γ˜ (τ). Hence we may invoke Lemma B.2 to show that there
























for all τ ′ ∈ [τ, τ ], and so g ◦g(i) = g(j) and we have shown
that [τ, τ ] ⊆ B(j). Hence we may write [0, 1] = ∪nTn as a countable union of closed intervals Tn
such that any pair of intervals intersects at most at their endpoints, and each interval Tn is a subset
of B(i) for some i. For each Tn fix some i(n) = i so that Tn ⊆ B(i). Intuitively, this means that at




is dominated by γ˜ (τ) via school i.
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We now construct a function g that satisfies the required properties as follows. If τ ∈ Tn ⊆ B(i),
let g (τ) = g(i) (τ). Now g is well-defined despite the possibility that Tn ∩ Tm 6= ∅. This is because

















(by domination via i (m) and i (n) respectively), and so g(i(n)) (τ) ≤ g(i(m)) (τ) ≤ g(i(n)) (τ) and
we can pick one value for g that satisfies all required properties. Now by definition γ (g (τ)) is
dominated by γ˜ (τ) via school i, and moreover g is defined on all of [0, 1] since ∪i∈CB(i) = [0, 1].
This completes the proof.
Lemma B.4. Let C ⊆ C be a set of schools, and let D be a region on which H˜C (x) is irreducible
for all x ∈ D. For each x let A (x) be given by replacing the nth column of H˜C (x)− IC with the all
ones vector 1.4 Then the function f (x) = [0, 0, . . . , 0,−1]A (x)−1 is piecewise Lipschitz continuous
in x.
Proof. It suffices to show that the function which, for each x, outputs the matrix A (x)−1 is piecewise








θ : rθ≥x,rθ 6≥xi+ε·ei, jθC
ν (θ) dθ,
where ν (·) is bounded below on its support and piecewise Lipschitz continuous, and the points of





nonzero and hence bounded below, and so H˜C (x)i,j is bounded above and piecewise Lipschitz
continuous in x, and therefore so is A (x). Finally, since H˜C (x) is an irreducible row stochastic
matrix for each x ∈ D, it follows that A (x) is full rank and continuous. This is because when
H˜C (x) is irreducible every choice of n− 1 columns of H˜C (x)− IC gives an independent set whose
span does not contain the all ones vector 1C . Therefore if we let A (x) be given by replacing the
nth column in H˜C (x)− IC with 1C , then A (x) has full rank.
Since A (x) is full rank and continuous, in each piece det (A (x)) is bounded away from 0, and
so A (x)−1 is piecewise Lipschitz continuous, as required.
4IC is the identity matrix with rows and columns indexed by the elements in C.
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Connection to Continuous Time Markov Chains
In this section, we formalize the intuition from Appendix 4.4.3. In Appendix 4.4.3, we appealed
to a connection with Markov chain theory to provide a method for solving for all the possible
values of d (x). Specifically, we constructed a continuous time Markov chain with state space C and
transition rates from state i to j equal to Hji (x). We argued that if K (x) is the set of recurrent
communication classes of this Markov chain, then the set of valid directions d (x) is identical to the





K is the unique solution to the trade balance
equations (4.2) restricted to K. We present the relevant definitions, results and proofs here in full.
Let us first present some definitions from Markov chain theory.5 A square matrix P is a right-
stochastic matrix if all the entries are non-negative and each row sums to 1. A probability vector is
a vector with non-negative entries that add up to 1. Given a right-stochastic matrix P , the Markov
chain with transition matrix P is the Markov chain with state space equal to the column/row
indices of P , and a probability Pij of moving to state j in one time step, given that we start in
state i. Given two states i, j of a Markov chain with transition matrix P , we say that states i and
j communicate if there is a positive probability of moving to state i to state j in finite time, and
vice versa.
For each Markov chain, there exists a unique decomposition of the state space into a sequence
of disjoint subsets C1, C2, . . . such that for all i, j, states i and j communicate if and only if they are
in the same subset Ck for some k. Each subset Ck is called a communication class of the Markov
chain. A Markov chain is irreducible if it only has one communication class. A state i is recurrent
if, starting at i and following the transition matrix P , the probability of returning to state i is 1.
A communication class is recurrent if it contains a recurrent state.
The following proposition gives a characterization of the stationary distributions of a Markov
chain. We refer the reader to any standard stochastic processes textbook (e.g. Karlin and Taylor
(1975)) for a proof of this result.
Proposition B.1. Suppose that P is the transition matrix of a Markov chain. Let K be the set
5See standard texts such as Karlin and Taylor (1975) for a more complete treatment.
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of recurrent communication classes of the Markov chain with transition matrix P . Then for each
recurrent communication class K ∈ K, the equation pi = piP has a unique solution piK such that




⊆ K. Moreover, the support of piK is equal to K. In addition, if
||pi|| = 1 and pi is a solution to the equation pi = piP, then pi is a convex combination of the vectors
in {piK}K∈K.
To make use of this proposition, define at each point x and for each set of schools C a Markov
chain MC (x) with transition matrix H˜C (x). Note that this is equivalent to taking the embedded
discrete-time Markov chain of a continuous-time Markov chain with transition rates Hj|Ci (x) for i 6=






is the normalization term
used to construct H˜C (x)). We will relate the valid directions d (x) to the recurrent communication
classes of MC (x), where C is the set of available schools. We will need the following notation and
definitions. Given a vector v indexed by C, a matrix Q with rows and columns indexed by C and
subsets K,K ′ ⊆ C of the indices, we let vK denote the restriction of v to the coordinates in K, and
we let QK,K′ denote the restriction of Q to rows indexed by K and columns indexed by K ′.
The following lemma characterizes the recurrent communication classes of the Markov chain
MC (x) using the properties of the matrix H˜C (x), and can be found in any standard stochastic
processes text.
Lemma B.5. Let C be the set of available school at a point x. Then a set K ⊆ C is a recurrent
communication class of the Markov chain MC (x) if and only if H˜C (x)K,K is irreducible and
H˜C (x)K,C\K is the zero matrix.
It is easy to see that the same result holds when we replace H˜C by HC .
The following lemma allows us to characterize the valid directions d in terms of the matrix
H˜C (x).
Lemma B.6. The vector d is a valid direction at x with available schools C if and only if
d · 1 = −1 and d = d · H˜C (x) .
214
Proof. It suffices to show that d = d · H˜C (x) if and only if
∑
k∈C
dk ·H i|Ck (x) =
∑
k∈C
di ·Hk|Ci (x) ∀i ∈ C.
Now








































dk ·H i|Ck (x) ∀i ∈ C
which concludes the proof.
Proposition B.1 and Lemmas B.6 and B.5 allow us to characterize the valid directions d (x).
Theorem B.1. Let C be the set of available schools, and let K (x) be the set of subsets K ⊆ C for
which H˜C (x)K,K is irreducible and H˜C (x)K,C\K is the zero matrix. Then for each K ∈ K (x) the










= [0, 0, . . . , 0,−1]ACK (x)−1 ,
where ACK (x) is the matrix obtained by replacing the (|K| − 1)th column of H˜C (x)K,K − IK with
the all ones vector 1K .
Moreover, if d · 1 = −1 and d is a solution to the equation d = d · H˜C (x) , then d is a convex
combination of the vectors in {dK}K∈K(x).
Proof. Proposition B.5 shows that the sets K are precisely the recurrent sets of the Markov chain
with transition matrix H˜ (x). Hence uniqueness of the dK and the fact that d is a convex combina-
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tion of dK follow directly from Proposition B.1. The form of the solution dK follows from Lemma
B.1.
This has the following interpretation. Suppose that there is a unique recurrent communication
class K, such as when η has full support. Then there is a unique infinitesimal continuum trading
cycle of students, specified by the unique valid direction d satisfying d = d · H˜ (x). Moreover,
students in the cycle trade seats from every school in K. Any school not in K is blocked from
participating, since there is not enough demand to fill the seats they are offering. When there
are multiple recurrent communication classes, each of the dK gives a unique infinitesimal trading
cycle of students, corresponding to those who trade seats in K. Moreover, these trading cycles are
disjoint. Hence the only multiplicity that remains is to decide the order, or the relative rate, at
which to clear these cycles. We will show in Appendix B.1 that, as in the discrete setting, the order
in which cycles are cleared does not affect the final allocation.
Proof of Theorem 4.2
We first show that there exist solutions p, γ, t to the marginal trade balance equations and capacity
equations. The proof relies on selecting appropriate valid directions d (x) and then invoking the
Picard-Lindelöf theorem to show existence.
Specifically, let C be the set of available schools, fix a point x, and consider the set of vectors d
such that d · H˜C (x) = d. Then it follows from Theorem B.1 that if d (x) is the valid direction from
x with minimal support under the shortlex order, then d (x) = dK(x) for the element K (x) ∈ K (x)
that is the smallest under the shortlex ordering.6 As the density ν (·) defining η (·) is Lipschitz
continuous, it follows that K (·) and K (·) are piecewise constant. Hence we may invoke Lemma
B.4 and the form of d (·) as given in Lemma B.1 to conclude that d (·) is piecewise Lipschitz within
each piece, and hence piecewize Lipschitz in [0, 1]C . Since d (·) is piecewise Lipschitz, it follows from
the Picard-Lindelöf theorem that there exists a unique function γ (·) satisfying dγ(t)dt = d (γ (t)). It
follows trivially that γ satisfies the marginal trade balance equations, and since we have assumed
6We choose the shortlex ordering to ensure that we choose valid directions corresponding to a single recurrent
communication class, rather than unions of recurrent communication classes.
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that all students find all schools acceptable and there are more students than seats it follows that
there exist stopping times t(i) and cutoffs pib.
Proof of the Uniqueness of the TTC Allocation In this section, we prove the uniqueness
claim in Theorem 4.2, that any two valid TTC paths give equivalent allocations. The intuition for
the result is the following. The connection to Markov chains shows that having multiple possible
valid directions in the continuum corresponds to having multiple possible trade cycles in the discrete
model. Hence the only multiplicity in choosing valid TTC directions is whether to implement one
set of trades before the others, or to implement them in parallel at various relative rates. We can
show that the set of cycles is independent of the order in which cycles are selected, or equivalently
that the sets of students who trade with each other is independent of the order in which possible
trades are executed. It follows that any pair of valid TTC paths give the same final allocation.
We remark that the crux of the argument is similar to what shows that discrete TTC gives a
unique allocation. However, the lack of discrete cycles and the ability to implement sets of trades
in parallel both complicate the argument and lead to a rather technical proof.
We first formally define cycles in the continuum setting, and a partial order over the cycles
corresponding to the order in which cycles can be cleared under TTC. We then define the set of
cycles Σ (γ) associated with a valid TTC path γ. Finally, we show that the sets of cycles associated
with two valid TTC paths γ and γ′ are the same, Σ (γ) = Σ (γ′).
Definition B.2. A (continuum) cycle σ = (K,x, x) is a set K ⊆ C and a pair of vectors x ≤ x in
[0, 1]C . The cycle σ is valid for available schools {C (x)}x∈[0,1]C if K ∈ KC(x) (x) ∀x ∈ (x, x].
Intuitively, a cycle is defined by two time points in a run of TTC, which gives a set of students,7
and the set of schools they most desire. A cycle is valid if the set of schools involved is a recurrent
communication class of the associated Markov chains.8 We say that a cycle σ = (K,x, x) appears
7The set of students is given by taking the difference between two nested hyperrectangles, one with upper coor-
dinate x and the other with upper coordinate x.
8Note that we consider validity only in terms of whether the schools are the appropriate schools for a trading
cycle, and not in terms of the feasibility of trade balance for the students in the cycle.
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at time t in TTC (γ) if K ∈ KC(γ(t)) (γ (t)) and γi (t) = xi for all i ∈ K. We say that a student θ
is in cycle σ if rθ ∈ (x, x]9, and a school i is in cycle σ if i ∈ K.
Definition B.3 (Partial order over cycles). The cycle σ = (K,x, x) blocks the cycle σ′ = (K ′, x′, x′),
denoted by σ B σ′, if at least one of the following hold:
(Blocking student) There exists a student θ in σ′ who prefers a school in K to all those in K ′,
i.e. there exist θ and i ∈ K \K ′ such that i θ i′ for all i′ ∈ K ′.
(Blocking school) There exists a school in σ′ that prefers a positive measure of students in σ to
all those in σ′, i.e. there exists i ∈ K ′ such that η
(
θ | θ in σ, rθi > x′i
)
> 0.10
Let us now define the set of cycles associated with a run of TTC. We begin with some ob-
servations about Hb|Ci (·) and H˜C (·)bi. For all b, i ∈ C the function Hb|Ci (·) is right-continuous
on [0, 1]C , Lipschitz continuous on R for all R ∈ R and uniformly bounded away from zero on






is constant on R for all R ∈ R. It follows that H˜C (·)bi is also
right-continuous, and Lipschitz continuous on R for all R ∈ R. Moreover, there exists some finite




is constant on R
for all R ∈ R′.





is constant on R for all R ∈ R′.
For x ∈ [0, 1]C and C ⊆ C, let KC (x) be the recurrent communication classes of the Markov










Lemma B.7. KC (·) is constant on R for every R ∈ R′.
For each K ∈ KC (x), let dK (x) be the unique vector satisfying d = dH˜C (x), which exists by
Theorem B.1.
9Recall that since rθ, x and x are vectors, this is equivalent to saying that rθ 6≤ x and rθ ≤ x.
10For i to block the cycle σ it is necessary but not sufficient that xi > x′i, since there also need to be students in σ
with the intermediate ranks at school i.
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Let γ be a TTC path, and assume that the schools are labeled in order. It follows that for all
x there exists ` such that C (x) = C(`) def= {`, `+ 1, . . . , |C|}. For each set of schools K ⊆ C, let
T (`) (K, γ) be the set of times τ such that C (γ (τ)) = C(`) and K is a recurrent communication
class for H˜C(l) (γ (τ)). Since γ is continuous and weakly decreasing, it follows from Lemma B.7 that
T (`) (K, γ) is the finite disjoint union of intervals of the form [t, t). Let I
(
T (`) (K, γ)
)
denote the
set of intervals in this disjoint union. We may assume that for each interval T , γ (T ) is contained
in some hyperrectangle R ∈ R′.11
For a time interval T = [t, t) ∈ I
(
T (`) (K, γ)
)
, we define the cycle σ (T ) = (K,x (T ) , x (T )) as
follows. Intuitively, we want to define it simply as σ (T ) = (K, γ (t) , γ (t)), but in order to minimize
the dependence on γ, we define the endpoints x (T ) and x (T ) of the interval of ranks to be as close
together as possible, while still describing the same set of students (up to a set of η-measure 0).
Define
x (T ) = max
{











x (T ) = min
{











to be the points chosen to be maximal and minimal respectively such that the set of students
allocated by γ during the time interval T has the same η-measure as if γ (t) = x (τ) and γ (t) =
x (τ).12 In other words, x (τ) and x (τ) are chosen to be respectively maximal and minimal under
the lexicographical order such that
η
((∪i∈KT i (γ; t) \ T i (γ; t)) \ {θ : Chθ (C(`)) ∈ K, rθ ∈ (x (T ) , x (T )]}) = 0.
In a slight abuse of notation, if σ = σ (T ) we will let x (σ) denote x (T ) and x (σ) denote x (T ).






σ (T ) .
11This is without loss of generality, since if γ (T ) is not contained we can simply partition T into a finite number
of intervals ∪R∈R′γ−1 (γ (T ) ∩R), each contained in a hyperrectangle in R′.
12In order to take the maximum and minimum of the set of possible values for x and x respectively we order the
elements of [0, 1]C lexicographically.
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For any cycle σ ∈ Σ (γ) and time τ we say that the cycle σ is clearing at time τ if γ (τ) 6≤ x (σ)
and γ (τ) 6> x (σ). We say that the cycle σ is cleared at time τ or finishes clearing at time τ if
γ(l) (τ) ≤ x (σ) with at least one equality. We remark that for any TTC path γ there may be
multiple cycles clearing at a time τ , each corresponding to a different recurrent set. For any TTC
path γ the set Σ (γ) is finite.
Fix two TTC paths γ and γ′. Our goal is to show that they clear the same sets of cycles,
Σ (γ) = Σ (γ′), or equivalently that Σ (γ)∪Σ (γ′) = Σ (γ)∩Σ (γ′). We will do this by showing that
for every cycle σ ∈ Σ (γ) ∪ Σ (γ′), if all cycles in Σ (γ) ∪ Σ (γ′) that block σ are in Σ (γ) ∩ Σ (γ′),
then σ ∈ Σ (γ) ∩ Σ (γ′). We first show that this is true in a special case, which can be understood
intuitively as the case when the cycle σ appears during the run of TTC (γ) and also appears during
the run of TTC (γ′).
Lemma B.8. Let E = (C,Θ, η, q) be a continuum economy, and let γ and γ′ be two TTC paths for
this economy. Let K ⊆ C and t be such that at time t, γ (γ′) has available schools C (C ′), the paths
γ, γ′ are at the same point when projected onto the coordinates K, i.e. γ (t)K = γ′ (t)K , and K
is a recurrent communication class of MC (γ (t)) and of MC′ (γ′ (t)). Suppose that for all schools
i ∈ K and cycles σ′ B σ involving school i, if σ′ ∈ Σ (γ), then σ′ is cleared in TTC (γ′), and vice
versa. Suppose also that cycle σ = (K,x, x) is cleared in TTC (γ), γ (t) = x, and measure 0 of σ
has been cleared by time t in TTC (γ′). Then σ is also cleared in TTC (γ′).
Proof. We define the ‘interior’ of the cycle σ by X = {x : xi ≤ xi ≤ xi ∀i ∈ K, xi′ ≥ xi′ ∀i′ 6∈ K}.
Fix a time u such that γ′ (u) ∈ X and let D′ denote the set of available schools at time u in
TTC (γ′). Then we claim that K is a recurrent communication class of MD′ (γ′ (u)), and that a
similar result is true for γ and a similarly defined D. The claim for γ,D follows from the fact that σ
is cleared in TTC (γ), σ ∈ Σ (γ). It remains to show that the claim for γ′, D′ is true. Formally, by
Lemma B.5 it suffices to show that H˜D′ (x)K,K is irreducible and H˜D
′ (x)K,D′\K is the zero matrix.
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We first examine the differences between the matrices H˜C′ (γ′ (t)) and H˜D′ (γ′ (u)). Since K
is a recurrent communication class of MC′ (γ′ (u)), it holds that there are no transitions from
















= 0, all students’ top choice
schools out of C ′ or D′ are the same (in K), and so H˜C′ (γ′ (u))K,K = H˜D
′ (γ′ (u))K,K and both
matrices are irreducible. Hence K is a recurrent communication class of MD′ (γ′ (u)).
We now invoke Theorem B.1 to show that in each of the two paths, all the students in the
cycle σ clear with each other. Specifically, while the path γ is in the ‘interior’ of the cycle, that is
γ (τ) ∈ X, it follows from Theorem B.1 that the projection of the gradient of γ to K is a rescaling
of some vector dK (γ (τ)), where dK (·) depends on H˜ (·) but not on γ. Similarly, while γ′ (τ ′) ∈ X,
it holds that the projection of the gradient of γ′ to K is a rescaling of the vector dK (γ′ (τ ′)), for the
same function dK (·). Hence if we let piK (x) denote the projection of a vector x to the coordinates













Recall that we have assumed that for all schools i ∈ K and cycles σ′ B σ involving school
i, if σ′ ∈ Σ (γ), then σ′ is cleared in TTC (γ′), and vice versa. This implies that for all i ∈ K,
the measure of students assigned to i in time [0, t] under TTC (γ) is the same as the measure
of students assigned to i in time [0, t] under TTC (γ′). Moreover, we have just shown that for
any x ∈ γ (γ−1 ((x, x])) , x′ ∈ γ′ (γ′−1 ((x, x])) such that xK = x′K , if we let τ = γ−1 (x) and
τ ′ = (γ′)−1 (x′) then the same measure of students are assigned to i in time [t, τ ] under TTC (γ)
as in time [t, τ ′] under TTC (γ′). Since TTC (γ) clears σ the moment it exits the interior of σ, this
implies that TTC (γ′) also clears σ the moment it exits the interior.
We are now ready to prove that the TTC allocation is unique. As the proof takes several steps,
we separate it into several smaller claims for readability.
Proof of uniqueness. Let γ and γ′ be two TTC paths, and let the sets of cycles associated with
TTC (γ) and TTC (γ′) be Σ = Σ (γ) and Σ′ = Σ (γ′) respectively. We will show that Σ = Σ′.
Let σ = (K,x, x) be a cycle in Σ ∪ Σ′ such that the following assumption holds:
Assumption B.1. For all σ˜ B σ it holds that either σ˜ is in both Σ and Σ′ or σ˜ is in neither.
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We show that if σ is in Σ ∪ Σ′ then it is in Σ ∩ Σ′. Since Σ and Σ′ are finite sets, this will be
sufficient to show that Σ = Σ′. Without loss of generality we may assume that σ ∈ Σ.
We give here an overview of the proof. Let ΣBσ = {σ˜ ∈ Σ : σ˜ B σ} denote the set of cycles
that are comparable to σ and cleared before σ in TTC (γ). Assumption B.1 about σ implies that
ΣBσ ⊆ Σ′. We will show that this implies that no students in σ start clearing under TTC (γ′) until
all the students in σ have the same top available school in TTC (γ′) as when they clear in TTC (γ),
or in other words, that if some students in σ start clearing under TTC (γ′) at time t, then the cycle
σ appears at time t. We will then show that once some of the students in σ start clearing under
TTC (γ′) then all of them start clearing. It then follows from Lemma B.8 that σ clears under both
TTC (γ) and TTC (γ′).
Let ` denote the round of TTC (γ) in which σ is cleared, C (x) = C(`) ∀x ∈ σ. We define the
times in TTC (γ) and TTC (γ′) when all the cycles in ΣBσ are cleared, by
tBσ = min
{















∈ ΣBσand H˜ (γ′ (t)) 6= 0
}
.
We define also the times in TTC (γ) when σ starts to be cleared and finishes clearing,
tσ = max {t : γ (t) ≥ x} , tσ = min {t : γ (t) ≤ x}
and similarly define the times t′σ = max {t : γ′ (t) ≥ x} , tσ = min {t : γ′ (t) ≤ x} for TTC (γ′).
We remark that part of the issue, carried over from the discrete setting, is that these times tBσ
and tσ might not match up, and similarly for t′Bσ and t′σ. In particular, other incomparable cycles
could clear at interwoven times. In the continuum model, there may also be sections on the TTC
curve at which no school is pointing to a positive density of students. However, all the issues in
the continuum case can be addressed using the intuition from the discrete case.
We first show in Claims (B.1), (B.2) and (B.3) that in both TTC (γ) and TTC (γ′), after all
the cycles in ΣBσ are cleared and before σ starts to be cleared, the schools pointed to by students
in σ and the students pointed to by schools in K remain constant (up to a set of η-measure 0).
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Claim B.1. Let σ = (K,x, x) ∈ Σ satisfy Assumption B.1. Suppose there is a school i that some
student in σ prefers to all the schools in K. Then school i is unavailable in TTC (γ) at any time
t ≥ tBσ, and unavailable in TTC (γ′) at any time t ≥ t′Bσ.
Proof. Suppose that school i is available in TTC (γ) after all the cycles in ΣBσ are cleared. Then
there exists a cycle σ˜ clearing at time t˜ ∈ (tBσ, tσ) in TTC (γ) involving school i. But this means
that σ˜ B σ so σ˜ ∈ ΣBσ, which is a contradiction. Hence the measure of students in ΣBσ who are
assigned to school i is qi, and the claim follows.
Claim B.2. In TTC (γ), let Θ˜ denote the set of students cleared in time [tBσ, tσ) who are preferred









> 0. Then, since there are a finite number of cycles in Σ (γ), there exists




∈ Σ (γ) containing a positive η-measure of students in Θ˜. We show
that σ˜ is cleared before σ. Since σ˜ contains a positive η-measure of students in Θ˜, it holds that
there exist t1, t2 ∈ [tBσ, tσ) and a school i ∈ K for which x˜i ≤ γ (t1)i < γ (t2)i ≤ ˜(x)i. Hence
xi ≤ γ (tσ)i ≤ γ (t1)i < γ (t2)i ≤ x˜i, so σ˜ B σ as claimed. But by the definition of t1, t2 it holds
that ˜(x)i ≤ γ (t1)i < γ (t2)i ≤ γ (tBσ)i , so σ˜ is not cleared before tBσ, contradicting the definition
of tBσ.


















> 0. Then, since there are a finite number of cycles in Σ (γ′), there exists




∈ Σ (γ′) containing a positive η-measure of students in Θ˜. We show
that σ˜ is cleared before σ. Since σ˜ contains a positive η-measure of students in Θ˜, it holds that








for which x˜i ≤ γ′ (t1)i < γ′ (t2)i ≤ ˜(x)i. Hence xi ≤ γ′ (t′σ)i ≤ γ′ (t1)i <








so it follows from the definition of t′Bσ that σ˜ 6∈ ΣBσ, but since we assumed that σ˜ ∈ Σ′ it follows
that σ˜ ∈ Σ′ \ Σ, contradicting assumption B.1 on σ.
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We now show in Claims (B.4) and (B.5) that in both TTC (γ) and TTC (γ′) the cycle σ starts
clearing when students in the cycle σ start clearing. We formalize this in the continuum model by
considering the coordinates of the paths γ, γ′ at the time tσ when the cycle σ starts clearing, and
showing that, for all coordinates indexed by schools in K, this is equal to x.
Claim B.4. γK (tσ) = xK .
Proof. The definition of tσ implies that γ (tσ)i ≥ xi for all i ∈ K. Suppose there exists i ∈ K
such that γ (tσ)i > xi. Since σ starts clearing at time tσ, for all ε > 0 school i must point
to a non-zero measure of students in σ over the time period [tσ, tσ + ε], whose scores rθi satisfy
γ (tσ)i ≥ rθi ≥ γ (tσ + ε)i. For sufficiently small ε the continuity of γ (·) and the assumption that
γ (tσ)i > xi implies that rθi ≥ γ (tσ + ε)i > xi , which contradicts the definition of xi.
Claim B.5. γ′K (t′σ) = xK .
As in the proof of Claim (B.4), the definition of t′σ implies that γ′ (t′σ)i ≥ xi = γ (tσ)i for all
i ∈ K. Since we cannot assume that σ is the cycle that is being cleared at time t′σ in TTC (γ′), the
proof of Claim (B.5) is more complicated than that of the Claim (B.4) and takes several steps.
We rely on the fact that K is a recurrent communication class in TTC (γ), and that all cycles
comparable to σ are already cleared in TTC (γ′). The underlying concept is very simple in the
discrete model, but is complicated in the continuum by the definition of the TTC path in terms of
specific points, as opposed to measures of students, and the need to account for sets of students of
η-measure 0.
Let K= be the set of coordinates in K at which equality holds, γ′ (t′σ)i = γ (tσ)i, and let K> be
the set of coordinates in K where strict inequality holds, γ′ (t′σ)i > γ (tσ)i. It suffices to show that
K> is empty. We do this by showing that under TTC (γ′) at time t′σ, every school in K> points to
a zero density of students, and some school in K= points to a non-zero density of students, and so if
both sets are non-empty this contradicts the marginal trade balance equations. In what follows, let
C denote the set of available schools in TTC (γ) at time tσ, and let C ′ denote the set of available
schools in TTC (γ′) at time t′σ.
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Claim B.6. Suppose that i ∈ K>. Then there exists ε > 0 such that in TTC (γ′), the set of students
pointed to by school i in time [t′σ, t′σ + ε] has η-measure 0, i.e. H˜C
′ (γ′ (t′σ))ib = 0.
Proof. Since i ∈ K> it holds that γ′ (t′σ)i > xi, and since γ′ is continuous, for sufficiently small ε it
holds that γ′ (t′σ + ε)i > xi. Hence the set of students that school i points to in time [t′σ, t′σ + ε] is
a subset of those with score rθi satisfying γ′ (t′σ)i ≥ rθi ≥ γ′ (t′σ + ε)i > xi. By assumption B.1 and
Claim (B.3) any cycle σ˜ clearing some of these students contains at most measure 0 of them, since
σ˜ is cleared after ΣBσ and before σ. Since there is a finite number of such cycles the set of students
has η-measure 0.
Claim B.7. If i ∈ K=, b ∈ K and H˜C (γ (tσ))ib > 0, then H˜C
′ (γ′ (t′σ))ib > 0.
Proof. Since every H˜C (γ′ (t′σ))ib is a positive multiple of H
b|C
i (γ′ (t′σ)), it suffices to show that
H
b|C′
i (γ′ (t′σ)) > 0. Let Σ′− (ε)
def= (γ′ (t′σ)− ε · ei, γ′ (t′σ)]. We first show that for sufficiently small




= Ω (ε). Let Σ− (ε)
def=
(
γ (tσ)− ε · ei, γ (tσ)
]
. Since H˜C (γ (tσ))ib > 0,
it follows from the definition of Hb|Ci (·) that Hb|Ci (x) .= limε→0 1εηb|C (Σ− (ε)) > 0 and hence
ηb|C (Σ− (ε)) = Ω (ε) for sufficiently small ε. Moreover, at most η-measure 0 of the students in Σ− (ε)
are not in the cycle σ. Finally, Σ′− (ε) ⊇ Σ− (ε) \ Σ+ (ε), where Σ+ (ε)
def= (γ (tσ) + ε · ei, γ (tσ)].




) ≥ ηb|C (Σ− (ε))− ηb|C (Σ+ (ε)) = Ω (ε).
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that Hb|C
′
i (γ′ (t′σ)) = limε→0 1εηb|C





= o (ε) for sufficiently small ε. Then there is a school b′ 6= b and type θ ∈ Θb|C∩Θb′|C′
such that there is an η-measure Ω (ε) of students in σ with type θ. Since b′ ∈ C ′ it is available in
TTC (γ′) at time t′σ, and by Claim (B.1) it holds that b′ ∈ K . Moreover, θ ∈ Θb|C implies that θ
prefers school b to all other schools in K, so b = b′, contradiction.
Proof of Claim (B.5). Suppose for the sake of contradiction that K> is nonempty. Since some
students in σ are being cleared in TTC (γ′) at time t′σ, by Claim (B.3) there exists i ∈ K = K=∪K>
and b ∈ K such that H˜C′ (γ′ (t′σ))ib > 0. If i ∈ K> this contradicts Claim (B.6). If i ∈ K=, then
H˜C
′ (γ (tσ))ib > 0 and so by Claim (B.1) H˜C (γ (tσ))ib > 0. Moreover, K = K= ∪K> is a recurrent
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communication class of H˜C (γ (tσ)), so there exists a chain i = i0 − i1 − i2 − · · · − in such that
H˜C (γ (tσ))iiii+1 > 0 for all i < n, ii ∈ K= for all i < n − 1, and in−1 ∈ K>. By Claim (B.7)
H˜C
′ (γ′ (t′σ))iiii+1 > 0 for all i < n. But since in−1 ∈ K>, by Claim (B.6) H˜C
′ (γ (t′σ))in−1in = 0,
which gives the required contradiction.
Proof that Σ = Σ′. We have shown in Claims (B.4) and (B.5) that for our chosen σ = (K,x, x),
it holds that γ (tσ)K = γ′ (t′σ)K = xK . Invoking Claims (B.2) and (B.3) and Lemma B.8 shows
that σ is cleared under both TTC (γ) and TTC (γ′). Hence Σ = Σ′, as required.
Proof of Theorem 4.3
Consider two continuum economies E = (C,Θ, η, q) and E˜ = (C,Θ, η˜, q), where the measures η and
η˜ satisfy the assumptions given in Section 4.3. Suppose also that the measure η and η˜ have total
variation distance ε and have full support. Let γ be a TTC path for economy E , and let γ˜ be a TTC
path for economy E˜ . Consider any school i and any points x = γ (t) ∈ Im (γ) , x˜ = γ˜ (t˜) ∈ Im (γ˜)
such that xi = x˜i, and both are cleared in the first round of their respective TTC runs, t ≤ t(1)
and t˜ ≤ t˜(1). We show that the set of students allocated to school i under TTC (γ) from time 0 to
t differs from the set of students allocated to school i under TTC (γ˜) from time 0 to t˜ by a set of
measure O(ε|C|).
Proposition B.2. Suppose that γ, γ˜ are TTC paths in one round of the continuum economies E
and E˜ respectively, where the set of available schools C is the same in these rounds of TTC (γ) and
TTC (γ′). Suppose also that γ starts and ends at x, y, and γ˜ starts and ends at x˜, y˜, where there
exist j, k ∈ C such that xj = x˜j, yk = y˜k, and xa ≤ x˜a, ya ≤ y˜a for all a ∈ C. Then for all i ∈ C,
the set of students with ranks in (y, x] ∩ (y˜, x˜]who are assigned to i under TTC (γ) and not under
TTC (γ˜) has measure O (ε |C|).13
Proof. By Lemma B.3, we may assume without loss of generality that γ and γ˜ are parametrized
such that x = γ (0) , y = γ (1) and x˜ = γ˜ (0) , y˜ = γ˜ (1), and for all times τ ∈ [0, 1] there exists a
school i (τ) such that γ (τ) is dominated by γ˜ (τ) via school i (τ).
13This is according to both measures η and η˜.
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Let Ti = {τ ≤ 1 : i (τ) = i} be the times when γ is dominated by γ˜ via school i. We remark
that, by our construction in Lemma B.3, we may assume that Ti is the countable union of disjoint
closed intervals, and that if i 6= i′ then Ti and Ti′ have disjoint interiors.
Since γ is a TTC path for E and γ˜ is a TTC path for E˜ , by integrating over the marginal trade
balance equations we can show that the following trade balance equations hold,




for all i ∈ C. (B.1)




for all i ∈ C. (B.2)
Since γ is dominated by γ˜ via school j at all times τ ∈ Tj , we have that
Tj (γ;Tj) ⊆ Tj (γ˜;Tj) . (B.3)
Moreover, by the choice of parametrization, ∪jTj = [0, 1] and so, since x ≤ x˜,
∪i,j T i|C (γ;Tj) ⊇ ∪i,jT i|C (γ˜;Tj) . (B.4)
Now since η, η˜ have total variation ε, for every school i it holds that
η
(










+ ε (by (B.4))
= η (Ti (γ;Ti))− η˜ (Ti (γ˜;Ti)) + ε (by (B.1) and (B.2))
≤ 2ε (by (B.3)), (B.5)
Also, for all schools i 6= j, since η has full support and bounded density ν ∈ [m,M ], it holds that
η
(










Hence, as Tj have disjoint interiors,
η
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That is, given a school i, the set of students assigned to school i with score rθ 6≤ x under γ and
not assigned to school i with score rθ 6≤ x˜ under γ˜ has η-measure O (ε |C|). The result for η˜ follows
from the fact that the total variation distance of η and η˜ is ε.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Assume without loss of generality that the schools are labeled in order. Let
σ be a permutation such that if we reindex school σ (i) to be school i then the schools are labeled
in order under TTC (γ˜). We show by induction on ` that σ (`) = ` and that for all schools i, the
set of students assigned to i under TTC (γ) by the end of the `th round and not under TTC (γ˜)
by the end of the `th round has η-measure O (ε` |C|). This will prove the theorem.




. Define y˜ ∈ Im (γ˜)






∣∣∣y˜ − γ˜ (t˜(1))∣∣∣
2
= O (ε). Now by Proposition B.2 the set of students with ranks in
(y, γ (0)] ∩ (y˜, γ (0)] who are assigned to 1 under TTC (γ) and not under TTC (γ˜) has η˜-measure
O (ε |C|). Hence the residual capacity of school 1 at y˜ under TTC (γ˜) is O (ε |C|), and so since







. (If the residual capacity is negative we can exchange the roles of γ
and γ˜ and argue similarly.)
Let us now show that the inductive assumption holds. Fix a school i. Then by Proposition
B.2 the set of students with ranks in (y, γ (0)]∩ (y˜, γ (0)] who are assigned to i under TTC (γ) and
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not under TTC (γ˜) has η˜-measure O (ε |C|). Moreover, since








has full support and has density bounded from above and below by M and m, the set of students




] assigned to school i by TTC (γ˜) has η˜-measure O (ε |C|). Hence the set
of students assigned to i under TTC (γ) by time t(1) and not under TTC (γ˜) by time t˜(1) has η-
measure O (ε |C|). Moreover, if t(1) < t(2) then for sufficiently small ε it holds that t˜(1) = mini t˜(i),
and otherwise there exists a relabeling of the schools such that this is true, and so σ (1) = 1.
We now show the inductive step, proving for ` + 1 assuming true for 1, 2, . . . , `. By inductive
assumption, for all i the measure of students assigned to i under TTC (γ) and not under TTC (γ˜)








is O (ε` |C|) for all i.








. Define x˜ ∈ Im (γ˜) to be the minimal point such that x ≤ x˜







= O (ε). Now
by inductive assumption η
({















∣∣∣x˜b − γ˜b (t˜(`))∣∣∣2 = ∣∣∣xb − γ˜b (t˜(`))∣∣∣2 which we have just shown is O (ε). Finally,









and so for all i it holds that
∣∣∣x˜i − γ˜i (t˜(`))∣∣∣ ≤ O (Mm ε).
The remainder of the proof runs much the same as in the base case, with slight adjustments to
account for the fact that x 6= x˜. Define y˜ ∈ Im (γ˜) to be the minimal point such that y ≤ y˜ and





∣∣∣y˜ − γ˜ (t˜(`+1))∣∣∣
2
= O (ε).
Now by Proposition B.2 the set of students with ranks in (y, x] ∩ (y˜, x˜] who are assigned to ` + 1
under TTC (γ) and not under TTC (γ˜) has η˜-measure O (ε |C|). This, together with the inductive
assumption that the difference in students assigned to school ` is O (ε` |C|), shows that the residual
capacity of school ` + 1 at y˜ under TTC (γ˜) is O (ε (`+ 1) |C|), and so since η˜ has full support
and has density bounded from above and below by M and m, it holds that






m ε (`+ 1) |C|
)
. (If the residual capacity is negative we can exchange the roles of γ and γ˜ and
argue similarly.)
Let us now show that the inductive assumption holds. Fix a school i. Then by Proposition B.2
the set of students with ranks in (y, x]∩ (y˜, x˜] who are assigned to i under TTC (γ) and not under
TTC (γ˜) has η˜-measure O (ε |C|). Moreover, since









full support and has density bounded from above and below by M and m, the set of students with




] assigned to school i by TTC (γ˜) has η˜-measure O (ε (`+ 1) |C|). Hence the
set of students assigned to i under TTC (γ) by time t(`+1) and not under TTC (γ˜) by time t˜(`+1)
has η-measure O (ε (`+ 1) |C|). Moreover if t(`+1) < t(`+2) then for sufficiently small ε it holds that
t˜(`+1) = mini>` t˜(i), and otherwise there exists a relabeling of the schools such that this is true, and
so σ (`+ 1) = `+ 1.
B.2 Omitted Proofs for Section 4.4
B.2.1 Derivation of Marginal Trade Balance Equations
In this section, we show that the marginal trade balance equations (4.2) hold,
∑
k∈C
γ′k (τ) ·H ik (x) =
∑
k∈C
γ′i (τ) ·Hki (x) .
The idea is that the measure of students who trade into a school i must be equal to the measure
of students who trade out of i.
In particular, suppose that at some time τ the TTC algorithm has assigned exactly the set
of students with rank better than x = γ (τ), and the set of available schools is C. Consider the
incremental step of a TTC path γ from γ(τ) = x over  units of time. The process of cycle clearing
imposes that for any school i ∈ C, the total amount of seats offered by school i from time τ to
τ +  is equal to the amount of students assigned to i plus the amount of seats that were offered but
not claimed or traded by the student it was over to over that same time period. In the continuum
model the set of seats offered but not claimed or traded is of η-measure 0.14 Hence the set of
students assigned to school i from time τ to τ +  has the same measure as the set of students who
14A student can have a seat that is offered but not claimed or traded in one of two ways. The first is the seat is
offered at time τ and not yet claimed or traded. The second is that the student that got offered two or more seats
at the same time τ ′ ≤ τ (and was assigned through a trade involving only one seat). Both of these sets of students
are of η-measure 0 under our assumptions.
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were offered a seat at school i in that time,
η
({












T i|C (γ; [τ, τ + ])
)
= η (Ti (γ; [τ, τ + ])) . (B.7)
We now prove that the marginal trade balance equations follow from equation (B.7). Following






θ ∈ Θj|C | rθ ∈ [x− αei, x)
}
.
We may think of T j|Ci (x, α) as the set of the next α students on school i’s priority list who are
unassigned when γ (τ) = x, and want school j. We remark that the sets used in the definition of
the Hj|Ci (x) are precisely the sets T
j|C
i (x, α).
We can use the sets T j|Ci (x, α) to approximate the expressions in equation (B.7) involving
Ti (γ; ·) and T i|C (γ; ·).
Lemma B.9. Let γ (τ) = x and for all  > 0 let δ () = γ (τ)− γ(τ + ). For sufficiently small ,
during the interval [τ, τ + ], the set of students who were assigned to school i is





j (x, δj ())
and the set of students who were offered a seat at school i is












for some small set ∆ ⊂ Θ. Further, it holds that lim
τ→0
1








i (x, δi ()) ∩ T k|Ci′ (x, δi′ ())
)
= 0 and T k|Ci (x, δi (τ)) ∩ T k
′|C
i (x, δi ()) = φ.
15We use the notation [x, x) = {z ∈ Rn | xi ≤ zi < xi ∀i } for x, x ∈ Rn, and ei ∈ RC is a vector whose i-th
coordinate is equal to 1 and all other coordinates are 0.
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Proof. The first two equations are easily verified, and the fact that the last intersection is empty is





i (x, δi ()) ∩ T k|Ci′ (x, δi′ ())
)







i (x, δi ()) ∩ T k|Ci′ (x, δi′ ())
)
=





i (x, δi ()) ∩ T k|Ci′ (x, δi′ ())
)
≤M |γi(τ)− γi (τ + )| |γi′(τ)− γi′ (τ + )| .










i (x, δi ()) ∩ T k|Ci′ (x, δi′ ())
)
≤MLiLi′
for some Lipschitz constants Li and Li′ and the lemma follows.
We now now ready to take limits and verify that equation (B.7) implies that the marginal trade
balance equations hold. Let us divide equation (B.7) by δi () = γi (τ) − γi (τ + ) and take the






































































·Hi|Cj (x) (by definition of δ and H)









































































i (x) (by definition of δ and H)
as required. This completes the proof.
B.3 Omitted Proofs for Applications (Section 4.5)
Throughout this section, we will say that a vector d is a valid direction at point x if d satisfies the
marginal trade balance equations at x, and d · 1 = −1. We will also augment the notation from
Section 4.3 to specify the economy. Specifically, for an economy E = (C,Θ, η, q) let
Di (x|E) = η
({
θ | rθ 6< x, Chθ (C) = i
})
denote the mass of students whose rank at some school j is better than xj and whose first choice
is school i.
Effects of Changes in the Distribution of School Quality
In this section, we prove the results stated in Section 4.5.1. We will assume that the total measure
of students is 1, and speak of student measures and student proportions interchangeably.










be the TTC path, cutoffs and stopping times.
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For each x ∈ [0, 1]2 let d (x) (resp. dˆ (x)) denote the valid direction at x under Eδ (resp. Eδˆ)
with support that is minimal under the order {1} < {1, 2} < {2}. As there are only two schools,
|d1 (x)| ≥
∣∣∣dˆ1 (x)∣∣∣ and |d2 (x)| ≤ ∣∣∣dˆ2 (x)∣∣∣ for all x.16 It follows that γˆ moves faster in the 2 direction

















Hence without loss of generality we may assume that the time parameters in the TTC paths are
scaled so that at all times t the path γˆ is dominated by γ via school 1, i.e. γ1 (t) = γˆ1 (t) and
γ2 (t) ≥ γˆ2 (t) for all t (see Appendix (B.1)).








. We may interpret
this as it becoming more difficult to use priority at school 2 to trade into 1 after 2 gets more
popular. We will show that this will also result in more students being assigned under γ by time
t(1) than under γˆ by time tˆ(1). But since school 1 is also more popular under E this means that




, which gives the required
contradiction.


























, where the equality comes from the assumption that γˆ is dominated by γ via school 1 at








































and the second inequality holds since
δˆ2 ≥ δ2 and δˆ1 = δ1.
We now show that p11 ≥ pˆ11, i.e. it becomes easier to use priority at school 1 to be assigned to








. We will use
the marginal trade balance equations to show that this means more students traded into school 1
under γ by time t(1) than under γˆ by time tˆ(1), which gives the required contradiction.













16Note that by definition valid directions have norm 1.
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where the first containment follows from the fact that t(1) > tˆ(1) and the second containment follows
from the fact that γˆ is dominated by γ via school 1, and so fewer students are offered/trade away
seats at school 1 by time tˆ(1) under γˆ than under γ.
Moreover, integrating over the marginal trade balance equations gives that under both paths,
the set of students who traded a seat at 2 for a seat at 1 has the same measure as the set of students
































|Chθ {1, 2} = 2
})
. (B.9)























































which gives the required contradiction.
The fact that pˆ22 ≥ p22 follows from the fact that pˆ11 ≤ p11 decreases, since the total number of
assigned students is the same.
Proof of Proposition 4.5.
In the logit economy we assume that the total measure of students is normalized to 1, and that
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∑
i qi < 1. Recall that we also assume that all students prefer all schools to being unassigned. Note
that the logit economy yields that P
(










≤ · · · ≤ qn
eδn
. This holds since









and if the schools are labeled in order then q1
eδ1
= mini qieδi . The other inequalities
hold by induction, since in any round with remaining schools C and i ∈ C the choice probabilities
yield that a fraction eδi∑
k∈C e
δk
of the students assigned to schools in C are assigned to school i so
again for all i, j ∈ C the ratio of students assigned to schools j and i respectively in that round (or




This also shows that Ri = 1 − ∑i′<i qi′ − piceδi qi is the measure of unassigned, or remaining,




qi students are assigned to school i.
TTC Cutoffs We calculate the TTC cutoffs under the logit economy for different student
choice probabilities by using the TTC paths and trade balance equations. We show by induction













i′≥i eδi′ , R0 = 1 and for all i ≥ 1 the quantity Ri = 1−
∑
i′<i qi′ − piieδi qi is the measure




where qi−1 = δi−1 = 0, then
Ri−1 −Ri = − pii−1
eδi−1











′−1 −Ri′ = 1−Ri.
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Consider the base case i = 1. In round 1, the marginals H ij (x) for i, j ∈ C at each point x ∈ [0, 1]





i′ 6=j xi′ . As the valid directions d = d (x) solve the marginal trade











Now the vector d (x) defined by
di (x) = − e
δixi∑
j∈C eδjxj
clearly satisfies both the marginal trade balance equations and the normalization d (x) · 1 = −1.
Moreover since H (x) is irreducible this is the unique valid direction d.
We now find a valid TTC path γ using the trade balance equations (4.2). Since the ratios of
the components of the gradient dj(x)di(x) only depend on xj , xi and the δi′ , for all i we solve for xi in
terms of x1, using the marginal trade balance equations and the fact that the path starts at 1.




= xeδi−δ11 for all i.
























for at least one




















i′≥1 eδi′ . This completes the base case.
For the inductive step, suppose that Equation (B.10) holds for the cutoffs in rounds 1, 2, . . . , i−1.
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Consider the residual TTC path during the ith round and let it be denoted by γ˜. For all j ≥ i
let xj = γ˜j (t). Recall that by definition γ˜j (t) = pi−1j = p
j
j for all j < i and t ≥ t(i−1). The
residual TTC path is non-constant only for schools j in the set C(i) = {i, i+ 1, . . . , n}, and the





. Therefore we can solve for xj in terms of xi , using the fact that the path starts at












where the first equality is obtained by integrating over the marginal trade balance equations and
providing the initial conditions, and the second equality holds by substituting in the values of pi−1









= pjj for all j < i.






















= Ri−1 −Ri, (B.11)




for at least one school


























































TTC Cutoffs - Comparative Statics We perform some comparative statics calculations
for the TTC cutoffs under the logit model. For j 6= ` it holds that the TTC cutoff p1j for using





















+ 1(1− ρ1pi1) − 1
]
is negative, since 0 < 1(1−ρ1pi1) < 1 and f (x) = x− ln (x)− 1 is positive for x ∈ [0, 1].





























(1− ρ1pi1) − 1
)
is negative since both terms are negative.
Similarly, for i < ` and j ≥ i the TTC cutoff pij is decreasing in δ`. We first show that this
holds for i < ` and j ≥ i, j 6= ` by showing that 1
eδj



























































































































where the last inequality holds since for all k the first term is negative, and the second term








where fk (x) = (1−
∑
i′<k qi′) 1x + ln (x) has negative derivative
f ′k (x) ≤ 0 for all x ≤ (1−
∑
i′<k qi′), and Rk ≤ Rk−1 < (1−
∑

































where the last inequality holds since pii < 1 and we have shown that ∂∂δ`
[
ln pii
] ≤ 0 .






































































where the first term is positive since p`j < 1 (from which it follows that lnR` −
∑
i′<` ln (p) < 0),
and the second term is positive since ∂R`∂δ` =
pi`+1
(eδ`)2 q` > 0 and we have shown that for all i






Proof of Proposition 4.6.
Welfare Expressions We derive the welfare expressions corresponding to these cutoffs. Let




≤ · · · ≤ qn
eδn
, it follows that
the schools also fill in the order 1, 2, . . . , n.
Suppose that the total mass of students is 1. Then the mass of students with budget set C(1)



























= ρ2pi2. A straightforward inductive











which depends only on δj for j ≥ i− 1.
Moreover, each such student with budget set C(i), conditional on their budget set, has expected
utility Small and Rosen (1981)










 = ln (pii) ,
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· U i +
∑
i≤`













Proof of Proposition 4.7. We solve for the social welfare maximixing budget allocation. For a fixed




≤ · · · ≤ qn
eδn






















































































































and so ∂U∂κk ≥ 0∀k.
Moreover, if qi−1κi−1 =
qi
κi




qj if j < i− 1
qi−1 + qi if j = i− 1
qj+1 if j > i− 1
, κ˜j =

κj if j < i− 1
κi−1 + κi if j = i− 1
κj+1 if j > i− 1




































Hence if there exists i for which qiκi 6=
qi−1
κi−1 , we may take i to be minimal such that this occurs,
decrease each of κ1, . . . , κi−1 proportionally so that κ1 + · · ·+κi−1 decreases by ε and increase κi by
ε and increase the resulting value of the objective. It follows that the objective is maximized when
q1
κ1
= q2κ2 = · · · =
qn
κn
, i.e. when the money assigned to each school is proportional to the number of
seats at the school.
Design of TTC Priorities
We demonstrate how to calculate the TTC cutoffs for the two economies in Figure 4.14 by using
the TTC paths and trade balance equations.
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Consider the economy E , where the top priority students have ranks uniformly distributed in
[m, 1]2. If x = (x1, x1) is on the diagonal, then H˜ji (x) = x12 for all i, j ∈ {1, 2}, and so there is
a unique valid direction d (~x) =
 −12
−12
. Moreover, γ (t) = ( t2 , t2) satisfies dγ(t)dt = d (γ (t)) for all







is the unique TTC path. The cutoff points
satisfy p11 = p12 = p21 = p22 = p for some constant p, and (by symmetry) the capacity equations
D1 (p) = D2 (p) = q for p = (p, p). Since D1 (p) +D2 (p) = 1− p2, it follows that 1− p2 = 2q, or
p =
√
1− 2q. The cutoff points pcb =
√
1− 2q give the unique TTC allocation.
Consider now the economy E , where top priority students have ranks uniformly distributed in
the r˜ × r˜ square (1− r˜, 1]× (m,m+ r˜] for some small r˜, where r˜ ≤ (2m−1)(1−m)2m .




∀j and Hj2 (x) = m2 ∀j, so






 . If x is in (m, 1− r˜]×(m, 1] then
Hji (x) = m2 for all i, j and there is a unique valid direction d (x) =
 −12
−12
. Finally, if x = (x1, x2)
is in [0, 1] \ (m, 1]2 then Hj1 (x) = 12x2 and Hj2 = 12x1 for all j and there is a unique valid direction




Hence the TTC path γ (t) has gradient proportional to
 −1
−1− (1−m)2r˜m
 from the point (1, 1) to
the point
(


































by observing that 12
(




















We now show that the economy E is extremal, i.e. if economy E ′ is given by perturbing the
relative ranks of students in
{
θ | rθc ≥ m ∀c
}
, then the TTC cutoffs for E ’ are given by p11 = p21 =
x, p12 = p22 = y where x ≤ p =
√
1−2q
1−2m+2m2 and y ≥ p =
√
(1− 2q) (1− 2m+ 2m2). (By symmetry,
it follows that p ≤ x, y ≤ p.)
Let γ and γ′ be the TTC paths for E and E ′ respectively. Let (xbound,m) be the point where the
TTC path γ′ first hits the boundary of the box [m, 1]× [m, 1] containing all the highly ranked stu-




to the TTC cutoffs (x, y).
Consider the aggregate trade balance equations for students assigned before the TTC path
reaches (xbound,m). They stipulate that the measure of students in [0,m]× [m, 1] who prefer school
1 is at most the measure of students who are either perturbed or in [xbound, 1]×[0,m], and who prefer
school 2. This means that 12m (1−m) ≤ 12
(
(1−m)2 +m (1− xbound)
)
, or xbound ≤ m+ (1−m)
2
m . It
follows that γ′ hits the boundary of the box at a point that is to the left of where γ hits the boundary
box, and hence the path γ′ lies above the path γ.17 It follows that x ≤ p and y ≥ 1−2qp = p.
17That is, for each x′, if (x′, y′) lies on γ′ and (x′, y) lies on γ, then y′ ≥ y.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 5
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C.1 Regret-Free Mechanisms in Extensive Form
In this section, we provide three extensive-form game descriptions of regret-free mechanisms. We
first define general mechanisms as extensive-form dynamic games of imperfect information. We
note that as regret-free mechanisms are incentive-compatible, we may restrict our attention to
direct mechanisms, where students need only report either their type, or given a set of schools to
inspect need only inspect that set of schools and truthfully report their inspected values. We then
formally define choice-based messages, where we restrict the messages from students to be only
choice-based information about their own preferences, such as choice functions and partial orders,
and we restrict the actions and messages of the mechanism designer to use only the choice-based
information. Finally, we formally define Accept-Waitlist-Reject (AWR) mechanisms, which restrict
the mechanism designer to only tell students which schools will definitely be in their budget set,
which schools definitely will not, and which schools are uncertain.
C.1.1 General Mechanisms
We formally define general mechanisms as dynamic games of incomplete information. There is a
set of players: s ∈ S, possible actions: a ∈ A, and possible messages m ∈ M. There is a set of
nodes Z, with initial node z0 and terminal nodes T . At each node z ∈ Z there is a message history
Mz = {Msz}s∈S ; at each non-terminal node there is a set of active students S (z) who are sent
new messages {ιsz = ιs (Mz)}s∈S(z). At each node z every student has private information about
their history hsz = ({asz′ ,Msz′ , ιsz′}) of their actions. These actions result in inspections χ = χsz and
values vs|χ, which are also privately known to the student.
There is a partition H={H1, H2, . . .} of the nodes into information sets, which represent the
information available to the students. Each student s has a partition Hs = {Hs1 , . . .} such that
any two nodes z, z′ are in the same information set (i.e. z, z′ ∈ Hsi ) for some i if and only if,
up to relabeling of other students, they have the same information state Msz = Msz′ and history
hsz = hsz′ Note that for a given student s the mechanism designer only knows rs as well asMs, and






then they are indistinguishable to the mechanism
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designer at node z. Each information set Hi has a set of active students S = S (Hi) of positive
measure such that s ∈ S ⇒ Hi ∈ Hs and if two students s, s′ are indistinguishable to the mechanism
designer at any node z ∈ Hi then s ∈ S ⇔ s′ ∈ S.
The available actions As (Hi) ⊆ A for the set of active students s ∈ S (Hi) at an information
set Hi are as follows. Students first inspect some subset of uninspected schools {i : χsz = 0}, where
the subset can be adaptively chosen based on the observed values of other schools inspected at that
node. Students then report a message m to the mechanism.
At terminal nodes z ∈ T the mechanism outputs a matching µz and inspections χz, where χsz
is consistent with history hsz.
We let Σs denote the set of strategies for student s, i.e. an action a ∈ As (Hi) for each history
Hi such that s ∈ S (Hi).
Definition C.1. We say that a general mechanism is regret-free stable if at all terminal nodes
z = (µz, χz) ∈ T the matching µz is regret-free stable with any underlying economy consistent with
the mechanism designer’s current information stateMz, and χz = χRFz (µ|·).
C.1.2 Choice-Based Mechanisms
We formally define choice-based mechanisms as dynamic games of incomplete information as follows.
There is a set of players s ∈ S, possible actions, a ∈ A, and possible messages m ∈ M. The
main restriction of a choice-based mechanism is thatM is restricted to be the set of choice-based
information states I = {s}s∈S . There is a set of nodes Z, with initial node z0, and terminal
nodes T . At each node z ∈ Z there is a partial message history, given by a single choice-based
information state Iz = {sz}s∈S ; at each non-terminal node there is a set of active students S (z)
who are sent new messages {ιsz = ιs (Iz)}s∈S(z) based on the information state Iz. At each node
each student has private information about their history hsz = ({asz′ , Isz′ , ιsz′}) of actions. These
actions result in inspections χ = χsz and values vs|χ, which are also privately known to the student.
There is a H={H1, H2, . . .} of the nodes into information sets. Each student s has a partition
Hs = {Hs1 , . . .} such that any two nodes z, z′ are in the same information set z, z′ ∈ Hsi for some
i if and only if, up to relabeling of other students, they have the same choice-based information
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state Isz = Isz′ and history hsz = hsz′ . Note that for a given student s the mechanism designer







indistinguishable to the mechanism designer at node z. Each information set Hi has: (1) a set of
active students S = S (Hi) of positive measure such that s ∈ S ⇒ Hi ∈ Hs and if two students s, s′
are indistinguishable to the mechanism designer at any node z ∈ Hi then s ∈ S ⇔ s′ ∈ S; and (2)
a set of schools c (Hi).
The available actions As (Hi) ⊆ A for the set of active students s ∈ S (Hi) at an information set
Hi are as follows. Students first inspect some subset of uninspected schools {i : χsz = 0} in c (Hi),
where the subset can be adaptively chosen based on the observed values of other schools inspected
at that node. Students then report a refinement of sz, which encodes their choice of schools in
that set.
At terminal nodes z ∈ T the mechanism outputs a matching µz and inspections χz, where χsz
is consistent with history hsz
We let Σs denote the set of strategies for student s, i.e. an action a ∈ As (Hi) for each history
Hi such that s ∈ S (Hi).
Definition C.2. We say that a choice-based mechanism is regret-free stable if at all terminal
nodes z = (µz, χz) ∈ T the matching µz is regret-free stable with any underlying economy consistent
with the mechanism designer’s current information state Iz, and χz = χRFz (µ|·)
C.1.3 Accept-Watilist-Reject Mechanisms
We formally define Accept-Waitlist-Reject (AWR) mechanisms as dynamic games of incomplete
information as follows.
There is a set of players s ∈ S, possible actions, a ∈ A, and possible messages m ∈ M. The
main restriction of an AWR mechanism is thatM is restricted to be the set messages of the form
C{A,W,R} ∪ C, where each element of C{A,W,R} oncodes a possible message from the mechanism to
a student about the set of schools that accept them (A) as the school is definitely in their budget
set, waitlist them (L) as the school may or may not be in their budget set, or reject them (R)
as the school is definitely not in their budget set. There is a set of nodes Z, with initial node
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z0, and terminal nodes T . At each node z ∈ Z there is a partial message history mz, given by
a single element mz ∈ MS , with msz representing the last message sent between the mechanism





s∈S(z) based on the message history mz. At each node each student
has private information about their history hsz = ({asz′ ,msz′ , ιsz′}) of actions. These actions result in
inspections χ = χsz and values vs|χ, which are also privately known to the student.
There is a H={H1, H2, . . .} of the nodes into information sets. Each student s has a partition
Hs = {Hs1 , . . .} such that any two nodes z, z′ are in the same information set z, z′ ∈ Hsi for some i
if and only if they have the same history hsz = hsz′ . Note that for a given student s the mechanism









are indistinguishable to the mechanism designer at node z. Each information set Hi has: (1) a set
of active students S = S (Hi) of positive measure such that s ∈ S ⇒ Hi ∈ Hs and msz ∈ C{A,W,R},
and if two students s, s′ are indistinguishable to the mechanism designer at any node z ∈ Hi then
s ∈ S ⇔ s′ ∈ S; and (2) a message in mz ∈ C{A,W,R} for those students.
The available actions As (Hi) ⊆ A for the set of active students s ∈ S (Hi) at an information
set Hi are as follows. Students first inspect some subset of uninspected schools {i : χsz = 0} such
that i accepts them (i.e. the element of msz corresponding to school i is A), where the subset can be
adaptively chosen based on the observed values of other schools inspected at that node. Students
then report their favorite school i ∈ A.
At terminal nodes z ∈ T the mechanism outputs a matching µz and inspections χz, where χsz
is consistent with history hsz
We let Σs denote the set of strategies for student s, i.e. an action a ∈ As (Hi) for each history
Hi such that s ∈ S (Hi). Note that in an AWR mechanism each student will be an active student
at a node exactly once.
Definition C.3. We say that an AWR mechanism is regret-free stable if at all terminal nodes
z = (µz, χz) ∈ T the matching µz is regret-free stable with any underlying economy consistent with
the mechanism designer’s current information state Iz, and χz = χRFz (µ|·)
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C.2 Examples demonstrating Impossibility of Regret-Free Stable
Mechanisms
We now demonstrate that standard mechanisms can fail spectacularly in learing market-clearing
cutoffs and alleviating the costs associated with information acquisition. Intuitively, in choice-based
mechanisms students need to know other students’ choices in order to determine their optimal in-
spection strategy, and so in general the student who performs the ’first’ inspection will incur addi-
tional inspections costs. Standard Deferred Acceptance mechanisms, which are played as one-shot
games where students submit their full preference lists, perform especially poorly, as students are
given almost no information about their choices before deciding on their inspection strategy. While
in some settings regret can be eliminated by allowing for multi-round mechanisms, we prove the
stronger result that for general economies even multiple-round mechanisms must either incur regret,
or create an information deadlock, where every student waits for others to acquire information first.
C.2.1 Direct One-Shot Mechanisms
To demonstrate the issues in computing regret-free stable matchings, let us first consider the case
where all students are willing to inspect any school as long as it is in their budget set. We may
view this as a setting where the costs affect which schools students are willing to inspect, but not
the order in which they are willing to inspect them. It is clear that the standard implementation of
Deferred Acceptance as a one-shot game will not be regret-free even for such students, as students’
budget sets will depend on the preferences of other students, and so students who have low priority
at the schools they prefer are likely to incur regret. We illustrate this in the following example.
Example C.1. Consider a discrete economy E = (C,S, q) with n students and n schools each with
capacity qi = 1. Suppose that school priorities are perfectly aligned, i.e. rsi = rsj for all s ∈ S,
i, j ∈ C, and students have random preferences and are willing to incur the cost to attend any
school. Such demand can be rationalized e.g. by the priors F si (x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1), F si (x) = 14




and costs csi = 1 for all s ∈ S.
In any one-shot choice-based mechanism, a student s will have no regret only if she chooses to
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examine precisely the set of all schools not selected by higher-ranked students. This is because a
student is willing to incur the cost to examine any school if and only if it is in her budget set. As
student preferences are random, the probability that every student other than the highest-ranked






)n−1 → 1e all n − 1. The example
can also be modified so that with probability → 1e a proportion → 1 of students incur unbounded
regret.1
This example demonstrates that single-shot choice-based mechanisms cannot hope to find regret-
free stable matchings, even in settings where students are willing to incur the costs of searching
any number of schools, due to their inability to coordinate the students’ search.
C.2.2 Impossibility of Student-Optimal Regret-Free Stable Mechanisms
In this section we provide an example demonstrating that even in settings where it is possible
to implement a regret-free stable choice-based mechanism, it may be impossible to verify that a
matching is student-optimal without incurring regret.
Example C.2. Consider an economy E with two schools C = {1, 2} with capacities q1 = q2 = 1
and 2 students S = {x, y}.2
Suppose that school priorities are given by
priority at 1 : ry1 > rx1
priority at 2 : rx2 > r
y
2 .






= 12k for all k > 1 and P (v
s





k∈N, i.e. with priors F
s
i (x) = 0





1For each bound K the example can be modified so that with probability → 1
e
all n− 1 students other than the
top priority student incur regret at least K times their utility.
2Strictly speaking, as we assumed that there are more students than seats, the economy should have three students
S={x, y, d} where d is a dummy student who has lower priority at every school than the students in {x, y} and who
has arbitrary preferences. For simplicity we omit these students in the description of the economy; however note that
the proof applies as written to both economies.
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that student costs for inspection are given by cx1 = c
y
2 = 1 and cx2 = c
y
1 = 2. As E [(vsi − v)] = ∞
for all s, i and v ∈ R it follows that both students’ optimal strategies are to inspect all the schools
that are available to them.3
Note that the matching µ = µschool defined by (µ (x) , µ (y)) = (2, 1) is always regret-free
stable, and is the school-optimal regret-free stable matching. Let µ′ = µstudent be defined by
(µ′ (x) , µ′ (y)) = (1, 2). We will consider two separate events. Let X denote the event that vx1 =
vy2 = 2 and vx2 = v
y
1 = 4. Let X ′ denote the event that vx1 , v
y
2 > 4 and vx2 = v
y
1 (ω) = 4. Note
that µschool is the student-optimal regret-free stable matching subject to event X, as both x and
y obtain their highest valued schools, and that µstudent is the student-optimal regret-free stable
matching subject to event X ′, as both x and y again obtain their highest valued schools.






Furthermore, vx2 = v
y
1 (ω) = 4 in either event. Thus, conditional on one of the events X or X ′
occurring, the only way to distinguish which event occurred is for student x to inspect school 1 or
student y to inspect school 2.
We now first demonstrate why the existence of such X and X ′ shows that we cannot verify
student-optimality in a regret-free manner. Note that if µ = µschool is the student-optimal regret-
free stable matching then each school is assigned their top choice student, and so based on school
preferences alone there are no blocking pairs and the corresponding student budget sets are Bµ (x) =
{2} , Bµ (y) = {1}. Hence under χRF (µ|·) student x only inspects school 2, and student y only
inspects school 1. However, if µ′ = µstudent is the student-optimal regret-free stable matching then
under χRF (µ′|·) both students inspect both schools. Thus, since it is impossible to distinguish
between events X and X ′ without requiring either student x to inspect school 1 or student y to
inspect school 2, one of these inspections must occur in the event X ∨X ′ in order to determine the
student-optimal regret-free stable matching, which incurs regret under event X. In other words,
it is impossible to verify that µschool is the student-optimal regret-free stable matching without
incurring regret. Since X has positive probability, we conclude that it is impossible to verify that
3It is simple to extend this example so that vsi (·) is continuous random variable with continuous density by






the student-optimal regret-free stable matching is student-optimal without incurring regret with
positive probability.
C.3 Estimating Regret-Free Stable Cutoffs
C.3.1 Continuity and Convergence of Market-Clearing Cutoffs
We first define a metric on the space of economies and on the space of stable matchings. Fix a set




converges to the continuum economy E = (η, q) if ηk converges in the weak sense to η, and qk → q.
We define the distance between stable matchings to be the distance between their associated cutoffs,
d (µ, µ′) = maxP,P ′:M(P )=µ,M(P ′)=µ′ ‖P − P ′‖.4 Given a finite economy E = (C, S, q) define the
continuum economy Φ (E) = (C,S, η, q) by taking the distribution η defined by
η
({
s ∈ S | θs = θt, vsi ∈
{
vti (ω) |ω ∈ X
}})
= 1|S|p (X) ∀t ∈ S, X ⊆ Ω.
We may think of this as first taking the empirical distribution ∑t∈S 1|S|δt and then changing the
point distribution δt for student t to mirror the possible distribution of values vt. We say that a




converge to E .
Theorem C.1. Suppose the continuum economy E admits a unique regret-free stable matching
µ. Then the regret-free stable matching correspondence mapping economies to regret-free stable
matchings is continuous at E within the set of continuum economies.
Proof. The theorem follows from the analogous result in Azevedo and Leshno (2016) as well as
observing that the set of regular measures is open.
Theorem C.2. Suppose the continuum economy E admits a unique regret-free stable matching µ,
and has a C1 demand function that is non-singular at the market-clearing cutoffs (i.e. ∂D (P ∗)
4Note that if E is the embedding of a finite economy then there are many cutoffs that give the same matching µ.
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be a randomly drawn finite economy, with k students drawn








0, ∂D (P ∗)−1 · Σq · ∂D (P ∗)−T
)
,




−qiqj if i 6= j
qi (1− qi) if i = j.
Theorem C.2 shows that the estimated cutoffs P k are normally distributed around P ∗, and
follows directly from the analogous result in Azevedo and Leshno (2016). Another interpretation is
that given and underlying population η and cutoffs P ∗, if demand is given by sampling k students
from η then the resulting market-clearing cutoffs P k will be normally distributed around P ∗.















Let X be a random variable that gives a student randomly drawn according to η with cor-
responding demand DX , and with probability αα+1 and
1
α+1 assigns them to be a ’past’ stu-
dent and ’present’ student respectively. Let m (X,P ) = 1 {X is ’past’}
(
DX (P )− q
)
and let
g (X, q, P ) = 1 {X is ’present’}
(
DX (P )− q
)
. Note that as bqkc − qk ≤ 1k it follows that
√
kPˆ
converges in distribution to
√




def= ∑(α+1)ki=1 αα+1 (D(Xi)(Pˆ ′)k − q) =
0. Note also that similarly
√




















d→ N (0, V ), where
V = (1 + α)var
(














and cov (g (·) ,m (·))=0, this








= (1+α)α Σq as required.
C.3.2.2 Example 5.3
We first show that the outcome (µ, χ) after both rounds is regret-free stable with respect to realized
demand qˆk. It suffices to show that for all students s ∈ Sf (E) with free market information it




. Now since s ∈ Sf (E) it holds that ∀i rsi 6∈
⌈
1−∑j qj , 1− qi), and
her first-round budget set is Bs = {i | rsi ≥ 1− qi}. Moreover, if i ∈ Bs then if µ (i) = qi it follows








then 1 − rsi ≤
∑
j qj , as all students find
































Let X be a random variable that gives a student randomly drawn according to η with corresponding
demand DX . Let the first-round cutoffs be P fi = 1−qi, let m (X,Γ) = 1{X∈SF (E)}DX
(
P f |η (Γ)
)
−




. Note that the esti-




def= ∑ki=1 α(DXi(P f |η(Γˆ))|X∈SF (E))k − qf = 0, and that the estimate



























|X 6∈ SF (E)
)
k


















and A = E [∇Γ (g (X, q,Γ∗)−m (X,Γ∗))]E [∇Γm (X,Γ∗)]−1 .




. Moreover cov (g (·) ,m (·))=var (m (·))
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and so

















=2αΣqf , this is equal to Σq+
2AΣqf
(
1 + 1αA
)T
as required.
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